The transcendental structure of the world by Bader, Ralf M.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD
Ralf M. Bader
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews
2011
Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1890
This item is protected by original copyright
T T S
  W
Ralf M. Bader
Ph.D. dissertation
University of St Andrews

I, Ralf M. Bader, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately ,
words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out
by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher
degree.
I was admitted as a research student in September  and as a candidate for the
degree of Ph.D. in September ; the higher study for which this is a record
was carried out in the University of St Andrews between  and .
Date:  May  Signature of candidate:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulﬁlled the conditions of the Resolution
and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of St An-
drews and that the candidate is qualiﬁed to submit this thesis in application for
that degree.
Date:  May  Signature of supervisor:
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that
we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with
the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to
any copyright vested in the work not being aﬀected thereby. We also understand
that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may
be made and supplied to any bona ﬁde library or research worker, that my the-
sis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by
award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to mi-
grate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access
to the thesis. We have obtained any third- party copyright permissions that may
be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the
appropriate embargo below.
e following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the elec-
tronic publication of this thesis:
Access to Printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University
of St Andrews.
Date:  May  Signature of candidate:
Signature of supervisor:
i
ii
A
is dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcen-
dental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood
as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that
are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by
means of a co-ordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. is frame-
work is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level
explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, mak-
ing intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persis-
tence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. e key
claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have
to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are pro-
vided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to
be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that inte-
grates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a
uniﬁed perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must
be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and
phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientiﬁc knowledge
of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical
and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as on-
tological structure of the world. e ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of
reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientiﬁc, metaphysical and
moral realism, thereby warding oﬀ the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation
of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of
those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness
can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a
law-governed external world. e conclusion then is that a realist stance is to
be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and
hold that the world has a transcendental structure.
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Introduction
To be a realist one has to be a transcendental idealist.
e world has a transcendental structure, a structure that it derives from the
noumenal realm. Without this structure, the world would be ontologically amor-
phous and would not even constitute a uniﬁed spatio-temporal manifold. Ac-
cordingly, there would not be an objective world and experience as well as science
would consequently be impossible. Moreover, this lack of ontological structure
would undermine the possibility of metaphysics and would imply that the meta-
physical presuppositions of ethics would not be met. e possibility of science,
metaphysics and ethics thus all crucially depend on the transcendental structure
of the world.
 : For there to be an objective world, for there to be a uniﬁed
spatio-temporal manifold, there must be transcendental structure. is
structure is necessary for connecting the fragmented perspective-dependent
spatio-temporal frameworks, thereby giving rise to a uniﬁed perspective-
independent physical space-time manifold (cf. ..). e transcendental
structure of the world consequently provides us with an objective world
that can be the subject of scientiﬁc investigation and hence provides the
subject matter of science. Additionally, if we are to gain knowledge of the
world, if we are to have access to objective facts, then theremust be substan-
tive correspondences between appearances and phenomena, there must be
certain features to which we have direct access and that are shared by the
subjective objects of which we are immediately aware and the intersubjec-
tive objects investigated by science. ese correspondences are provided
by the forms of intuition. Intuitive form, that is spatio-temporal form,
is required to yield non-trivial objective content, since logical form can
only underwrite cardinality claims. e forms of intuition consequently
allow us to discover the structure of the empirical world by providing us
with non-logical relations that do not need to be implicitly deﬁned and in
terms of which scientiﬁc theories can be stated, making objective knowl-
edge possible and allowing science to be non-trivial (cf. ..).

 : For metaphysics to be possible, there must be ontologi-
cal structure that can be cognised by us. is requires there to be transcen-
dental structure since the phenomenal realm is ontologically amorphous
when considered on its own and can only be said to be structured in rela-
tion to the noumenal realm that grounds it. By accepting non-empirical
grounds of phenomena we can make room for non-empirical features at
the phenomenal level that provide this realm with ontological structure
(cf. .). In addition, if we are to cognise these non-empirical features,
we need to have the requisite conceptual resources, namely a priori cate-
gories. ere must be non-empirical concepts that allow us to latch onto
the non-empirical features and cognise ontological structure. Finally, we
must be able to provide transcendental arguments, if we are to identify
metaphysical constraints that the world must satisfy, thereby enabling us
to identify its metaphysical structure (cf. .). All of these conditions for
vindicating metaphysics can be met by accepting a noumenal realm that
grounds phenomena and by accepting that we have pure concepts of the
understanding, namely the categories.
 : For moral requirements to be objectively valid and applicable to
us, the metaphysical presuppositions of ethics must be satisﬁed. In particu-
lar, if we are to understand ourselves as uniﬁed agents who persist through
time, who can be eﬃcacious by acting on maxims that we have freely incor-
porated and who can be responsible for our deeds, then we must be able to
accommodate a substantive conception of the self, as well as an intelligible
notion of causal eﬃcacy that can feature in agent causation. Since these
presuppositions require there to be transcendental structure, it follows that
being a moral realist equally requires one to be a transcendental idealist (cf.
. & ..).
Transcendental idealism thusmakes room for transcendental structure and thereby
vindicates science, metaphysics and ethics, allowing us to be realists about these
domains. In particular, it allows us to claim that science is non-trivial and reveals
to us the structure of the world, that the world is not ontologically amorphous
but has ontological structure that can be cognised and discovered by us, as well
as that we are bound by categorical moral requirements, can act freely and be
genuinely responsible for our actions.
Since its initial formulation by Kant, there has been much debate as to the
nature, cogency and merit of transcendental idealism. is dissertation proposes
a systematic understanding of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. It pro-
vides a description of the fundamental ontology that it implies, giving an account
of the diﬀerent kinds of objects that exist, the status that they possess and the
relations that hold between them. is analysis follows the epistemic order, be-

ginning with what is subjectively given, namely appearances, and then moving
on to what exists intersubjectively, namely phenomena. is ontology will then
be utilised for providing dual-level explanations and transcendental arguments.
Since this is a project in systematic metaphysics, it is rather explorative and
speculative in nature. It attempts to provide a sketch of a metaphysical system
and identify its main contours. A great deal of emphasis will be placed on the
explanatory power that the system possesses and the problems it can solve. is,
of course, means that many details still need to be ﬁlled in and that many assump-
tions and presuppositions still need to be defended, but these tasks will have to
wait for other occasions.
While this project has a distinctly Kantian character in virtue of the starting-
point from which it begins, as well as in virtue of some of the principles, distinc-
tions and methods to which it appeals, it is not an exercise of exegesis. Instead,
it is an attempt at a critical and systematic reconstruction of transcendental ide-
alism. I believe that transcendental idealism has live philosophical currency and
can solve a number of important philosophical problems. I take Kant’s work as
a point of departure, rather than treating it as the analysandum. Since I am not
engaging in textual or historical analysis, I would like this work to be judged not
on interpretative grounds, but purely on its philosophical merits.
e starting-point of this dissertation is the assumption that space and time
are forms of intuition and that there exists amind-independent reality (the noume-
nal world) that has a causal impact on us (noumenal aﬀection). To say that space
and time are forms of intuition is to say that space and time are mental frame-
works that result from the constitution of our minds. ey are our contribution
to the world and are not mind-independent features of reality.
It is important to note that the mind-dependence of space and time is re-
stricted to intuitive space and time and not to formal or physical space and time.
ese types of space and time (as well as space-times) are not forms of intuition
but have a diﬀerent status.
: Formal spaces and times are abstract mathematical structures that are
axiomatically speciﬁed and that hold of all those things that satisfy the
axioms. e non-logical terms appearing in the axioms (such as point, line
or plane) are improper concepts that are implicitly deﬁned by the axiomatic
system. Accordingly, there is no connection to anything outside the system,
there is nothing to which the system has to conform and coherence is the
only criterion that an axiomatic system has to satisfy.
: Physical space-times are relational structures within which empiri-
cal objects are embedded. As we will see below, we can distinguish be-
tween perspective-dependent spatio-temporal structures and perspective-
independent physical space-time. Neither the perspective-dependent nor

the perspective-independent structures are forms of intuition. ey are
rather logical complexes that are constructed out of the spatio-temporal
relations of intuitive space and time.
: While formal space and time are not in any sense distinctively spa-
tial or temporal, but hold of anything satisfying the axioms, intuitive space
and time are characterised by distinctively spatial and temporal features.
ey are subjective mental frameworks that allow us to represent and or-
der the contents of awareness. ey are the frameworks that structure our
perception and representation of reality.
It should be noted that none of the arguments put forward in this dissertation rely
on intuitive space and time having any particular structural properties, but only
on them being forms of intuition that have some structure or other. I do believe,
however, that intuitive space is in fact Euclidean and that this can be established
on the basis that (i) Euclidean space is the only space that allows for non-isometric
similarity mappings, and that (ii) pure intuition allows us to construct geomet-
rical shapes by following general rules or schemata, the application of which is
invariant across all spatial regions, thereby not only giving rise to a requirement
of free rotation which implies a Riemannian geometry, as well as a requirement
of free mobility which implies a Riemannian geometry of constant curvature, but
also a requirement of free construction which implies a Riemannian geometry of
constant curvature that is globally Euclidean.
e existence of intuitive space and time is simply taken for granted and no
direct support is provided for this assumption. It should be noted, however, that
the following considerations speak in favour of this assumption: (i) it allows us
to make sense of synthetic a priori knowledge of the global structure of intuitive
space and time, of the global structure of perspective-dependent physical spatio-
temporal frameworks as well as of the inﬁnitesimally Euclidean local structure
of perspective-independent physical space-time (cf. ..), (ii) it allows us to
make room for objective knowledge since the Newman problem establishes that
logical structure is not suﬃcient for yielding non-trivial content and that we need
spatio-temporal structure that must be accessible to intuition (cf. ..), (iii)
it allows us to avoid the Antinomies (cf. ..), (iv) it allows us to develop a
metaphysical system that has vast explanatory power and enables us to underwrite
the metaphysical presuppositions of Kantian ethics (cf. . & .), (v) it allows
us to give transcendental arguments and gain synthetic a priori knowledge of the
ontological structure of reality (cf. .).
Intuitive space and time are accordingly to some extent analogous to what are frequently
described in contemporary discussions as phenomenal space and time.

C : Given that space and time are subjective forms of intuition, it
follows that there are subjective spatio-temporal frameworks populated by sub-
jective objects of which we are immediately aware and with which we are ac-
quainted, namely appearances. ese objects are intentional objects that arise as
a result of the process of intuition. Noumenal aﬀection provides a manifold of
intuition to noumenal selves that is then processed. e processing of the infor-
mation contained in this manifold is guided by the forms of intuition and can be
broken down into three sub-processes, namely imposition, selection and transla-
tion. Spatio-temporal frameworks are imposed by us. e information provided
by noumenal aﬀection is selected for compatibility with these forms and the se-
lected information is then translated into the frameworks. at is, we translate a
selected manifold into imposed forms of intuition.
On the proposed account, representational media are noumenal and inten-
tionalia are sui generis subjective entities that are immanent to acts of awareness.
is view is required to respond to various challenges concerned with the tem-
porality and reality of representations. Once we accept the ideality of the forms
of intuition we have to deal with the problem of making sense of the temporality
and reality of representations. On the one hand, it seems as if representations
are in time, which is problematic since temporality would then not merely be a
feature of the way things are represented to be but would pertain to how things
really are. Time would consequently be real rather than ideal. On the other hand,
it seems that whilst we can reduce various aspects of the world to representations,
representations themselves cannot be reduced in this way but have to be consid-
ered to be transcendentally real. e solution to these problems requires us to
adopt an intentional object view of appearances that is combined with the claim
that the representational medium through which the intentional object is given
is itself noumenal.
C : In addition to the subjective realmsmade up of intentionalia that
are peculiar to particular subjects, there is also an intersubjective empirical realm,
consisting of the intersubjective correlates of appearances, namely phenomena.
e phenomenal world is objective for us and we can discover its structure by
means of scientiﬁc investigation. It is empirically real since it is determined jointly
by the absolutely real noumenal realm and the intersubjective forms of intuition.
e matter of phenomena is absolutely objective, whilst the forms of intuition
are mind-dependent features that are essentially shared by cognitive beings like
us and are consequently objective for us. While noumena are absolutely objective
and while appearances are only subjectively objective, phenomena are intersub-
jectively objective.
Phenomena are not emergent existents but are logical constructs that have
translated noumenal information as elements. We have an informational man-
ifold that encapsulates noumenal properties and that enters into a constructive

process leading to a logical complex. Accordingly, the phenomenal realm em-
bodies translated noumenal information. Phenomena and noumena encapsulate
the same information, once in a translated form and once in its pure original vari-
ant. e phenomenal realm is hence dependent on the noumenal realm since it is
nothing other than an informational manifold that results from a process which
takes noumenal information as its input. e noumenal realm is thus the ground
of the phenomenal realm and phenomena are reducible to noumenal features via
the forms of intuition. is dependence relation can be captured in quasi-formal
terms. In particular, we can use co-ordinated multiple-domain supervenience re-
lations to model the determination and dependence relations between noumena
and phenomena, whereby the co-ordination relation is to be identiﬁed with the
process of intuition.
C : e fact that phenomena are grounded in noumena allows us to
provide dual-level explanations that explain metaphysical features of phenomena
in terms of features of their underlying noumenal grounds. Such explanations
identify explanatory connections between the diﬀerent realms, that owe their
existence to the grounding relation. In this way we can make room for non-
empirical properties and provide ontological structure to the phenomenal realm.
While the phenomenal realm fails to be structured intrinsically, it turns out to be
structured in relation to noumena.
Once these metaphysical features have been made intelligible, we can appeal
to theoretical and practical transcendental arguments to show that these features
are necessary preconditions of the possibility of experience and morality, respec-
tively. Since only transcendental idealism permits us to make intelligible the
preconditions of experience and morality, it follows that one must either reject
the reality of experience and morality or accept transcendental idealism. While
transcendental realists accept the antecedents of the conditionals established by
these transcendental arguments, they lack the requisite explanatory resources to
account for the consequents. Accordingly, we can see that we either have to deny
the antecedents and be nihilists and sceptics or accept transcendental idealism.
is then shows that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists.

Chapter 
Appearances
eworld reveals itself to us in perception. It reveals itself to us not as it is in itself
but only as it appears to us. By means of perception we become aware of what the
world is like for us. at of which we are aware is a world of appearances and not
a world of things in themselves. is is due to the fact that perception/intuition
has two components. On the one hand, there is that which derives from the
world (the manifold, the matter). On the other, there is that which derives from
us (the forms). What is conveyed to us by the world is the manifold of intuition.
What is provided by us is the forms of intuition. Together, form and matter
determine what the world is like for us. Together, they determine that of which
we are aware. is means that the forms of intuition mediate our awareness of the
world, ensuring that we are aware only of appearances (matter-in-form) and not
of things in themselves. Given that all our awareness is mediated by our forms
of intuition, it follows that our awareness is restricted to appearances and that we
lack direct access to things-in-themselves. We are always only given matter-in-
form and never the matter as it is in itself.
. e process of intuition
“[E]xperience is not a free composition, but rather a translation into
the diction of space and time of a text framed in another idiom”
(Findlay: , p. ).
In intuition, the world provides matter that is subjected to forms. Appearances
result from a process in which the noumenal self translates selected input pro-
vided by noumenal aﬀection into imposed frameworks. is process begins with
noumenal aﬀection, whereby a subject is provided with a manifold of intuition.
is manifold is then taken up, ordered, processed and synthesised in accordance
with the forms of intuition. e output of this process consists of noumenal
representations that have ordered and structured contents and of which we can

become aware in a temporal manner by means of an act of reﬂexive awareness.
e processing of the manifold can be broken down into three component sub-
processes, namely () imposition, () selection, and () translation.
e structure of the mind is characterised by certain mental frameworks,
namely by the forms of intuition. ese frameworks are imposed on the manifold
of intuition. e imposition of the frameworks explains whywe have a distinction
between noumena, on the one hand, and appearances as well as phenomena, on
the other. is is the distinction between things that exist in themselves indepen-
dently of our conditions of experience and things that result from the interaction
between the forms of intuition and the manifold of intuition. It is because we
impose the form of intuition on the manifold that we can distinguish between,
on the hand, the manifold as it is in itself and, on the other, the translated man-
ifold that is ordered in the forms of intuition. Since the forms of intuition are
mere forms of intuition and consequently do not apply to the manifold as it is
in itself, it follows that the matter that has been translated into these forms is
transcendentally ideal when it is considered as matter-in-form.
Given that these frameworks are imposed on the manifold, it follows that
there is a selection process which involves selecting those features of the man-
ifold that are translatable into the frameworks that our minds impose. All the
information contained in the manifold that is incommensurable with our forms
of intuition and that cannot ﬁt into the translation function is ﬁltered out. at
is, a selection or ﬁltering process takes place insofar as only those aspects of the
manifold that are compatible with the frameworks and that can be translated into
them are processed.
It is important to note that we do not impose properties, but only impose
frameworks into which the information contained in the manifold of intuition
is translated. We neither impose properties on objects, nor do objects simply
happen to conform to the conditions under which we can represent them. In-
stead, they happen to be constituted in such a way that it becomes possible for us
to translate the information that they provide into our frameworks. We do not
make them conform, but we impose the frameworks into which this information
happens to be translatable. We do not ﬁlter or select only those things which
have the properties that conform to our conditions of representation. Instead,
we impose our frameworks, select those things that are amenable to translation
and then translate the selected manifold into these frameworks.
e selection process explains the possibility of transcendent (as opposed to
transcendental) objects and properties. A transcendent property is either a prop-
erty that does not contribute to the manifold of intuition and is not reﬂected
therein, or it is a property that provides a manifold that is incompatible with the
forms of intuition and is not amenable to translation. e manifold provided by
the latter kind of transcendent property gets ﬁltered out and does not play any
role in the process by which phenomena arise. Transcendental properties, on the

contrary, provide information that is amenable to translation and that belongs to
that part of the manifold which is processed and translated into our frameworks.
Transcendental objects then are objects that have transcendental properties that
play a role in determining what the world is like for us, by giving rise to a man-
ifold that is amenable to translation, while transcendent objects are objects that
only have transcendent properties.
e ﬁltering that results from the imposition of the forms of intuition thus
makes room for the possibility of transcendent objects and properties. ese
transcendent properties include properties, such as freedom, that cannot be ex-
perienced, but which we must nonetheless posit from a practical point of view.
ough we do not have knowledge of them, there is room for the possibility of
their existence and this room is provided by opening up the possibility of noume-
nal reality going beyond transcendental reality, that is, by allowing for the logical
possibility of transcendent reality.
Information contained in the manifold that is compatible with the forms
of intuition is translated into these forms. e selected manifold is translated
and ordered in space and time. is translation turns the manifold provided by
noumena, i.e. the matter of intuition, into appearances, i.e. matter-in-form.
e translation function explains why intuition is not arbitrary but reveals what
the world is like for us. While the structure of the mind prescribes that outer
objects must have a spatial location, a temporal location and an intensive magni-
tude, the mind does not arbitrarily determine these properties but is constrained
by the noumenal object. e structure of the mind provides spatio-temporal
frameworks and determines that phenomena must be spatial and temporal, but
noumena then determine what the particular spatio-temporal relations are. While
we ensure that phenomena are in space and time, noumena ensure the particular
way in which they are in space and time.
We do not randomly construct the spatial and temporal properties of appear-
ances and do not represent things in a way that does not have any basis in how
noumena are, but are constrained by the objects. e relation between appear-
ances and noumenal objects is marked by necessity, as it is the objects that stop
our appearances from being arbitrary but make them the way they are, thereby
providing objectivity to them. Yet, this does not imply that transcendental objects
have spatial and temporal properties. It is not the case that the noumenal objects
are in space and time independently of our mental activities and that we sim-
ply intuit their spatial and temporal properties. Rather, the manifold provided
by the objects is somehow intrinsically ordered, without it having any spatial or
temporal properties. is intrinsic ordering is then translated into our forms of
intuition, by which process the matter of the manifold, i.e. the information con-
tained therein, is turned into the world of appearances.
Accordingly, the properties of appearances are not in any way fake. ey
are not imposed by us onto the object. Instead of being imposed by us, the

properties derive from the manifold of intuition and are objectiﬁed for us by our
forms of experience since they are translated into these frameworks. It is only
subjective additions and transformations that are peculiar to particular subjects
that are imposed, such as secondary properties and properties that are imagined
or hallucinated. Only these properties of appearances are fake and lack reality.
.. Inner and outer intuition
is schematic account of the process of intuition applies to both outer and inner
intuition. e distinction between outer intuition and inner intuition is con-
cerned with the source of the manifold of intuition, distinguishing between a
scenario in which the manifold is provided by an object that is distinct from the
self and a case in which the manifold derives from the self itself.
In the case of outer intuition, it is a noumenal object that aﬀects the noume-
nal self and provides it with a manifold of intuition. e form of intuition that
is imposed and into which this manifold is translated is the form of outer intu-
ition, namely space. is process yields a spatially ordered content. In the case of
inner intuition, it is the noumenal self that aﬀects itself and provides itself with a
manifold of intuition. e form that is imposed and into which this manifold is
translated is the form of inner intuition, namely time. is process yields a tem-
porally ordered content. us, in each case, we have a manifold of intuition that
is provided to the noumenal self. is manifold is then processed either by the
form of outer sense, if the manifold derives from an object that is transcendentally
external, or by the form of inner sense, if the manifold is due to the noumenal
self itself. We then end up with a noumenal mental state with an ordered and
processed content.
By means of a reﬂexive act of awareness the self can become aware of the
contents of its representations. is process activates the representation leading to
the emergence of an appearance, that is, of an intentional object that is immanent
to the act of awareness. ese intentionalia are the immediate objects of our
awareness. ey are subjective objects that exist for the subject and with which
only the subject is acquainted.
is allows us to provide a dual-level account of the content of the mind.
As regards the noumenal level, it is inner and outer intuition that determine or
produce the noumenal mental states, the modiﬁcations of the noumenal mind.
It is by means of apperception that we can then gain a reﬂexive awareness of the
content of noumenal mental states, bringing this content to the level of con-
Itmight seem objectionable to claim that noumenal representations have spatial and temporal
content. Yet, this is not problematic since nothing in the noumenal realm is in space or time.
It simply is the case that the content of noumenal representations is spatially and temporally
structured. Moreover, we only know representations as they appear to us and do not know what
their content is like independently of the form of inner sense. All we know is that the content is
structured in such a way as to appear to us thus and so.

sciousness. Appearances are thus the result of a two-stage process. In the case of
outer appearances the manifold is ﬁrst translated to yield a spatial representational
content and is afterwards temporalised when the self becomes reﬂexively aware
of the content of that representation. In the case of inner appearances the man-
ifold is ﬁrst translated to yield a temporal representational content and is then
temporalised as a result of an act of reﬂexive awareness.
Inner sense Outer sense
Appearances
Noumenal mental statesNoumenal
Phenomenal
inner intuition outer intuition
reflexive
awareness
.. Reﬂexive awareness
Apperception is reﬂexive awareness of the content of representations. By means
of apperception, the mind reﬂects on its own representations. As a result, it does
not become aware of these representations, but rather via them becomes aware in
a temporalised manner of the intentional content of the representations. When
we are aware, we are aware not of the representation itself but of that which is
represented. We are aware of the intentional object that is represented and not of
the mental entity that is doing the representing. In order for us to be aware of the
representation, it would have to feature as the object of another representation.
It itself would have to be represented in a representing. Accordingly, representa-
tions do not feature in the content of awareness. ey are not the things of which
we are aware. Instead, we are aware of the intentional objects that these represen-
tations represent. e immediate objects of awareness are thus intentional objects
rather than the representational media through which these intentional objects
are given.
is kind of apperception is empirical in nature and has to be distinguished from transcen-
dental apperception. e latter is consciousness of the activity of the determining self. e former
is consciousness of the temporalised content of noumenal mental states.

ough there is a mediating state, i.e. a representation, we are nonetheless
immediately aware of the content of our representations. is is because we are
not aware of the content by being aware of the medium, but are aware of the
content via the medium. As a result, intentional objects are the immediate objects
of awareness. It is not the case that we are aware of the mediating state and then
via it of the intentional object. Rather, awareness is only of the intentional object.
e intentional object is given through the medium, rather than in the medium.
Instead of being in the medium, it is in the awareness. e intentional object
is immanent to the act of awareness, while this awareness is achieved through
the representational medium since the object is given through the content of the
representation.
Given that apperception is subject to the form of inner sense, it follows that
our awareness of the content of the noumenal representations is mediated by
the form of inner sense. Accordingly, we are not aware of the content of the
representation as it is in itself, but are only aware of it as it is mediated by this form,
as it appears to us. at is, the content of the representationalmedium ismediated
when it is apperceived and it is this mediated content which forms the content of
our awareness and which is immanent to the act of awareness. is means that
apperception produces a temporalised awareness of the representational content
of noumenal mental states.
e intentional objects that result from this process can be both inner and
outer. We have an inner appearance if the noumenal mental state is the result of
inner intuition, andwe have an outer appearance if the noumenalmental state was
produced by outer intuition. Accordingly, both internal and external objects are
immediate objects of perception, given that ‘internal’ and ‘external’ are taken in
the empirical and not the transcendental sense. Whenwe are aware of an external
object, it is not simply the case that we have a representation of an external object.
Instead, we are immediately aware of an external object existing in space. is
is possible because external objects are mind-dependent intentional objects that
exist in subjective spatio-temporal frameworks. As a result, we have direct access
to the external world, even though this external world is a subjective world, given
that space and time are subjective mental frameworks.
While all representational media through which appearances are given are
noumenal, it is important to note that some appearances are themselves repre-
sentations. ese are inner appearances that result from the reappropriation of
mental content by means of inner intuition. In such cases, the appearance of
which we are aware is a phenomenal representation. e noumenal representa-
tion itself has a representation as its objects, i.e. its content is another represen-
tation. Such a noumenal representation results from inner intuition understood
as reappropriation, whereby a mental state becomes the object of another mental
An object is external in the empirical sense if it exists in space. It is external in the transcen-
dental sense if it is distinct from the subject.
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state. A mental state had by the self is reappropriated and becomes the object of
an inner intuition.
We thus have to distinguish between two notions of inner sense. First, there
is that whereby we become reﬂexively aware of the contents of our noumenal
representations. is kind of empirical apperception does not produce any rep-
resentations, any noumenal entities with representational content, but is that by
means of which we become aware of the content of the representations we have.
Instead of producing new representations, it produces a temporalised awareness
of the content of noumenal representations. Second, there is that whereby we
reappropriate mental states. is process of reappropriation produces noumenal
representations by inwardly intuiting a representation that we already have. We
can then become reﬂexively aware of the content of these noumenal represen-
tations, which amounts to becoming aware of inner appearances. In short, we
can distinguish between inner sense as the reﬂexive awareness of the content of
noumenal mental states and inner sense as the reappropriation of mental states.
Both forms of inner sense are subject to time. In the case of apperception, it
is the contents of noumenal representations that are temporalised, whereas in the
case of inner intuition, it is the contents of phenomenal representations that are
ordered in time.
Apperception involves the temporalised awareness of the contents of noume-
nal representations. By means of apperception we become reﬂexively aware of
the content of noumenal representations and this awareness is subject to time.
Reﬂexive awareness produces a temporalised awareness of the intentional objects
insofar as it makes us aware of appearances as existing ‘now’, whereby the tem-
poral determination ‘now’ applies to both inner and outer appearances. at is,
we are aware of spatial objects as well as of our phenomenal representations as
existing ‘now’ since these are the contents of the noumenal representations that
are being apperceived.
While the phenomenal representations of which we are aware are assigned
the temporal position ‘now’ by apperception, their content is temporally ordered
as a result of the process of intuition. Phenomenal representations are higher-
order representations and their content is ordered in time as a result of having the
form of intuition imposed on the manifold that is inwardly intuited. at is, in-
ner intuition results in higher-order representations that have temporally ordered
content. is temporal ordering of the contents of phenomenal representations
is analogous to the way in which the manifold of outer intuition is ordered in
space. In the case of space, it is the contents of noumenal representations that are
spatialised by assigning spatial positions and relations to the intentional objects
of these representations. In the case of time, it is the contents of phenomenal rep-
resentations that are temporalised by assigning temporal positions and relations
to the (higher-order) intentional objects of these representations.
Given this understanding of reappropriation, it follows that there are higher-

order representations. at is, there are representations which represent things
that represent further things. ese are noumenal representations that have phe-
nomenal representations as their intentional objects, which in turn have other
objects as their intentional objects. Such higher-order representations may seem
to be problematic since there appears to be an “absurdity . . . in the idea that one
item can be an object of awareness to another that is itself merely an intention-
alium [sic]. at would be like saying the ﬁgments of my dreams have dreams
of their own” (van Cleve: , p.  footnote ). While it seems wrong
to say that dreams can have dreams, it does not appear to be problematic to say
that one can dream having dreams. e higher-order dreams must be contained
in the lower-order dreams had by the subject. ere can be no free-ﬂoating or
autonomous dreams. Similarly, there can be no free-ﬂoating or autonomous in-
tentionality. at is, the original noumenal representation must represent other
things as representing things.
Making time the form of awareness of the intentional content of noumenal
representations allows us to make sense of the temporality of outer objects. Given
that time is the form of inner sense, it would seem to follow that only the objects
of inner sense are ordered in time. Accordingly, it would be diﬃcult to explain
how objects of outer sense can be in time. Given that outer objects are objects of
outer and not of inner sense, it would seem to be unclear how one can claim that
they are in time. Time would then apply only to phenomenal representations of
outer objects, rather than to outer objects themselves.
By claiming that time is the form of the reﬂexive awareness of the content of
noumenal representations, we can avoid these unpalatable consequences. Insofar
as time is a feature of awareness, it pertains directly to all those things of which
we are aware. us, since reﬂexive awareness is subject to time, it follows that
everything of which we are aware is in time. Since we are aware of the intentional
objects of our representations and since these intentional objects are appearances,
it follows that all appearances are in time. is applies equally to inner as well as
to outer appearances.
. Appearances as intentional objects
e account we have developed so far can be summarised as follows. e noume-
nal self is aﬀected and provided with a manifold of intuition. is manifold is
processed to yield a noumenal representation, a mental state or modiﬁcation of
the mind. Apperception then leads to awareness of the temporalised content of
the mental states. us, representations are noumenal mental states that arise as
a result of noumenal aﬀection, while the intentional objects which they represent
is obviously presupposes that appearances that are representations can have intentionality.
is presupposition can be defended by means of an analogy, namely that pictures within pictures
can represent something in the same way that pictures themselves are representational.
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and of which can become aware are appearances.
e reason for regarding representational media as being noumenal and for
treating appearances as intentional objects is that we would otherwise not be
able to deal with two structurally analogous challenges that would undermine
the whole of transcendental idealism. e ﬁrst problem concerns the temporality
of representations, while the second problem concerns the reality of representa-
tions. ese problems show that the representational media through which the
objects of awareness are given have to be noumenal. e objects that are given
through them and of which we are immediately aware then need to be consid-
ered as intentional objects. ese intentional objects emerge when the noumenal
mental states are activated by a reﬂexive act, leading to an awareness of the inten-
tional objects. e intentionalia are immanent to the act of awareness, whereby
our awareness is essentially temporal given that time is the form of inner sense.
.. e temporality of representations
One of the most serious challenges to transcendental idealism is the objection that
time cannot be ideal and a mere form of intuition since intuitions or representa-
tions change which implies that their change is real, which in turn requires time
to be real. is objection was already formulated in the s by Mendelssohn,
Lambert and Schultz in response to Kant’s claim in the Inaugural Dissertation
of  that “Time is not something objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor
an accident, nor a relation. Time is rather the subjective condition which is nec-
essary, in virtue of the nature of the human mind, for the co-ordinating of all
sensible things in accordance with a ﬁxed law. It is a pure intuition” (:).
More carefully, the objection runs as follows. Appearances are represented
to stand in spatio-temporal relations. But what about the representations them-
selves? Do representations exist in time, or are they merely represented to be
existing in time? It seems that we face a dilemma. On the one hand, we can ac-
cept that representations are only represented to be in time. In this case we need
further representations doing the representing, leading us to an inﬁnite regress
or a vicious circle. On the other hand, we can accept that representations are
actually in time and change in time. In this case, however, we are committed to
viewing time as more than a form of intuition.
J. H. Lambert’s criticisms are to be found in a letter to Kant from . October , as well
as in a review of Herz’s defence of Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation. M. Mendelsohn’s objection is in
a letter to Kant dated . December . J. Schultz put forward a similar objection in his review
of the Inaugural Dissertation, which was published in the Konigsbergische gelehrte und politische
Zeitungen in two parts (Vol. , Friday . November  and Vol. , Monday . November
).
Kant tried to respond to these criticisms in the Transcendental Aesthetic (cf. A-/B-).
e same problem is also noted by McTaggart at the end of his article on the unreality of
time. “And how are we to deal with the appearance itself? If we reduce time and change to

To deal with this problem, we need to claim that representations are noumenal
and therefore outside of time. While appearances are represented to be temporal
and are represented to be changing in time, representations themselves are not in
time and do not change. Only the intentional objects of these representations are
in time because they are represented to be in time, because we are aware of them in
a temporal manner. Since we can be aware of both inner and outer appearances,
and since inner appearances are representations, it follows that we can be aware
of representations that are in time. ese representations, however, are merely
phenomenal representations that are intentional objects of atemporal noumenal
representations. In other words, it is not that which is doing the representing that
is in time, but only that which is represented that is in time, which in these cases
happen to be phenomenal representations.
If things are represented as being in time, without the representations being in
time, then we need a distinction between the representations and that which they
represent. is is a conclusive reason for rejecting a sense-datum approach since
the sense-datum is the mental item of which we are aware. Instead, we should ac-
cept an intentionalist approach, whereby we have representations which represent
things to us. Mental states are representational media that have intentionality.
e intentional objects which these mental states represent are the appearances
of which we are aware. Representations have intentional objects and in being
aware of a representation one is aware of the intentional object.
e source of the problem can be clariﬁed by considering the case of space.
According to transcendental idealism, x is next to y iﬀ x is represented as being
next to y. is means that the represented x is next to the represented y, but it
does not mean that x and y in themselves are spatially related. In the temporal
case, x is prior to y iﬀ x is represented as being prior to y. is means that the
represented x is prior to the represented y. But, again, it does not mean that x
and y in themselves are temporally related.
e spatial case is not problematic because representations themselves are not
spatial. e represented objects are represented to occupy spatial locations, while
representations themselves are not intuitively taken to be spatial entities. Ac-
cordingly, we can reduce space and spatial properties to something non-spatial,
namely features of representations. Spatiality will then simply be a feature of the
way things are represented to be and not of how they really are.
In the case of time we need to make sure that the represented objects are
represented to occupy temporal locations, without the representations themselves
having temporal locations. e problem of the temporality of representations
arises because it seems that representations themselves are temporal, that they
exist in time and change in time. Accordingly, it would seem that we cannot
appearance, must it not be to an appearance which changes and which is in time, and is not time,
then, shown to be real after all?” (McTaggart: , p. )
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treat time as an appearance, as merely a feature of the way we represent the world.
Since representations themselves are intuitively taken to be temporal entities, it
would seem to follow that temporality cannot be reduced to a feature of the way
things are represented to be. Instead, it would have to be a feature of how things
really are.
us, the diﬀerence between space and time is that while representations
themselves do not seem to be spatial entities, they do seem to be temporal enti-
ties. is ensures that we can unproblematically reduce space to representations
since these are non-spatial. Time, however, does not appear to be reducible in a
similar way due to the apparent temporality of representations.
is apparent temporality of representations needs to be denied. We have to
deny that representations are temporal entities that exist and change in time. In-
stead, we have to claim that representations, understood as modiﬁcations of the
mind, are noumenal and thus not in time. Only appearances are in time. is
means that only appearances of representations, that is, phenomenal representa-
tions, are in time, not the representations themselves. It is only the contents of
representations that are placed in the temporal framework, not the representa-
tions themselves. We do not place representations in time, but that which they
represent. at which is represented is structured in space and time. We are aware
of intentional objects as spatial and temporal. ey appear thus to us. ey are
arranged and ordered in the mental frameworks.
By making time the form of awareness, we are able to deal with the problem
of the temporality of representations. Time is merely a feature of the way we
represent the world, without representations themselves being in time. It is only
the intentional objects of which we are aware that are in time. e intentional
objects are spatial and temporal, but this does not mean that the mental entities
that function as the representational media are in time, which would be impossi-
ble given that they are noumenal. While representations qua mental entities are
outside of time, the contents of awareness are in time. It is not representations
that change but the contents of awareness. ings are represented as changing,
rather than there being representations that change.
Given that noumenal states do not change, the question arises as to how in-
tentionalia can change. ey can only change insofar as they are represented as
undergoing changes (cf. van Cleve: , Chapter ). On this picture one can
still account for representations being represented to be changing, namely insofar
as one is not concerned with noumenal representations or mental states, but with
phenomenal representations that are the intentional objects of noumenal repre-
sentations. ese phenomenal representations can be represented to be changing.
We can represent ourselves as having diﬀerent phenomenal representations at dif-
e same holds for the spatial framework since it is the contents of representations that are
spatially ordered, not the representations themselves.
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ferent times. is is why Kant is right in saying that we only know ourselves as
we appear and that an appreciation of this point is crucial for answering the ob-
jection against the subjectivity of time. We need to make representations into
appearances if they are allowed to change, that is, into intentional objects and
not into noumenal mental entities or states.
us, time is a modiﬁcation of how we perceive and represent things, not of
how things are. Time is not a feature of absolute reality, but is only a subjective
form of sensibility. It applies not to representations, but to our awareness of
representations. As Wittgenstein said, the self is not part of the world but is the
limit of the world (cf. Wittgenstein: , x. & x.). e self is the self
with its representations since representations are modiﬁcations of the self. e
world is the spatio-temporal phenomenal world. Neither self nor representations
are spatio-temporal. Instead, the spatio-temporal world appears to the self, it is
the content of its representations.
.. e reality of representations
A similar problem to that concerned with the temporality of representations re-
gards the reality of representations. When reducing appearances to representa-
tions, the question quickly arises what the status of representations is. It seems
that they themselves cannot similarly be reduced, which would imply that they
cannot be appearances.
is problem was already raised by H. A. Pistorius who claimed that it was
diﬃcult for him “to convince himself that the sensations that are given in time
are equally mere phenomena as the intuitions given in space, because he could
not overcome the diﬃculty that as soon as our inner sensations or representations
would have to be not things in themselves but appearances, nothing other than
appearance would be there and no real object would remain to which something
would appear” (Pistorius: , p. ). It is not clear “how it is possible to think
that representations, which we always have to presuppose as real or as things in
themselves if one wants to explain how an appearing is possible, can themselves
be mere appearance and what that then is whereby and wherein this appearance
exists?” (Pistorius: , pp. -)
More precisely, we want to say that objects in space and time are not things
in themselves but are merely inner as well as outer appearances. is can be
achieved quite straightforwardly when dealing with outer objects. Such objects
can be treated as appearances that are somehow reduced to representations. ey
are objects that appear in the representations. ere being an outer object that
As a result, no awareness or consciousness is to be found in the phenomenal world. Instead,
the world is to be found inside the awareness. We can only ﬁnd the correlates of consciousness,
not consciousness itself.
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appears to us, amounts to us having a representation of an outer object. e
problem now is that inner objects, i.e. representations, do not seem to be re-
ducible in this way, thereby threatening to undermine the claim that they are
merely appearances and not things in themselves. is appears to give rise to a
dilemma.
On the one hand, we cannot claim that representations are appearances. is
is because they would have to be reduced to other representations. ere would
have to be further representations wherein they would appear. But these further
representations would then have to be reduced as well. As a result, we would end
up with an inﬁnite regress or a vicious circle.
On the other hand, we cannot claim that representations are not appearances.
is is because representations are in time. Since time is a mere form of intuition,
it follows that that which is in time is transcendentally ideal. Hence, representa-
tions are transcendentally ideal and consequently have to be appearances. More-
over, it seems that we are aware of our representations and have knowledge of
them. Since we are ignorant of noumena, it would again seem to follow that
representations have to be appearances.
To solve this problem we need to claim again that there are both noumenal
and phenomenal representations. e former are atemporal and unknown, while
the latter are temporal and known. More precisely, we need to understand repre-
sentations as being real in order to make sense of appearances. Something appears
because there is a representation in which it appears. is means, however, that
the representations themselves cannot be appearances. Accordingly, we have to
accept that the representations through which things appear are real existents.
is, in turn, requires us to accept that representational media are noumenal,
while that which appears through them by an act of reﬂexive awareness is phe-
nomenal.
While it is true that representations are at some level irreducible, this is not
problematic since irreducibility only applies to noumenal representations. Con-
sequently, the irreducibility claim does not conﬂict with the fact that phenomenal
representations are appearances that exist in time. Phenomenal representations
are nothing but intentional objects of noumenal representations. ey are tempo-
ral appearances, while the noumenal representations through which they appear
are atemporal real existents.
Moreover, this does not undermine the claim that we are ignorant of noumena.
We only know the contents of the noumenal representations as they are mediated
by the forms of intuition and do not know those noumenal representations them-
selves. We are not aware of the representations themselves but only of the content
of the representations as this content appears to us having been mediated by the
form of inner sense. Since awareness of the representational content results from
empirical apperception and is thus necessarily temporal, it follows that we do not
know the content as it is in itself but only as it appears to us. It is because aware-
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ness is mediated by time that the intentional objects of noumenal representations
are heterogeneous from the contents of the noumenal representations. Given this
heterogeneity, we cannot gain knowledge of noumenal representations from our
knowledge of their temporalised intentional objects.
We can thus avoid the dilemma by noting that some representations are ap-
pearances and some representations are noumenal. On the one hand, by claiming
that we have noumenal representations, we can avoid the objection of an inﬁnite
regress or a vicious circularity. In this way we can reduce all appearances to tran-
scendentally real and irreducible noumenal representations. On the other, by
claiming that we have phenomenal representations, we can avoid the objection
of temporalising noumena and rendering them knowable. In this way we can
allow for the temporality and knowability of those representations of which we
are aware.
All of this ties in with Kantian anti-Cartesianism. No priority is given to the
inner realm. Instead, the inner and the outer are seen to be on a par. e inner
is only privileged in the sense that that which is transcendentally in me is di-
rectly known, which means that we epistemically privilege the subjective over the
objective. at is, the world of appearances is revealed to us by empirical apper-
ception, resulting in a direct acquaintance with this subjective world. Within this
subjective world, however, no distinction of status is made between the inner and
the outer. Only the transcendentally inner is privileged over the transcendentally
outer. e empirically inner and the empirically outer are treated in the same
way. Our knowledge of inner objects is of the same kind as that of outer objects.
In both cases we only know the appearances and in both cases these appearances
are known immediately.
. Perspectival fragmentalism
Our access to the world is essentially perspectival. We always view the world from
a particular perspective. We are aware of things as happening ‘now’ and as being
located relative to ‘here’. A perspective is a here-now occupied by a subject –
it is an I-here-now. Since appearances are subjective objects that have the fea-
tures that they are represented to have, it follows that appearances are essentially
perspectival and have an ineliminable indexical aspect.
Not only are appearances perspectival, they are also fragmented. e diﬀer-
ent perspectives that a subject occupies, as well as the diﬀerent contents of which
the subject is aware, are not ordered and do not stand in relations to each other.
In particular, they do not stand in spatial or temporal relations to each other and
thus do not constitute a temporal or spatial order. is fragmentation follows
e subject has to be understood as the transcendental and not the empirical subject.
For the rest of this section, we will ignore the spatial aspect and only focus on the temporal

from the ideality of time. Since time applies only to the content of awareness
and since all content is represented as existing ‘now’, it follows that all temporal
determinations, that result from time being the form of apperception, are ‘now’
determinations. Everything is happening ‘now’. Since there is a plurality of dif-
ferent now’s, none of which is privileged, we can see that this is not a version of
presentism, whereby only the privileged present exists. Instead, all these diﬀerent
now’s exist and are equally real, which means that we are dealing with a version of
fragmentalism. Since the only temporal determination resulting from the form
of awareness is the determination ‘now’, and since things are temporal only to
the extent to which they are represented to be temporal, we can see that all these
things that are happening at their respective now’s are fragmented and do not
stand in temporal relations to each other. e diﬀerent now’s do not constitute a
temporal order and do not belong to a common extended temporal framework.
More precisely, since time is a form of intuition that is imposed on the content
of awareness, it follows that awareness itself is not temporal and does not occur
in time. Only the content of awareness is placed in time. Time itself is part of
the content of awareness, namely the form of the content, rather than being the
medium in which awareness takes place. Put diﬀerently, temporal operators are
within the scope of awareness and qualify that of which one is aware, rather than
it being the case that awareness is within the scope of the temporal operators and
that these operators qualify the awareness itself and not only its content.
Given the perspectival nature of intuition, we are aware of appearances as
existing ‘now’. We are aware of the contents of our noumenal representations
as occurring in the present. Since awareness is not in time, it follows that there
is not a time at which one is aware. Hence, it is not the case that at t: I am
aware of x as happening ‘now’ and that at t’: I am aware of y as happening ‘now’.
Rather, temporality qualiﬁes the diﬀerent contents of awareness. Accordingly,
I am (atemporally) aware of x as happening ‘now’ and aware of y as happening
‘now’, without it being the case that I am aware of x and y as happening ‘now’
since these now’s are diﬀerent. Being ‘now’ or being present attaches to all these
diﬀerent contents.
All of these contents are real for the subject and all of them are happening
at their respective now’s. e diﬀerent now’s attaching to the contents of which
a subject is aware all exist for that subject. Each of these fragmented now’s is
equally real, rather than there being some privileged now. Since the diﬀerent
contents of which a subject is aware are only represented as occurring ‘now’ and
are not represented as standing in temporal relations, it follows that they are not
temporally ordered. Accordingly, one cannot say that content x is earlier than
content y or that y is earlier than x. ere simply are no facts about temporal
orderings or temporal relations amongst representings, amongst our appearances.
aspect.
For a discussion of fragmentalism, cf. Fine: , chapter .
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e diﬀerent now’s are not ordered but fragmented.
Even though our appearances are not temporally ordered, we can represent
temporal orders by means of higher-order representations. at is, it is only the
contents of our higher-order representations that are temporally ordered, and it is
bymeans of such representations that we can represent diﬀerent things as happen-
ing at diﬀerent times and as standing in temporal relations. Such representations
allow us to represent x as being earlier than y. In this way, temporal orderings
pertain to the contents of our higher-order representations. First-order represen-
tations are temporal insofar as we are aware of them as occurring ‘now’. Yet, an
extended temporal framework only comes into play when we are concerned with
higher-order representations. ese representations go beyond the ‘now’. Since
the contents of such higher-order representations can be assigned temporal loca-
tions that diﬀer from that of the occurrence of the representing itself, they allow
us to step outside the particular temporal perspective that is occupied when the
representing occurs. In this way, they allow us to represent temporal orderings
amongst the contents of diﬀerent such temporal perspectives, amongst diﬀer-
ent now’s. ey can integrate and order these now’s into a common framework,
thereby representing an extended temporal order.
us, we do not have temporal relations amongst ﬁrst-order intentional ob-
jects (appearances). Instead, temporal relations only pertain to the representa-
tional contents of second-order representations. Given that appearances do not
stand in temporal relations, it follows that these representations of temporal or-
derings cannot strictly speaking reﬂect an objective temporal ordering. ere are
no temporal relations amongst the appearances to which such higher-order repre-
sentations could correspond. Accordingly, representations of temporal orderings
would seem to turn out to be arbitrary and lack criteria of correctness.
ough appearances are not temporally ordered, representations of temporal
orderings can nevertheless be well-founded. Whether they are well-founded does
depend on matters of fact, but not on temporal matters of fact. Our representa-
tions of temporal orderings do not have to match an objective temporal ordering
since such an ordering does not strictly speaking exist. Instead, they have to re-
ﬂect objective priority/dependency relations amongst the events. e temporal
relations which feature in the content of higher-order representations should cor-
respond to the priority/dependency relations amongst the events that are being
represented. us, there exist a plurality of times, a plurality of now’s. ese,
however, do not stand in earlier/later relations to each other and are not tempo-
rally ordered. Instead, our ordering of them has to reﬂect priority/dependency
relations. ese priority/dependency relations then determine which earlier/later
representations are well-founded.
Accordingly, we can see that diﬀerent now’s are connected even though they
are not connected by means of temporal relations. ere are facts about how we
should represent temporal orderings, about how we should order the contents
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of our higher-order representations. In particular, the temporal ordering of the
contents of higher-order representations should reﬂect the dependency ordering
amongst the events that are represented by these higher-order representations.
Representations of temporal orders can be well-founded if they accurately reﬂect
the dependency order amongst the contents. Accordingly, it is not just a brute
fact that we should represent x as being earlier than y. Instead, there is something
that makes it the case that we should represent x and y in this order, rather than
another order. What makes this the case is that y depends on x. We should
represent x as being followed by y because this temporal ordering respects the
dependency ordering amongst the events. Hence, even though it is not the case
that x is earlier than y, we should nevertheless represent x as being earlier than y
since this way of representing the relation between x and y is well-founded and
reﬂects an objective fact.
. e status and nature of appearances
e outcome of the process of intuition is the world of appearances of which we
are aware. Appearances are matter-in-form. ey are the result of translating the
selected manifold into imposed forms. Given that each subject has his or her own
mental frameworks within which that person’s manifold is ordered, it follows that
that which is translated into these forms is equally subject-dependent. Put diﬀer-
ently, since intuitive space and time are subjective, it follows that those things of
which we are immediately aware and which are ordered in our spatio-temporal
frameworks, i.e. appearances, are subjective entities. ey are private entities that
only exist for the subject that is aware of them, the subject in whose subjective
spatio-temporal framework they are located. Whilst fragmentalism holds for the
appearances of which a subject is aware, relativism holds for the appearances of
diﬀerent subjects. Appearances only exist relative to the subject that has them
and do not exist for other people. eir existence or being is subject-relative and
is so to speak not intersubjectively available.
.. Subjectivity and intersubjectivity
It should be noted that though appearances are subjective objects, in the sense that
their existence is dependent on the particular subjects that are aware of them, they
can nonetheless be intersubjectively objective insofar as their features are deter-
mined not by peculiarities pertaining to particular subjects but only by features
We have just seen that, strictly speaking, there is no objective representation-independent
temporal or spatio-temporal order. Instead, what we have are facts about how we should repre-
sent spatio-temporal orderings. ere are facts about which representations of spatio-temporal
orderings are well-founded. For the remainder of this dissertation, I will be speaking loosely about
the ‘objective spatio-temporal order’ to refer to these well-foundedness facts.
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that are essentially shared. Put diﬀerently, even though their existence is subject-
dependent, they are not purely subjective in the sense of only having secondary
qualities, but can have primary qualities that correspond to what the world is like
for us.
is means that we need to distinguish the subjective into that which is de-
pendent on particular minds, in which case it is merely subjective, and that which
is dependent on features that are essentially shared by all minds of a certain kind,
in which case it is intersubjectively objective. at is, some subjective features
are shared by all selves of a certain kind, namely the forms of intuition and the
forms of thought. ese forms are subjective in the sense that they inhere in and
derive from the subject. ey are, however, intersubjectively objective since they
are essentially shared by all subjects of that kind. Other subjective features, on
the contrary, are not essentially shared in this way but are peculiar to particular
subjects and any sharing of these features is accidental.
e distinction between necessarily and contingently shared features allows us
to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. While primary qualities
are those qualities that are empirically real, secondary qualities are those qualities
that are empirically ideal, whereby to be empirically real is to be intersubjectively
objective and to be empirically ideal is to be merely subjective. us, while pri-
mary qualities are empirically real and depend only on mind-dependent features
that are necessarily shared, secondary qualities are empirically ideal and depend
on mind-dependent features that vary between diﬀerent cognitive subjects.
is account does not simply reduce to the problematic idea that “secon-
daries vary with observer and circumstance whereas the primaries are constant”
(van Cleve: , p. ). It is not a claim about the phenomenology of sec-
ondary qualities, but a claim about the source of the qualities. It is a claim that
is concerned with the question whether particular qualities derive from us and,
if so, whether they non-accidentally derive in the same way from all of us or
whether there can be diﬀerences between diﬀerent subjects. at is, we are con-
cerned with the question whether the mind-dependent source of the qualities is
essentially shared.
e diﬀerence between primary and secondary qualities thus results from the
generality of the kind of epistemic subject to which they are relativised. Primary
qualities are relative to our forms of intuition and are thus objective for us. is
intersubjectivity is not based on accidental agreement. It is not based on what
people simply happen to agree on, what beliefs or representations they happen
to share, but instead on features that are necessarily shared. Secondary quali-
ties, on the contrary, are relative to subjects with certain sensory systems and are
consequently subjective. ey do not arise from shared features that are inter-
subjectively objective but from contingent peculiarities of sensory systems that
are peculiar to particular subjects or only accidentally shared. Primary and sec-
ondary qualities thus have diﬀerent sources and hence diﬀer in ontological status.
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.. Emergent intentional inexistents
Not only are appearances subjective objects, they are also intentional objects. In
particular, they are intentional objects that emerge and that inexist. e reason
why we should accept the inexistence of intentionalia, rather than denying them
any substantive ontological status, is that this allows us to recognise the undeni-
able reality that must be granted to the immediate objects of our awareness. e
reality of the manifest image, of the given, of the immediate objects of aware-
ness, of that with which one is presented is too manifest and too immediate to
be deniable. If we are to respect the manifest reality of appearances, we need to
countenance diﬀerent forms of existence, in particular some kind of intentional
inexistence. We need to commit ourselves to there being diﬀerent kinds of exis-
tence, diﬀerent ways of being. Real existence can then be seen to be applicable to
noumena, while intentional inexistence applies to appearances.
Unlike phenomena, appearances are not mere logical constructs or logical
complexes but have some form of actual being. Since they are intentional objects,
they only have a lesser form of being than that enjoyed by noumena. Unlike a
noumenal mental state, an appearance is not a real existent or modiﬁcation of
a real existent. Instead, it is an intentional existent – a thing that exists in be-
ing represented. Moreover, unlike phenomena, they are emergent entities. ey
come into existence when the relevant episodes of awareness obtain since they are
immanent to the awareness. ey are not reducible to the representational media,
but feature as irreducible constituents of representings. While intentionalia inex-
ist and have being, they are nonetheless not fundamental entities but are rather
merely derivative entities. is is because they exist in virtue of there being an act
of awareness of which these intentionalia are the contents. ey are constituents
of the episodes of awareness in which they feature since they are nothing other
than the contents of those episodes of awareness. Intentional objects are thus
to be understood as emergent entities that result from representings. ey are
subjective objects or private entities that inexist.
Intentionalia are usually considered to be fully ﬂedged objects insofar as they
are understood either as the ordinary objects that are intended or as fully ﬂedged
intentional objects that may be non-existent or only inexistent. Since we have
argued that intentional objects result from representational media and since rep-
resentations are partial, we have to reject these traditional accounts and instead
consider intentional objects as partial and not fully determinate objects. Inten-
tionalia result from partial representations, given that we represent the world from
a particular point of view, and are consequently themselves only partial. Appear-
ances are thus not fully determinate objects but are intentional objects of partial
representations.
In this respect they are like ﬁctional objects since such objects only have those features the
ﬁction attributes to them or those which are entailed by the ﬁction, while it is indeterminate what
other properties they have. For example, if a ﬁction is about a human person, then it will follow
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e intentional object is represented by the representation and depends for
its existence on the representation. More precisely, the existence of an intentional
object is dependent on the representing, that is, on the representation joined with
apperception. is is because intentional objects require not only the represen-
tational medium, the determination of the mind. ey also require there to be
apperception by means of which the subject becomes aware of the content of the
noumenal representation. e representational medium needs to be activated by
means of reﬂexive awareness in order for the intentional object to emerge. is
implies that the intentional object only exists insofar as the subject is aware of
it. Since the act of reﬂexive awareness gives rise to the intentional object rather
than producing awareness of a pre-existing intentional object, it follows that this
object is immanent in the act of awareness, rather than in the representational
medium. Its inexistence is consequently dependent on the awareness in which
it is immanent. is means that intentional objects are neither immanent nor
transcendent to the noumenal representation in the ordinary sense. e inten-
tional object does not exist within the noumenal representation, nor does it exist
independently of that representation. Rather, it is immanent to the act of aware-
ness. e representation is the medium through which a temporalised awareness
of the intentional object is achieved, whereby that object is not separated from
the awareness. us, it is immanent in the mental act of awareness which arises
via the representational medium, but not immanent in that medium itself.
Intentional objects are entities that emerge out of representings. Since the rep-
resenting only creates the intentional object and not the phenomenon to which
this intentional object corresponds, we can still make sense of the idea that repre-
sentations represent independently given objects, rather than creating the objects
that they represent. us, the representation presents an intentional object to
the subject, whereby this intentional object corresponds to a phenomenon since
it has a phenomenon as its intersubjective correlate. Accordingly, we still have
an independently given object, namely the phenomenon that is represented by
us. It simply is the case that this object is not the immediate object of awareness.
Rather, what we are immediately aware of is the intentional object and this in-
tentional object is immanent to the act of awareness and consequently dependent
on the episode of awareness, on the particular representing in which it features.
that this ﬁctional object will have a height. However, while it possesses the determinable of having
a height, it lacks a determinate height as long as this is not speciﬁed by the ﬁction.
Accordingly, we should accept something along the lines of Brentano’s early understanding
of intentional objects. On this view, intentional objects are immanent and exist within the mental
act. is is opposed to a Husserlian view whereby the intentional object is separated from the
intending act.
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.. Ontologically amorphous appearances
Appearances result from translating the manifold of intuition that is provided by
the world into the forms of intuition. What we are aware of is a spatio-temporal
distribution of qualitative features that can be understood as phenomenological
intensive magnitudes. e world of appearances thus consists of extensive and in-
tensive magnitudes. Extensive magnitudes are spatio-temporal extensions, while
intensive magnitudes are qualitative features. In other words, we have sensory
qualities spread out in space and time. e only structure that is inherent in
the world of appearances is spatio-temporal structure. Spatio-temporal diﬀer-
ence grounds the distinctness of the qualitative features since these are partially
individuated by their spatio-temporal locations. While qualitative features are
structured in this way, there is no ontological structure. e distinctness of ob-
jects and the spatio-temporal boundaries of objects are not given to us and do not
feature in the world of appearances. We are only given the distinctness of qual-
itative features, but how these features are to be aggregated to constitute objects
is in no way settled.
is means that intentional objects are not reasonably well-deﬁned entities
corresponding to what we take to be ordinary objects. We do not have a plurality
of representations at any moment of time, representing diﬀerent but contempo-
raneous intentional objects. Intuition does not represent individual objects. We
are not given individual objects in perception. Instead, an intuition simply rep-
resents there being certain qualitative features located in certain spatio-temporal
regions. It represents the unindividuated and undiﬀerentiated qualitative char-
acteristics of the phenomenal world. ey are unindividuated in the sense that
they are not attributed to any individual objects. ey are not taken to be iden-
tical to or to be parts of substantive synchronic or diachronic entities. Rather
than attributing features to objects, it is merely represented that certain qualita-
tive features are distributed in a certain spatio-temporal manner. Accordingly,
what is represented can be captured by a purely adverbial account. at is, what
is represented is along the lines of ‘it is redly there’.
e world of appearances is ontologically amorphous and lacks ontological
structure. Appearances lack unity and do not classify as substantive individual ob-
jects. at which is represented contains no unities, no boundaries, no bundles,
no objects. Not only are no uniﬁed objects to be found in the world of appear-
ances, other ontological structure is missing as well. No causality and nomodality
are to be found there either. e world of appearances is accordingly completely
devoid of ontological structure. All that is given to us is the way things are for a
particular subject at a particular time. ings simply are as they are represented
by intuition and intuition does not represent causal or modal properties and re-
lations. Since the world of appearances is to be identiﬁed with the intentional
objects of which a subject is aware, it follows that the features of the intentional
objects exhaust the features of that world. Since intentional objects only possess
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those features that have been speciﬁed by the representation and of which we are
aware, it follows that this world only possesses those features that are given to us.
Since only intensive and extensive magnitudes are given to us, we can conclude
that the world of appearances does not possess any ontological structure.
is understanding of intuition is in conﬂict with a widely accepted view re-
garding the singularity of intuition. It is generally claimed that intuitions pick
out diﬀerent objects, that each intuition is a singular and immediate represen-
tation of a particular object. is view is mistaken if it is understood in such
a way that there is supposed to be one intuition for each ‘ordinary object’. It
is mistaken because intuition does not carve up the manifold for us. Intuition
lacks the resources to do so. More precisely, carving up the manifold requires us
to employ the dynamical categories, in particular the category of substance, and
these dynamical categories are not involved in intuition but only in judgement.
Nonetheless, we can still accommodate the singularity of intuition insofar as
intuition is singular with respect to time-slices. e manifold received at each
time-slice is treated as a unity, rather than as a collection of individual objects
to each of which we stand in a singular relation. We have one outer intuition at
each moment of time, rather than a plurality of such intuitions. ere is one in-
tuition per time-slice, rather than one intuition per uniﬁed phenomenal object.
Intuition does not carve up the manifold for us – this we must do ourselves.
It should be noted that this account only applies to outer intuition. It is the outer manifold
that is treated as a unity. is manifold, however, is distinguished from inner manifolds.
Kant’s commitment to the unity of time-slices of the manifold can be found at A: “Every
intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the
mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression from another; for each represen-
tation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but  ”
(emphasis added). A similar view can be identiﬁed in the form of Carnap’s ‘Elementarerlebnisse’
which he takes to be indivisible unities (cf. Carnap: , xx-).
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Chapter 
Phenomena
In addition to the subjective worlds of appearances that aremade up of intentional
objects and that only exist for particular subjects, there is also an intersubjective
world of phenomena that is made up of logical constructs and that exists for ev-
eryone with our forms of intuition. is world is grounded in the noumenal
sphere and is as such objective for us, i.e. for cognitive beings with our forms of
intuition. e objects to be found in the phenomenal world are the intersubjec-
tive correlates of appearances. is intersubjective world is objective for us and
functions as the subject matter of scientiﬁc inquiry and it is its structure that we
discover by means of scientiﬁc investigation.
. Constructing phenomena
Phenomena are intersubjective objects. ey are the objects with which scientiﬁc
investigation is concerned. Unlike appearances, phenomena are not emergent in-
existents but are instead logical complexes that are constructed out of noumenal
information. In particular, it is translated noumenal information that functions
as the elements in the logical complexes. is translated information corresponds
to that which is objective in our representations. e phenomenal realm thus em-
bodies information contained in the manifold of intuition that has been trans-
formed by the forms of intuition, which means that the existence of the empiri-
cal intersubjective realm can be reduced to the obtaining of facts concerning the
forms of intuition and the manifold of intuition made available by noumena.
Phenomena are constructed out of the manifold of intuition. Phenomena,
like appearances, consist of both matter and form. ey are matter-in-form.
eir two components are, on the one hand, the forms of intuition and, on the
other, the matter of intuition. e forms of intuition are space and time. ey
are our subjective mental frameworks which we use for ordering and representing
objects. e forms are our contribution to the phenomenal realm. e matter
of intuition, on the contrary, is not contributed by us since it is the manifold
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of intuition that derives from noumenal objects. e information contained in
this manifold is translated into the forms of intuition. We thereby end up with
a spatio-temporal manifold that consists of spatio-temporally ordered translated
information.
Since phenomena encapsulate information, in a translated form, that is pro-
vided by noumena, it follows that the noumenal realm is the ground of the phe-
nomenal realm and that the latter exists in virtue of the former. e phenomenal
and noumenal spheres stand in an asymmetric relation that involves the depen-
dence of phenomena on noumena. e phenomenal realm is dependent on the
noumenal realm since it is nothing other than an informational manifold that is
structured by the forms of intuition and that results from a process which takes
information provided by noumena as its input.
e phenomenal and noumenal realms consequently encapsulate the same
information in diﬀerent ways. Rather than having one object or entity that is
considered in two diﬀerent ways or that has two diﬀerent sets of properties, we
have one set of information that is embodied in diﬀerent ways. is means that
noumena and phenomena are connected insofar as they embody or encapsulate
the same information, yet they diﬀer insofar as this information is embodied by
them in two diﬀerent ways. In the case of noumena, this information is embodied
by the noumenal properties. In the case of phenomena, this information features
as the translated matter of logical constructs that have a spatio-temporal form
that derives from the forms of intuition.
In other words, we do not have one thing that is both spatio-temporal and
non-spatio-temporal. Rather, we have non-spatio-temporal entities which in-
stantiate certain properties. Facts about these objects and their properties are
encapsulated as the contents of the informational manifold that features as the
input of the constructive process that translates the given information into our
frameworks, resulting in spatio-temporal logical complexes.
e same information thus features in two diﬀerent frameworks and is present
e relation between the information transmitted in the manifold and the noumenal cat-
egorical grounds that give rise to this manifold seems to admit of two possible models. Either
(i) the manifold may in some sense reﬂect, resemble or correspond to the categorical ground, or
(ii) the manifold, though resulting from the categorical ground, does not reﬂect the categorical
ground. A helpful analogy here is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Pri-
mary qualities do resemble their categorical grounds, whereas this is not the case when it comes
to secondary qualities. Similarly, the information which is translated to yield phenomena may
or may not correspond to the categorical grounds. In the former case, the categorical noumenal
properties do not just give rise to the manifold, but they themselves enter into the manifold and
are reﬂected in the manifold. In the latter case, these properties would only give rise to the mani-
fold without being reﬂected therein. Both accounts are conceivable and there does not seem to be
anything to which we can appeal to settle the question whether the relation should be construed
along the lines of the primary or the secondary qualities model, that is, whether the untranslated
manifold that gives rise to the phenomena resembles or corresponds to the noumenal categorical
grounds.
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in two diﬀerent way. In one case, it is embodied in the noumenal objects and
properties. Here the information is pure and reﬂects absolute reality. In the other
case, it is the matter of a spatio-temporal informational manifold that charac-
terises the intersubjective nature of our experiences and that describes the struc-
ture and content of empirical reality. Here the information is no longer pure,
but is processed by the forms of intuition and reﬂects only our spatio-temporal
phenomenal reality.
Given this understanding of phenomena, we can see that the one-world v.
two-world debate is to some extent misguided. Since phenomena are logical con-
structs, it is neither the case that they are objects that can be identical to noumena,
nor is it the case that they form a distinct class of entities that constitute a world.
is means that, in a sense, we trivially end up with a non-identity view, but
contrary to the common understanding this does not imply a two-worlds view.
Rather than ending up with the non-identity of distinct objects, the only real
objects that we have are noumenal objects. Phenomena, though distinct from
noumena, are not real objects but only logical complexes. us, we can agree
with van Cleve that we only have one world since phenomena are not real objects
that constitute a world, but that we nonetheless have two domains of discourse
(cf. van Cleve: , p. ).
While the one-world v. two-world debate is somewhat misguided, there is
an important question regarding the relation between noumena and phenomena
in the vicinity. Instead of asking about the identity or non-identity of phenom-
ena and noumena, the real question that we should investigate is how noumenal
information is related to phenomenal information. As we have seen, these infor-
mational manifolds have the same matter but diﬀer in form.
Depending on whether we are concerned with appearances or phenomena,
we can discern diﬀerent ways in which this informational manifold enters into
the process whereby it is translated into the spatio-temporal frameworks. On
the one hand, there is the case in which a subject is aﬀected and provided with
information. Here the information is in some way transmitted from the object
to the cognitive subject, which can then process and synthesise the information,
resulting in modiﬁcations of the mind of which the subject can become reﬂexively
aware by means of apperception. Intentional objects of which we are immediately
aware then emerge upon the activation of noumenal mental states by reﬂexive
awareness. In other words, representations are produced by means of intuition
and these representations give rise to appearances when the subject becomes aware
of the content of these representational media.
On the other hand, when we consider the logical construction of phenom-
Noumenal aﬀection does not necessarily require two distinct objects. e aﬀection relation
can hold between two parts or aspects of the same object as is for instance the case when the
noumenal self aﬀects itself, resulting in an inner intuition.
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ena, the information enters into the construction process without there being
some relation between subject and object. All that is required is that the object
exists and that it possesses its properties. Given that these properties are instan-
tiated, it follows that there exists information that encapsulates these properties.
is information can then function as the material that is translated to yield the
elements of a logical complex. In being translated, this information is mediated
by the forms of intuition.
us, appearances are intentional objects, while phenomena are logical con-
structs. Both arise via the process of intuition. In the one case, there is an actual
cognitive process, while in the other case there is merely a logical construction.
Both times we have a manifold that is processed via the forms of intuition. Both
processes deal with the same information and involve the same forms. ey dif-
fer insofar as the former has subjective additions and transformations, given that
subjects view the world from a particular point of view and given that there are
subjective cognitive characteristics that are peculiar to particular subjects which
aﬀect their sensations, while the latter is restricted to that which is objective and
intersubjective.
In other words, they diﬀer because appearances are determined not only by
the manifold of intuition and the forms of intuition but also by peculiarities of
the sensory systems of particular subjects. Unlike in the case of phenomena, there
is no unique appearance associated with a given manifold of intuition. Put dif-
ferently, unlike in the case of the constructive process that yields phenomena, we
do not have a unique translation function that gives rise to appearances. Rather,
we are here dealing with actual cognitive processes that can vary amongst sub-
jects due to diﬀerences in the sensibilities they possess. While phenomena are
uniquely determined by the manifold, in the case of appearances the manifold
can interact with sensibility in diﬀerent ways since diﬀerent subjects can vary in
sensibility, whereby these variable features of our sensibility are the features that
are not essentially shared. Diﬀerent subjects can have diﬀerent ‘reactions’ to the
same input, thereby ensuring that the output can vary amongst subjects.
We can thus see that the phenomenal world is a logical construct. It is an
informational manifold that is dependent on the forms of intuition and on the
manifold of intuition. e phenomenal world exists atemporally and arises atem-
porally. e phenomenal manifold is simply given and exists statically – there is
no point in time at which it comes into existence. e world simply is there, it
exists simpliciter and it depends simpliciter on the noumenal realm.
Kant calls this the “particular constitution of sense in the subject” (A).
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.. Perspective-independent space-time
Given the perspectival nature of intuition, the phenomena constructed by trans-
lating the noumenal information into our forms of intuition do not constitute a
uniﬁed intersubjective spatio-temporal world. Instead, they give us perspective-
dependent intersubjective spatio-temporal frameworks. ey give us perspectival
accounts of the world and capture what the world is like from particular perspec-
tives (from diﬀerent here-now’s). Such perspectival accounts deal with spatio-
temporal frameworks corresponding to our forms of intuition that are centred
on particular perspectives, which means that the frameworks inherit their prop-
erties from those of the intuitive spatio-temporal framework.
e content of each framework is intersubjective since it is determined by
the manifold of intuition together with the translation function pertaining to the
forms of intuition. Such a perspectival account describes what is objectively the
case from a particular perspective and captures facts about what the world is like
from that perspective. It speciﬁes what the world is objectively like for us from
a particular point of view and does not contain any of the subjective transforma-
tions and additions that are characteristic of appearances. If someone were to
view the world from this perspective, then that in his or her perception which
would correspond to this perspectival account would be objective, while the rest
(e.g. the qualitative character of phenomenological intensive magnitudes) would
be merely subjective. In particular, while the intensive magnitudes of appear-
ances are subjective secondary qualities that are partially a function of the partic-
ular constitution of the subject whose appearances they are, the contents of the
intersubjective perspective-dependent frameworks do not depend on any particu-
larities of subjects but only on the shared forms of intuition. is means that the
contents of such perspective-dependent frameworks are characterised by physical
intensive magnitudes rather than by phenomenological intensive magnitudes.
While intuitive as well as perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks
are fragmented, perspective-independent space-time is uniﬁed. e perspective-
independent structure is the system of orders that incorporates and integrates all
the diﬀerent perspectives. It achieves this by abstracting from perspectival features
and instead only includes those features that remain invariant under changes of
perspectives. e content of perspective-independent physical space-time is ac-
cordingly invariant content that holds in all perspectives. Non-perspectival ac-
counts of empirical reality are thus concerned with those facts that hold from all
points of view. To get a perspective-independent characterisation of the empir-
What the world is like from a point of view accordingly also excludes inner intuition and only
deals with manifolds provided by outer intuition, since only they are intersubjectively available.
Perspective-independence is to be understood not in terms of perspective-transcending facts
but in terms of perspective-invariant facts. Such facts are invariant under changes of perspectives
and hence hold in all perspectives. Put diﬀerently, the perspective-independent point of view is
the point of view from nowhere in particular.
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ical world, to end up with a comprehensive and uniﬁed spatio-temporal man-
ifold that incorporates the totality of such phenomenal facts, we have to bring
in ontological structure to connect the perspective-dependent frameworks. e
diﬀerent perspectives (here-now’s) have to be ordered and put together to yield a
perspective-independent space-time manifold.
e ordering on the diﬀerent perspectives is imposed by the transcenden-
tal structure of the world. Since perspectives are fragmented and do not stand in
spatio-temporal relations to each other, we need to appeal to non-spatio-temporal
structure to put together the diﬀerent here-now’s. Empirically, we establish this
ordering by connecting the contents of diﬀerent perspectives. Yet, ontologically
the ordering of perspectives is determined by the metaphysical relations that ob-
tain amongst the diﬀerent perspectives. In particular, it is the ontological struc-
ture speciﬁed in terms of substance, causation and reciprocity that ﬁxes the order-
ing. Bymaking possible re-identiﬁcation, substance allows us to connect diﬀerent
time-slices and specify world-lines. Causation speciﬁes priority/dependency rela-
tions that give rise to an asymmetric diachronic ordering, such that if x depends
on y, then y is earlier x. Finally, reciprocity allows for synchronic ordering. To-
gether, they determine the continuous causal paths which ﬁx the topological facts
of the perspective-independent space-time.
It should be noted that this account of the perspective-independent world is
compatible with our claim that science proceeds solely by appealing to the math-
ematical categories and does not make use of dynamical categories, such as the
categories of substance and causation. Prima facie, there may seem to be an in-
compatibility since sciencemakes claims about spatio-temporal relations amongst
events, yet the account we have just given grounds such relations in metaphys-
ical structure that can only be cognised by means of the dynamical categories.
However, though ontological structure is required to ground objective and well-
founded representations of spatio-temporal orderings, it is not necessary to ap-
peal to ontological structure to arrive at such representations. In particular, we
can appeal to the spatio-temporal content of our representations to construct a
spatio-temporal ordering. Ontological structure is not required for constructing
such orderings but is required for grounding the objectivity and well-foundedness
of the orderings.
In other words, we can construct a spatio-temporal ordering by means of
the contents of our representations. is ordering can then be used in scien-
tiﬁc investigation to identify functional relationships amongst events of diﬀerent
kinds. e goal of science consists in formulating functional relationships that
reﬂect the independently given ontological relationships amongst the diﬀerent
events. ese ontological relations ground the objective spatio-temporal order-
ing, to which our constructed ordering should correspond. By appealing to the
functional relationships discovered by science, we can try to get better and better
approximations of this objective ordering.
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While the perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks inherit their
structure from intuitive space and time, the structure of perspective-independent
space-time need not correspond to that of our intuitive frameworks. Unlike in
the case of the perspectival structures, in this case we are not dealing with a spatio-
temporal structure that is determined by intuitive space and time. It should be
noted though that this structure is nonetheless speciﬁed in terms of the intu-
itive spatio-temporal structure, given that intersubjective physical space-time is
constructed out of the diﬀerent perspective-dependent spaces. is implies that
the structure of perspective-independent space-time only needs to correspond
to that of our intuitive spatio-temporal frameworks in the limit, i.e. the struc-
tures coincide locally. is means that knowledge of perspective-independent
physical space-time is mostly synthetic a posteriori and that only some structural
features are known a priori. is is because the perspective-independent space
will always coincide with the perspective-dependent space in the limit, which
implies that in the limit the former has the same structure as the latter. Since
the latter is Euclidean, the former is Euclidean in the limit, i.e. inﬁnitesimally
Euclidean. Put diﬀerently, if the Euclidean nature of intuitive space is granted,
then we can have synthetic a priori knowledge not only of intuitive space but
can also know a priori that physical space will be locally, i.e. inﬁnitesimally, Eu-
clidean, even though it need not be globally Euclidean. is is due to the fact that
they coincide in the limit, which means that physical space will locally have the
same properties as intuitive space. us, while we know the global structure of
perspective-dependent physical space and time a priori since it coincides with that
of intuitive space and time, we only have a priori knowledge of the local structure
of perspective-independent physical space-time since we can know a priori only
that they coincide in the limit.
. Phenomena and appearances
Phenomena and appearances stand in a correspondence relation, even though
there is no causal or reductive relation between them. is may, prima facie, seem
to be problematic since it is diﬃcult to understand how they can correspond to
each other if there are no substantial metaphysical relations that connect them.
Since they are neither reduced to each other, nor considered to stand in any causal
relations to each other, it may be questioned what the correspondence amounts to
and in virtue of what particular phenomena count as corresponding to particular
appearances.
To deal with this problem, we can appeal to the transcendental or noumenal
object to give a criterion as to which appearances correspond to which phenom-
For other arguments to the eﬀect that we have synthetic a priori knowledge of the locally
Euclidean character of physical space cf. Carnap:  & Weyl: , Introduction.
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ena. Instead of being connected via a causal or reductive relation, they are con-
nected via their noumenal grounds. In particular, they correspond to each other
insofar as their matter derives from the same source. Appearances and phenomena
that correspond to each other have a common reductive basis since the existence
of both can be explained in the same way, namely by appealing to the existence of
the relevant kind of noumenal information. is information then yields either
phenomena or appearances insofar as the information is either conceived of as
input into a constructive process or as input for a cognitive process.
us, despite the fact that phenomena are not constructed out of appearances,
these two kinds of objects are nonetheless connected, which means that we do not
end up with two entirely separate and detached realms. Since phenomena are
reduced to that which makes appearances possible, it turns out that appearances
and phenomena are on an equal footing. It is not the case that one is reduced
to the other or that one causes the other. Instead, they have the same reductive
basis, which implies that certain features of one correspond to certain features
of the other. In particular, phenomena and appearances are connected insofar as
phenomena correspond to that which is objective in appearances, thereby making
it the case that phenomena classify as the intersubjective correlates of appearances.
While diﬀerent subjects cannot be immediately aware of the same phenome-
nal object since we only directly perceive appearances and these objects are private
objects, the appearances perceived by diﬀerent individuals can nevertheless cor-
respond to the same phenomenon if their matter derives from the same source.
ese diﬀerent appearances are numerically distinct, but they nonetheless corre-
spond to the same phenomenon and have the same phenomenon as their corre-
late.
Moreover, the two are connected insofar as the existence of phenomena im-
plies that there is noumenal information that could be transmitted as themanifold
of intuition by noumenal aﬀection. is in turn implies that there are phenomena
iﬀ there are available intuitions. Phenomena are not reduced along phenomenal-
istic lines to available intuitions. Instead, phenomena are reduced to that which
makes intuitions available. Available intuitions and phenomena therefore always
go together.
For there to be a phenomenon, for there to be a ﬁlled region of intersubjec-
tive space-time, is for there to be physical intensive magnitudes associated with
certain space-time points. For there to be such physical intensive magnitudes
is for the manifold of intuition that is made available by noumenal objects to
be such that when transformed into a spatio-temporal framework, these physical
intensive magnitudes are to be found at these space-time points.
Equivalently, for there to be such physical intensive magnitudes is for there
to be available perceptions that involve qualitative features that have as their ob-
jective constituents these intensive magnitudes and which locate these qualitative
features in spatio-temporal regions that correspond to the intersubjective space-
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time points at which the magnitudes are to be found. Put diﬀerently, since an
appearance is a subjective spatio-temporal region across which qualitative features
are distributed, a phenomenal object correspond to an appearance if the intensive
physical magnitudes corresponding to the phenomenological intensive magni-
tudes of the appearance are distributed across the corresponding spatio-temporal
region in intersubjective space and time.
Appearance PhenomenonPhenomenal
Noumenal
Correspondence
Noumenal self Noumenal object
Self-affection
(apperception)
Noumenal affection
Noumenal grounding
Processing functions
(forms of intuition)
Logical construction
Noumenal information
(matter of intuition)
eworld of appearances diﬀers from the world of phenomena when we have
a dissonance between how things are for the subject, how the subject’s representa-
tions represent reality as being and how the intersubjective empirical reality really
is. is dissonance can either concern what objects exist (ontological misrepre-
sentation) or what properties really are instantiated by those things that do exist
(ideological misrepresentation).
Ontological misrepresentation occurs in case the subjective world contains
things that are not part of intersubjective reality. e things that are restricted
to the world of appearances and have no corresponding objects in the world of
phenomena are intentional objects that do not have their matter provided by a
manifold of intuition that derives from a noumenal object that is distinct from
the subject. ey are merely subjective objects and only exist for the subject
representing them. Examples of such subjectively existing intentional objects are
hallucinations, dreams and imaginings.
Ideological misrepresentation occurs when the properties of objects in the
world of appearances do not match up with the properties of the correlates of
those objects in the world of phenomena. Such diﬀerences in properties between
e terms ontological and ideological misrepresentation are due to Fine (cf. Fine: , p.
).
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the intentional object and its phenomenal correlate result when subjective fea-
tures are added to the object or when objective features are misrepresented, that
is, when the manifold of intuition is subjected to subjective additions and trans-
formations that are peculiar to particular subjects. Examples of such subjective
properties of intentional objects are secondary qualities, as well as various prop-
erties attributed to objects as a result of illusions.
.. Intensive and extensive magnitudes
Phenomena do not completely correspond to appearances since the manifold of
intuition embodied in appearances gets subjected to various subjective transfor-
mations and additions, such as the imposition of secondary qualities. Phenom-
ena only correspond to the intersubjective and objective features of appearances.
at is, what does belong to phenomena are the intersubjective correlates of the
subjective secondary qualities. Rather than attributing the qualitative features of
appearances to phenomena, we attribute to them the properties that objectively
correspond thereto, namely the physical intensive magnitudes that are correlated
with the relevant phenomenological intensive magnitudes.
In the construction of phenomena there is no place for anything that is merely
subjective and only the objective and intersubjective features are taken into con-
sideration. e objective features are the features of noumenal objects, whereas
the intersubjective features are the forms of intuitions which are shared by all
observers like us. Unlike appearances, phenomena are empirically objective and
do not depend upon particular subjects but only on the intersubjectively shared
forms of intuition.
Whatever is in the phenomenal world has a formal component that is de-
termined by the forms of intuition. ese forms function as ﬁlters insofar as
what is incompatible with them cannot be experienced and is consequently ex-
cluded from the phenomenal realm. Being an object of a possible experience
thus requires that the manifold of intuition be amenable to the translation and
transformation functions that characterise these forms. In short, something is an
object of a possible experience, or rather an object of a possible intuition, if it is
compatible with the forms of intuition, if its matter can be ordered in a spatio-
temporal framework. ere is accordingly nothing in the phenomenal realm that
is incompatible with our forms of intuition.
Since the forms of intuition are spatio-temporal forms, it follows that the
properties featuring in the phenomenal realm are either spatio-temporal proper-
ties or modes of spatio-temporal properties. We have spatio-temporal extensions
as well as qualitative characteristics modifying these spatio-temporal extensions.
In short, phenomena, like appearances, have extensive and intensive magnitude.
While characterising the extensive magnitudes of perspective-dependent phe-
nomena is unproblematic, problems arise when focusing on their intensive mag-
nitudes. As regards extensive magnitudes, there is a straightforward correspon-
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dence between appearances and phenomena since they have the same form, given
that both the world of appearances as well as the world of phenomena are deter-
mined by the forms of intuition. Since extensive magnitudes are modes of spatio-
temporal extension, no problems arise and phenomena can straightforwardly be
treated as correlates of appearances in this respect, which means that the spatio-
temporal features of appearances can correspond to those of phenomena.
Intensive magnitudes, however, pose a problem. ese magnitudes are con-
cerned with the reality that occupies the spatio-temporal framework, the real-
ity that ﬁlls space. Since the intensive magnitudes of appearances are secondary
qualities and are as such subjective, they cannot correspond to the intensive mag-
nitudes of intersubjective phenomena. Put diﬀerently, since the qualitative fea-
tures that are distributed over the subjective spatio-temporal framework are all
secondary qualities, and since phenomena are intersubjective entities that do not
possess any merely subjective features, such as secondary qualities, the question
arises as to how we are to understand intensive magnitudes in the case of phe-
nomena.
If we take away secondary qualities, we seem to be left with an empty spatio-
temporal framework. Giving an account of the intersubjective correlates of the
subjective intensive magnitudes of appearances thus amounts to the problem of
ﬁlling in space. We cannot use the qualitative features of appearances since these
are subjective. What then can we appeal to in order to characterise the phenom-
enal world if we cannot appeal to these qualitative features?
On an optimistic view these features can ultimately be revealed and our igno-
rance is temporary and can be overcome. “e ‘something real in space’ must, it
seems, retain its mystery until its true nature is revealed by sophisticated scientiﬁc-
philosophical inquiry” (Wilson: , p. ). is optimism is, however, mis-
guided since it is impossible for epistemic agents like ourselves to identify the
inner nature of the real in space. e intensive magnitudes of phenomena are
only known to us via the relational structures within which they are embedded.
ese relational features are all that science can tell us about the ﬁlling of space.
Science does not tell us what these magnitudes are, what their intrinsic nature
is, but only in what relations they stand to each other and to subjective sensa-
tions. We can only identify relational features, but what the phenomenal realm
is like intrinsically is unknown to us. Since it is in principle impossible for us
to be acquainted with its intrinsic nature, the inner natures of physical intensive
magnitudes turn out to be inscrutable for us.
e problem of accounting for intrinsic intensive magnitudes is analogous to the problem
faced by Carnap when he tried to constitute the intersubjective world. e problem, which
formed the basis of Quine’s critique, is that once we get to the intersubjective realm, it no longer
seems to be possible to give explicit deﬁnitions anymore. Instead, we have to appeal to other
methods, such as deﬁning or identifying physical features by the roles they play. While this is
problematic for a Carnapian who wants to construct a pure constitutional system, we are able to
make use of such implicit deﬁnitions.
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While appearances have phenomenological intensive magnitudes, phenom-
ena have physical intensive magnitudes. Physical intensive magnitudes are the
intersubjective features that correspond to the qualitative features of sensations.
ey are the intersubjective properties that correspond to the phenomenological
intensive magnitudes of appearances and that are distributed across the intersub-
jective spatio-temporal framework.
In order to give positive support for positing such intensive magnitudes and
in order to gain a better understanding of them, we need to look at the role that
they play. Phenomenal features are the empirically objective correlates of features
of appearances. Physical intensive magnitudes are the correlates of the qualita-
tive features of appearances since both the physical and the phenomenological
features derive from the manifold of intuition. While the former solely derive
from the manifold and the forms of intuition, the latter are rendered impure due
to subjective transformations and additions. Accordingly, we can give ontolog-
ical support for accepting physical intensive magnitudes. We can appeal to our
understanding of phenomena as matter translated into form. Phenomenal real-
ity amounts to matter-in-form, which is equivalent to intuitions minus what is
subjective in appearances. Physical intensive magnitudes are therefore whatever
is left over once what is subjective has been subtracted. ey are the residue that
remains after the subjective qualitative features of appearances have been ﬁltered
out. is means that our understanding of phenomena as logical constructs that
supervene on noumena via a mediated supervenience relation commits us to at-
tributing physical intensive magnitudes to the phenomenal realm.
To recap, the phenomenal world is the intersubjective correlate of the world of
appearances. is account gives rise to the problem of how to conceive of the real
in space, given that the qualitative features of appearances are subjective. We have
argued that physical intensive magnitudes are the correlates of the phenomeno-
logical intensive magnitudes. ese physical magnitudes are not the causes of
the qualitative features, but instead correspond to them. ey are their objective
correlates and count as the real in space. ey give rise to the diﬀerence between
there being something and there not being anything, to the diﬀerence between
ﬁlled space and empty space. We thus have a phenomenal world which can be
characterised in terms of extensive and intensive magnitudes, whereby there is
a correspondence between subjective and intersubjective spatio-temporal struc-
tures, as well as a correspondence between physical intensive magnitudes and the
intersubjective features of phenomenological intensive magnitudes.
Phenomena can accordingly be characterised in two ways. On the one hand,
one can consider actual and possible intuitions and ﬁlter out the subjective addi-
tions and transformations, focusing only on what is objective and intersubjective
in those intuitions. In other words, the intersubjective phenomenal objects can
be gained by ﬁltering out what is subjective in intuitions that are had or could
be had by the relevant cognitive subjects. On the other hand, one can side-step
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representations and only focus on the manifold of intuition not as it appears to a
subject after it has been transformed and modiﬁed in various ways, but consider
that manifold on its own and then only apply the intersubjective transformations
that derive from the forms of intuition. In other words, since the empirical world
is jointly determined by noumenal properties and forms of intuition, the inter-
subjective phenomena can be identiﬁed by subjecting what is objective to the
intersubjective transformation procedures.
.. Intensive magnitudes as powers?
Given that intensive magnitudes correspond to secondary qualities, it might be
suggested that we can give a causal reading of this relation. On this kind of ap-
proach, phenomena are considered to be the causes of appearances and physical
intensive magnitudes are considered to be the causal grounds of the secondary
qualities of our sensations. Such an account may be motivated by the observa-
tion that appearances arise when a manifold of intuition is provided to the self
by noumenal aﬀection and that this aﬀection relation is a kind of causal relation.
Accordingly, it might be suggested that the correspondence relation between ap-
pearances and phenomena supervenes on the causal noumenal aﬀection relation
between noumenal objects and noumenal selves. Hence, it might be argued that
we can understand the correspondence relation as a causal relation and that we can
understand the physical intensive magnitudes as the causes of the phenomeno-
logical magnitudes.
is suggestion, however, is problematic since treating intensive magnitudes
as causal powers only provides a relational characterisation of these magnitudes
and does not give a description of the categorical bases underlying the causal pow-
ers. A causal account would not reveal to us their inner natures. It would not
inform us of their categorical features. Accordingly, it would only be a partial
and incomplete characterisation of these magnitudes that would have to be sup-
plemented. is means that the causal reading of the correspondence relation is
not able to replace the account we have given, but can at best supplement this
account. Moreover, since the phenomenal realm is not intrinsically causally struc-
tured but only contains structure in relation to its grounds, the causal characteri-
sation would not only be a supplementary characterisation but also a subordinate
characterisation.
In response, it might be suggested that these magnitudes are bare dispositions
and that they should be treated as mere causal powers, rather than as possessing
causal powers in addition to their categorical natures. emagnitudes would then
be identiﬁed with their causal powers and would be exhausted by their causal
proﬁles. is would ensure that a causal characterisation would not miss out
anything and hence would not be partial and incomplete.
is revised account, however, is to be rejected as well since the manifold out
of which phenomena are constructed is not dispositional. While noumenal selves

receive this manifold as a result of a causal relation, this does not imply that the
matter of this manifold is dispositional in nature. e account that treats phe-
nomenal properties as bare dispositions thus has the problematic consequence
that it implies that no information is transmitted, that no information is encap-
sulated in the manifold of intuition by noumenal aﬀection, that the manifold
does not have any matter that can be processed by the cognitive subject. Ac-
cordingly, advocates of this model are not able to give an explanation as to why
aﬀection gives rise to spatio-temporally ordered sensations. ey simply posit a
disposition, rather than give an explanatory account that appeals to the manifold
as providing information to the subject as input which is processed according to
the forms of intuition to yield a certain output. It seems clear that the latter kind
of story is required by transcendental idealists given their understanding of cog-
nitive processing, in particular their understanding of how space and time feature
in intuition. us, while objects can have a disposition to give rise to sensations
or a disposition to provide a manifold of intuition, it does not seem possible for
the manifold itself to be dispositional. emanifold is not dispositional in nature
since it contains information that can be processed by us.
Moreover, the dispositional account is problematic, given that phenomena are
intersubjective correlates of appearances and give that appearances have categori-
cal intrinsic properties, namely phenomenological intensive magnitudes that are
not dispositional in nature. Since phenomena correspond to what is objective in
appearances, it follows that we can go from appearances to phenomena by ﬁltering
out everything that is merely subjective. However, subtracting the subjective fea-
tures of the categorical intrinsic properties of appearances does not suddenly yield
a dispositional power. e intersubjective correlate of a subjectively transformed
categorical intrinsic property should itself be a categorical intrinsic property and
not a dispositional property.
Furthermore, since phenomena fail to be intrinsically causally structured, it
would follow that if phenomena were considered in isolation from their grounds,
then there would not be anything left. at is, since causal structure is only had in
relation to noumenal grounds and since, according to the proposal we are consid-
ering, causal structure exhausts the phenomenal realm, it would follow that there
would not be anything that could be characterised independently of the grounds.
Since a scientiﬁc description of the world neither appeals to noumenal grounds
nor to features that are had only in relation to such grounds, but rather provides
a description of the world that only appeals to empirically accessible features, it
would follow from identifying intensive magnitudes with bare dispositions that
the world would not contain any features that could be described by science. Put
diﬀerently, it would follow that there would not be any ‘real’ in space that could
be characterised by means of scientiﬁc concepts. is is because science does not
employ metaphysical concepts, in particular it does not make use of the dynam-
ical but only the mathematical categories, which means that a scientiﬁc account
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of the empirical world does not appeal to the notion of a causal power but only
characterises empirically accessible facts in terms of functional relationships and
regularities.
Accordingly, we can see that the intensive magnitudes of phenomena are
not dispositional in nature and are not exhausted by their causal proﬁles. To
characterise these magnitudes, we need to provide a non-relational characterisa-
tion. ough causal powers can be attributed to the magnitudes if they have the
right kinds of grounds, they are not exclusively causal or dispositional and causal
characteristics do not exhaust the nature of these intensive magnitudes. Instead,
they have a non-dispositional nature that requires a non-causal characterisation
or speciﬁcation. As a result, we should reject accounts of transcendental ideal-
ism that commit us to an ontology of forces and a dynamical theory of matter.
Such views mistakenly consider intensive magnitudes to be purely dispositional.
Instead of having such pure powers or forces, what ‘ﬁlls’ space and what is dis-
tributed across space are categorical intensive magnitudes, the inner natures of
which are unknown to us.
us, physical intensive magnitudes are not in the ﬁrst place dispositional
properties. ey are not pure powers or tertiary qualities, but only have causal
powers in virtue of having certain grounds. Accordingly, no causal notions are
required for an empirical description of the phenomenal world and we can consis-
tently maintain that this world lacks ontological structure when we are abstracting
from noumenal grounds. In short, the empirical world, if it is considered on its
own, is ontologically amorphous in the same way as the phenomenological world.
We have a spatio-temporal distribution of physical intensive magnitudes that are
not metaphysically structured. is ontologically unstructured distribution can
be fully captured by an adverbial understanding and no appeal to metaphysical
concepts is required. In particular, no reference to objects or causal powers needs
to be made to give a scientiﬁc characterisation of the empirical world.
.. Scientiﬁc structuralism
Scientiﬁc investigation allows us to discover what the world is like for us, what is
objectively the case for us. It begins with what is subjective, namely appearances,
and then attempts to ﬁlter out the subjective additions and transformations that
are due to the peculiar nature of the cognitive subjects, in order to identify what
is objective for us, what is intersubjectively objective. In this process it leaves
aside the intrinsic nature of our experiences. is qualitative nature is merely
subjective and thus does not feature in an objective description of the world. It
is merely ostensible and not communicable. Accordingly, science is only con-
cerned with the structural features of our experiences (cf. Carnap: , x).
ese structural features are independent of the particular constitution of sense
of a subject, which implies that they are invariant under transformations of the
observers. ese features are objective for us and are preserved even when ob-
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servers are varied. is means that scientiﬁc investigation reveals the empirical
structure of the phenomenal world. Science tells us about the structure of the
phenomenal world and discovers what relations obtain.
We do not have access to the intrinsic nature of physical intensive magni-
tudes. We only know the relational features of the phenomenal world, we only
know its structure. More precisely, what we know is the structure of instantiations
of intensive magnitudes. is is because only structure is empirically accessible
to us. e intrinsic intensive magnitudes are inscrutable and hidden from us.
We only know their subjective counterparts that appear to us as secondary qual-
ities. Since these secondary qualities are subjective, only the relational structures
within which they are embedded count as objective. Since we only know the
relational facts of the phenomenal world, we only know the phenomenal world
up to isomorphism, which means that anything that has the same structure and
is accordingly isomorphic is indistinguishable for us.
While secondary qualities are subjective and vary amongst observers, spatio-
temporal structure is invariant and connects appearances and phenomena. In-
sofar as science describes what the world is like for us, what is objectively the
case and insofar as the only objective thing we know is spatio-temporal structure,
it follows that scientiﬁc theories are speciﬁed in terms of spatio-temporal struc-
ture. Scientiﬁc claims are thus structural claims and science is possible because
the spatio-temporal structures of the world of appearances and of the perspective-
dependent world of phenomena correspond to each other. is correspondence
relation obtains because the forms of both worlds are determined by the forms
of intuition. Given that the spatio-temporal structure amongst our representa-
tions is isomorphic to the structure of the empirical world, we can discover the
objective structure of the phenomenal world. It is because of this correspondence
relation that we can gain knowledge about the intersubjective empirical world.
e objective structure of the world is understood in terms of extensive magni-
tudes. ese extensive magnitudes are spatio-temporal magnitudes. Given that
the forms of intuition structure both appearances and phenomena, we can ﬁnd
out about the relational structure of physical intensive magnitudes by investigat-
ing the relational structure of phenomenological intensive magnitudes. us, we
can see that transcendental idealism enables us to explain how scientiﬁc investi-
gation allows us to discover the empirical structure of the phenomenal world and
that we can accordingly be realists about the structural descriptions of scientiﬁc
theories.
Since we accept a version of epistemic structural realism, we have to deal
In the case of perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks, we assess what is invariant
under transformations of the observer (holding ﬁxed the forms of intuition), whilst in the case of
the perspective-independent space-time we assess an extended range of transformations by also
looking at the features that are invariant under transformations of the perspective of observers.
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with the Newman problem. is problem states that structuralism makes scien-
tiﬁc claims trivial since they reduce to mere cardinality claims. is is because a
purely structural description only states that there are objects x . . . xn that stand
in relations R . . .Rn, exhibiting a particular structure. Such a description implic-
itly deﬁnes the theoretical terms, thereby capturing the idea that we only know
the formal and structural properties of properties and relations, without knowing
the properties and relations themselves. However, since nothing is known about
these relations and properties other than that they exhibit this structure, it follows
that this description can be satisﬁed by any collection with the right cardinality
(cf. Newman: , p.  & Demopolous and Friedman: ). at is, if we
existentially quantify over all theoretical terms and replace them by variables of
the right kind, then all theories that are empirically adequate will be equivalent
and truth will reduce to empirical adequacy, thereby bringing it about that the
only claim being made about the world is a cardinality claim. is would render
scientiﬁc knowledge almost trivial and undermine scientiﬁc realism. According
to scientiﬁc realism, true scientiﬁc theories are supposed to tell us what the world
is like, yet empirically adequate theories only tell us what the world looks like.
Transcendental idealism allows us to overcome this problem and enables us
to claim that scientiﬁc knowledge is not trivial. is is because the forms of
intuition are structuring principles of both appearances and phenomena. Both
appearances and phenomena are structured by the forms of intuition, which im-
plies that there are signiﬁcant correspondences between the realms. In particular,
the forms of intuition ensure that we have a correspondence between the spatio-
temporal structures of the two realms, whereby the spatio-temporal relations are
directly accessible to us. As a result, spatio-temporal structure can connect ap-
pearances with phenomena. is then allows us to accept an impure version of
structuralism, according to which science makes claims about spatio-temporal
structures. We do not have to accept a pure version of structuralism since spatio-
temporal structures are independently deﬁned and do not need to be Ramsey-
ﬁed. Accordingly, we do not just make claims about abstract structure, but about
spatio-temporal structure, that is, about concrete physical structure.
It is only pure forms of structuralism that are untenable because of their in-
ability to deal with the Newman problem. is is because the Newman problem
states that it is trivial to say that all we know is abstract structure. A Ramsey sen-
tence reduces to a mere cardinality claim when we quantify over all theoretical
predicates and relations. Accordingly, logical form is not suﬃcient to yield non-
trivial objectivity (as is evidenced by the failure of the Aufbau). Abstract logical or
mathematical structure is not enough and needs to be supplemented by concrete
intuitive structure. Logical formmust be supplemented by spatio-temporal form.
In order to ensure that structural descriptions are not trivial, we need to bring in
intuitive form thereby making it the case that spatio-temporal relations are not
implicitly deﬁned by the theory but are independently ﬁxed by intuitive space and
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time. It is by being stated in terms of these intuitively accessible spatio-temporal
relations that the structural claims can acquire signiﬁcance. By keeping certain
relations ﬁxed we can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of theories satisfying the
Ramsey sentence. As a result, it will no longer be the case that any theory that is
empirically adequate and attributes the right cardinality to the world will satisfy
the structural description. In this way, we can impose external constraints that a
theory must satisfy that go beyond the cardinality of the entities over which the
theory ranges. It is these constraints that add further content and provide sub-
stance to scientiﬁc claims, making it the case that true scientiﬁc theories really do
tell us what the world is like. us, it is not trivial to say that science discovers
the spatio-temporal structure of the world since this is concrete structure and not
merely abstract structure.
We have just shown how the sharing of relations that are accessible to in-
tuition and the resulting correspondence between the spatio-temporal structures
of appearances and phenomena makes science possible. Since these correspon-
dences only hold in the case of the perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frame-
works and not in the case of the perspective-independent physical space-time, it
may seem that only our knowledge of the former can be saved from triviality but
not our knowledge of the latter. However, while it is true that the structure of
perspective-independent space-time is not determined by the forms of intuition,
but by the ordering that the transcendental structure of the world imposes on the
fragmented perspectives, this does not undermine our solution to the Newman
problem regarding scientiﬁc knowledge of the perspective-independent phenom-
enal world.
While the correspondence between the spatio-temporal structures of appear-
ances and phenomena allows us to overcome the Newman problem and make
science possible, the connection between perspective-dependent and perspective-
independent frameworks makes room for suﬃcient ﬂexibility to allow for the
structure of the physical world to be discovered by science and to diﬀer from
that of our intuitive spatio-temporal frameworks. Since science discovers this
structure, it follows that the spatio-temporal relations in terms of which theories
about the perspective-independent world are stated are not ﬁxed by the forms of
intuition but are deﬁned by the theories. Whilst they are deﬁned by scientiﬁc
theories, they are not deﬁned solely in terms of abstract logical and mathematical
relations, but partly in terms of the concrete spatio-temporal relations that char-
acterise appearances and perspective-dependent phenomena. e concrete phys-
ical structure of perspective-dependent phenomena, which is known to us via the
concrete structure of appearances, thus permits us to gain non-trivial knowledge
of perspective-independent structure. As soon as we are dealing with perspective-
dependent structure, we are already at the level of the intersubjective phenomenal
world and beyond the world of subjective appearances. is means that we have
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already made the jump to the intersubjective world, which implies that we are
beyond the requirement of empirical adequacy.
In other words, scientiﬁc claims about the perspective-independent structure
of the world can have genuine content since this structure is directly connected to
and speciﬁed in terms of the concrete perspective-dependent structure, which in
turn corresponds to the structure of our forms of intuition to which we have im-
mediate access and which does not need to be implicitly deﬁned by the scientiﬁc
theory. at is, even though perspective-independent structure is not intuitive
structure, it is nevertheless connected to intuitive structure in an adequate man-
ner for it to count as concrete structure and for it to be partially deﬁned in terms
of the intuitively accessible relations. Accordingly, theories about perspective-
independent structure are not speciﬁed purely in terms of logical and mathemat-
ical structure, but in terms of concrete physical structure and hence must satisfy
constraints that go beyond empirical adequacy and cardinality conditions.
It should be noted that the solution to the Newman problem that we have
developed cannot be adopted by transcendental realists. In particular, it is not
possible to simply replace the claims we have made about intuitive space and time
by claims regarding phenomenal space and time. is is because transcendental
realists cannot explain the requisite correspondences between phenomenal space
and time, on the one hand, and physical space-time, on the other. Unless the
spatio-temporal relations correspond to each other, it is not possible to appeal to
them to impose constraints that scientiﬁc theories have to satisfy that go beyond
empirical adequacy. Transcendental idealists have no problems in this regard
since the spatio-temporal structures of appearances and (perspective-dependent)
phenomena are both ﬁxed by the forms of intuition, thereby ensuring that they
necessarily conform to each other. e forms to which we have direct access
structure both appearances and phenomena and thus bring it about that the req-
uisite correspondences obtain. Unless transcendental realists are able to give an
explanation as to why phenomenal space and time are in necessary harmony with
the structure of the physical world, they are not able to appeal to phenomenal
space and time to solve the Newman problem.
Moreover, if one wants to grant that science can discover the structure of
physical-space time as well as that this structure may be diﬀerent from that of phe-
nomenal or intuitive space and time and yet appeal to spatio-temporal structure to
solve the Newman problem, then one needs to distinguish between perspective-
dependent and perspective-independent spatio-temporal frameworks and directly
connect phenomenal or intuitive space and time to the former but not the latter.
Otherwise, one cannot explain how it is possible for science to discover the struc-
ture of physical space-time despite the fact that the theory is stated in terms of
intuitive spatio-temporal relations. Yet, it seems that transcendental realists can-
not accommodate the requisite distinction between perspective-dependent and
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perspective-independent spatio-temporal frameworks, which shows again that
one has to be a transcendental idealist to be a scientiﬁc realist.
us, the fact that space and time are forms of intuition allows us to con-
nect appearances and phenomena and thereby get from the structure of the for-
mer to that of the latter. At the same time, the transcendental ideality of space
and time prevents us from getting from the structure of phenomena to that of
noumena since there is no spatio-temporal continuity between these realms. Ac-
cordingly, we can reject Russell’s claim that noumenal ignorance is compromised
since noumena can be understood as forming “a world having the same structure
as the phenomenal world, and allowing us to infer from phenomena the truth of
all propositions that can be stated in abstract terms and are known to be true of
phenomena” (Russell: , p. ; also cf. Schlick: , p. ).
Given the transcendental ideality of space and time it follows that there is no
spatio-temporal correspondence between the realms, preventing us from getting
from the structure of phenomena to that of noumena. As a result, the noumenal
structure that could be inferred from phenomenal structure could only be under-
stood as abstract mathematical structure, rather than as concrete spatio-temporal
structure, ensuring that the structure of the phenomenal world could at most al-
low us to identify the cardinality of the noumenal domain. Unless concrete rela-
tions could be identiﬁed and suitably connected to known phenomenal relations,
any collection of the right cardinality would have the relevant abstract structure,
making this kind of knowledge almost trivial. Yet, even this knowledge of the
cardinality of the noumenal domain is ruled out and there is no guarantee that
the noumenal and phenomenal realms have the same cardinalities. Indeed, given
the possibility of transcendent properties and objects any isomorphism claim is
almost certain to be false. Transcendent objects do not play any role in ground-
ing experience and thereby ensure that the noumenal realm has additional struc-
ture that is not reﬂected in phenomena. As a result, the structure of phenomena
should not be expected to be isomorphic to the structure of noumenal reality,
undermining any cardinality claim.
It might be suggested that instead of an isomorphism claim about the rela-
tion between phenomena and noumena, we can make an embeddability claim by
specifying a sub-set of the noumenal realm, namely the realm consisting of tran-
scendental objects, that stands in an isomorphism relation to the phenomenal
realm. We could thereby make cardinality claims about transcendental objects,
while lacking knowledge of the noumenal sphere within which the transcenden-
tal objects are embedded. is, however, would still be problematic since we do
not know how to individuate the members of the domains and since we are ig-
norant of the translation function that connects the transcendental realm to the
phenomenal realm. ere are a number of plausible principles of individuation
even when it comes to individuating the members of the phenomenal domain.
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We could appeal to ﬁlled spatio-temporal points, logical complexes, or bounded
phenomenal objects. With respect to noumena, things are even less certain. e
members of the domain could be analogues of points, they could be noumenal
objects, aspects of such objects or something altogether diﬀerent. Given noume-
nal ignorance, the individuation of noumena is best characterised indirectly via
the process of intuition, i.e. via the co-ordination relation. Since this relation
could be a many-one, one-many, many-many or variably polyadic relation, there
is no guarantee that we can identify any isomorphisms and any cardinality claim
turns out to be unfounded.
us, while there is a non-arbitrary connection between the phenomenal and
noumenal realms, and while phenomena somehow correspond to and are man-
ifestations of noumena, any isomorphism or embeddability claim is inappropri-
ate. Instead of making such claims, we should argue that there is a co-ordinated
multiple-domain supervenience relation, without specifying the precise character
of the co-ordination relation. We only specify this relation functionally insofar as
it is equivalent to the translation function. However, we do not specify the par-
ticular input-ouput relation. is allows for suﬃcient ﬂexibility to allow not just
for one-one determination or correspondence as would be required for an iso-
morphism, but also for one-many, many-one, many-many and variably polyadic
relations.
is method only guarantees isomorphisms if we take the units of individu-
ation, which are then mapped by the isomorphisms, as being equivalent to the
input and output variables of the translation function. In this way, there would be
one output for each input, guaranteeing a one-one relation. is, however, does
not say anything about whether these inputs and outputs are simple or complex
or whether they can be given more ﬁne-grained individuations. In particular, the
individuation principles for the diﬀerent domains might well turn out to be com-
pletely diﬀerent. is would bring it about that we would have disparate units
for the two domains, thereby undermining the signiﬁcance of the isomorphism
claim. us, there is no reason to assume that the correct individuative principles
imply a one-one function that gives rise to an isomorphism between phenomena
and transcendental objects, which implies that we are ignorant of the cardinal-
ity of the transcendental realm as well. Accordingly, we can infer the structure
of phenomena from the structure of appearances since both of these realms are
structured by the forms of intuition and it is because of this that science is possi-
ble. However, we cannot make similar inferences when it comes to the relation
between phenomena and noumena.
. Noumena as grounds of phenomena
Phenomena are logical complexes that have translated noumenal information as
their elements. ey can be considered as informational manifolds that result

when noumenal information is translated in accordance with the process of intu-
ition. is means that it is the process of intuition that connects the two realms
and ensures that the phenomenal realm is grounded in the noumenal realm. It
is via this process that the phenomenal realm comes into existence. Noumena
provide the matter which is transformed in this process to yield phenomena. As
a result, the phenomenal realm is determined by and dependent on the noume-
nal realm as regards both its existence and its determinations. is dependence
relation can be captured in quasi-formal terms. In particular, we can use co-
ordinated multiple-domain supervenience relations to model the determination
and dependence relations between noumena and phenomena.
Supervenience relations allow us to model dependence and determination re-
lations since such relations concern the dependent-variation of properties and
accordingly hold if two families of properties are functionally connected. ey
consequently allow us to give a precise account of the determination and de-
pendency relations that are implicated in grounding relations and capture in a
quasi-formal manner the extensional aspects of grounding relations.
eproject of giving a quasi-formal account of the relation between noumena
and phenomena may be questioned given that we are ignorant of noumena. It is
reasonable to ask whether we can say anything more than just that there is some
supervenience relation or other. Our ignorance of noumena seems to preclude the
possibility of giving an informative account of this relation. While these doubts
are understandable, we will see that there are good grounds for optimism. In
particular, we can begin by noting that we do have knowledge of phenomena
and that this knowledge of one of the relata of the grounding relation allows us
to specify certain features of that relation. Moreover, even though we do lack
positive knowledge of the determinations of noumena, we nonetheless know that
noumena exist and we have some negative knowledge insofar as we know what
noumena are not, namely that they are not spatial and temporal entities. A further
consideration is that we have a relatively modest goal insofar as we do not want to
specify the precise characteristics of the supervenience relation but only specify
the key formal features of that relation. We want to specify the nature of that
relation, in particular what the relata are, what strength the relation has, what its
logical properties are, what kind of properties or entities it connects and what the
nature of the connection is.
We can make quite signiﬁcant progress in determining these kinds of for-
mal characteristics of the supervenience relation. In particular, we can know that
we are concerned with a multiple-domain, rather than a single-domain, superve-
nience relation since noumena and phenomena are distinct entities that possess
It is important to note that there is an additional hyperintensional aspect involved in the
grounding relation. is is a speciﬁcally metaphysical aspect that cannot be captured by superve-
nience relations. “We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in
other truths, then they account for its truth; P’s being the case holds in virtue of the other truths’
being the case” (Fine: , p. ).
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diﬀerent properties and that can be found in diﬀerent domains. We also know
that it is a mediated and co-ordinated supervenience relation since the noumenal
and phenomenal domains are connected by the process of intuition. at is, par-
ticular noumenal features are connected to particular phenomenal features via the
translation functions that derive from the forms of intuition (whether this func-
tion has a ﬁxed adicity or is variably polyadic is left open). As regards the logical
characteristics of the relation, we know that the relation is irreﬂexive, given that it
is a relation that connects distinct individuals in diﬀerent domains. Additionally,
we know that the base properties are restricted to transcendental properties since
it is only these properties that play any role in yielding phenomena – the others
are not compatible with the forms of intuition and are accordingly ﬁltered out.
In short, we know that the grounding relation can be modelled by a me-
diated, multiple-domain supervenience relation that is irreﬂexive and that con-
nects both non-relational and relational phenomenal features to non-relational
and relational transcendental features. In what follows, these characteristics of
the grounding relation, as well as of the associated supervenience principle, will
be justiﬁed and discussed in more detail.
.. Determination and dependence
Noumena determine phenomena and phenomena depend on noumena. While
phenomena are grounded in noumena, noumena themselves are ultimately un-
grounded. Noumena are absolutely real, whereas phenomena are only real for
us. ough some noumena might be grounded in other noumena, it is never
the case that phenomena ground noumena. e ultimate ground of every fact
whatsoever is to be found in the noumenal sphere. e chain of conditions that
connects something that is conditioned to its conditions does not terminate in
the phenomenal realm. e unconditioned can only be found in the noumenal
realm. Noumena are the conditions for phenomena and the chain of conditions
terminates in the noumenal realm. is is because the chain from conditioned to
conditions in the phenomenal realm is itself conditioned given that it is grounded.
So the noumenal terminus of the grounding chain is not to be found as a ﬁrst
member of the chain of conditions from which the others follow. Instead, it
stands outside that chain, making it possible in the ﬁrst place.
Not only are the properties of phenomena determined by noumena, the very
existence of the phenomenal realm is dependent on the noumenal realm. is is
because phenomena are derivative entities that are constructed out of the trans-
lated manifold of intuition. Without noumena there would not be any manifold
of intuition, and there would consequently not be anything that could serve as
For an account as to why we are justiﬁed in expecting the grounding relation to give rise to
a lower-bounded partial ordering, consisting of chains of conditions that terminate in ultimate
grounds cf. Fine: , p.  footnote .
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an element in a phenomenal logical complex. Phenomena are not independent
existents, but are rather dependent and derivative entities. Accordingly, it is not
just the case that the properties of objects within the phenomenal domain are
supervenient. Rather, the domain itself is supervenient. Given this relation
between phenomena and noumena, we can infer from there being phenomena
that there are noumena. For there to be constructions there must be something
out of which they are constructed. ere must be things that can feature as the
elements of the logical complexes.
us, noumena determine both the existence and the determinations of phe-
nomena – that they exist and how they exist. is connection can be captured
by strong supervenience relations. A-properties supervene on B-properties iﬀ B-
indiscernibility implies A-indiscernibility. We are dealing with a strong superve-
nience relation if this implication holds even if the objects that are indiscernible
with respect to B-properties are to be found in diﬀerent worlds. A strong deter-
mination relation is not just a relation that holds within worlds but also across
worlds. It thereby rules out cross-world variation in A-properties amongst objects
that are indiscernible in B-properties.
Supervenience principles can have diﬀerent modal strengths, depending on
the range of worlds for which they hold. In particular, we can distinguish be-
tween logical supervenience, which holds in all possible worlds such that B-
indiscernibility unrestrictedly implies A-indiscernibility, and nomological super-
venience, which holds in possible worlds where certain bridge laws obtain such
that B-indiscernibility implies A-indiscernibility only in that restricted range of
worlds.
Since phenomena are logical complexes, it follows that logical supervenience
characterises the relation between noumena and phenomena. Phenomena are
not emergent entities that require bridge laws to come into existence. All that is
required for the existence of phenomena is the existence of the relevant kinds of
noumena. We need nothing more than noumena to get phenomena since they
are logical complexes that have as their elements translated information provided
by noumena. In other words, noumenal properties exhaust the supervenience
base and the supervenience relation holds with logical necessity.
It might be objected that the forms of intuition play a role analogous to that
of bridge laws and that the supervenience claim should thus be restricted in such
a way as to hold only in cases where the forms of intuition are present. However,
as will be argued below (cf. ..), the forms of intuition mediate the superve-
is kind of connection is what Kim calls ‘existence supervenience’. “ere is no world in
which individuals of D exist but in which individuals of D do not” (Kim: , p. ).
e same connection also holds for appearances. If there is an appearance, then there is
something that grounds the existence of that appearance. We cannot have appearances without
things in themselves. is is because appearances are inexistent intentional objects and inexistent
objects require something wherein they can inexist, namely the reﬂexive awareness of a noumenal
representation.
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nience relation, rather than entering into the supervenience base. For there to
be phenomena, no actual observers with the human forms of intuition are re-
quired. e forms of intuition enter into the logical construction of phenomena
as a mediation relation independently of whether or not there are any beings in
that world that actually possess these forms.
Only when it comes to appearances, do the forms of intuition play a role in the
supervenience base because they are then relevant in producing that upon which
appearances supervene, namely the noumenal mental states. Since appearances
are the immediate objects of awareness of cognitive beings with the human forms
of intuition, it follows that there must be actual observers with the relevant forms
of intuition if there are to be appearances.
ere is thus an important diﬀerence in the way in which appearances and
phenomena depend on the forms of intuition. Since appearances are emergent
inexistents they are dependent on the conditions of emergence. Phenomena, on
the contrary, are logical complexes and are therefore in a way nothing over and
above the elements out of which they are constructed.
.. Multiple-domain supervenience
Ordinary supervenience relations concern the dependent-variation of diﬀerent
families of properties instantiated by the same objects. Such relations require
that objects that are indiscernible in terms of subvening properties are also in-
discernible in terms of supervening properties. is understanding of superve-
nience is not adequate for capturing the grounding relation between noumena
and phenomena since the subvening and supervening properties are instantiated
by distinct things that are to be found in diﬀerent domains. As a result, we have
to appeal to multiple-domain supervenience relations. Phenomenal properties
supervene on noumenal properties even though these properties have diﬀerent
exempliﬁers. Two distinct and disjoint domains are involved in the supervenience
relation in such a way that indiscernible distributions of properties in the subven-
ing domain give rise to indiscernible distributions in the supervening domain.
In the case of single-domain supervenience relations, A-properties supervene
on B-properties iﬀ B-indiscernibility implies A-indiscernibility. Two distribu-
tions are indiscernible with respect to B-properties if there is a B-preserving iso-
morphism. A mapping   counts as such a property-preserving isomorphism iﬀ
any x in D has any B-property F if and only if the object to which x is mapped
More precisely, we can identify two roles played by the forms of intuition. On the one
hand, they play a role in bringing about a noumenal mental state with a spatial or temporal
representational content, depending on whether we are dealing with representations of outer or
inner objects. On the other hand, the form of inner sense, understood as reﬂexive awareness,
plays a role in leading to the emergence of a temporalised intentionale that is immanent to the
act of awareness.
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by   in D also has F. us, A-properties supervene on B-properties iﬀ all B-
preserving isomorphisms are A-preserving. e problem now is to determine
what it means for there to be supervenience relations connecting distributions in
diﬀerent domains. In particular, we face the problem of specifying the relation
between the mappings in the diﬀerent domains. When dealing with a single do-
main, we can simply specify that every B-preserving mapping is an A-preserving
mapping. is, however, cannot be done when dealing with a plurality of do-
mains since we then have a plurality of mappings.
ismeans that we need to ﬁnd someway to connect the domains and thereby
connect the mappings. According to transcendental idealism, the two domains
are co-ordinated and connected, rather than being independent of each other.
Consequently, the mappings should not be independent of each other. is con-
dition can be satisﬁed by appealing to co-ordination relations that allow us to
identify the images of members of one domain in the other domain. Such co-
ordination relations allow us to connect the mappings of the members of one
domain with the mappings of their images in the other domain.
We can then say that supervenience holds iﬀ every property-preserving map-
ping on the subvening level is such that the images of the mapped objects are also
indiscernible. To state this properly we need to specify the notion of an associated
mapping.
  A mapping of members of the supervening domain
 0 from DS onto DS counts as an associated mapping of a mapping of
members of the subvening domain   from DB onto DB , if it is the case
that if any collection of members x. . . xn from DB is mapped onto x. . . x

n
from DB by  , then  0 maps the images of x. . . xn under R in DS, i.e.
y. . . yn, onto the images of x. . . x

n under R in DS , i.e. y

. . . y

n.
is notion then allows us to specify strong global multiple-domain superve-
nience relations, whereby the associated mappings of all B-preserving isomor-
phisms must be A-preserving isomorphisms if A-properties are to supervene on
B-properties.
If the set of B-properties should include irreducibly plural properties, then the notion of B-
indiscernibility must be supplemented by the condition that any plurality of xx’s has any plural
B-property F iﬀ the image of the plurality under   also has F (whereby the image of a plurality is
the plurality of the images of the members of the plurality).
is strong version can be distinguished from a weak version, whereby every B-preserving iso-
morphism must only have some associated A-preserving isomorphism, yet since the weak version
fails to track interesting dependence and determination relations we can set this version aside.
- for all worlds w and w*, every B-preserving mapping of the members of the subvening
domains of w and w* has an associated A-preserving mapping of the members of the
supervening domains of w and w*.
ese co-ordinated versions diﬀer only if the co-ordination relation fails to be unique, i.e. if
x. . . xn has a plurality of images under R in the supervening domain. In such cases, a particular
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- for all worlds w and w*, every B-preserving mapping of the members of
the subvening domains of w and w* is such that all its associated mappings
of the members of the supervening domains of w and w* are A-preserving.
Put diﬀerently:
A-properties supervene on B-properties iﬀ for all worlds w and w*, every
mapping   of objects in the subvening domains of w and w* that is such
that any x or plurality of xx’s has any B-property F if and only if the object
or plurality to which x or the xx’s are mapped by   also has F is also such
that any image under R of x or of the xx’s has any A-property G if and only
if any image under R of the object or plurality to which x or the xx’s are
mapped by   also has G.
We saw earlier how phenomena arise as a result of the process of intuition.
is process features in our supervenience analysis insofar as it provides the co-
ordination relation that connects the domains and insofar as it restricts the su-
pervenience base by selecting a subset of the noumenal realm, namely the tran-
scendental as opposed to transcendent realm. ese features will be explored in
more detailed in the following two sub-sections.
.. Domain co-ordination
e supervenience relation that characterises the relation between the noumenal
and phenomenal realms is a co-ordinated supervenience relation. e phenom-
enal sphere is not holistically determined by the noumenal sphere. Instead, the
determination is more ﬁne-grained insofar as it connects diﬀerent objects fea-
turing in the two domains. Particular phenomena are grounded in particular
noumena. We can model this feature of the grounding relation by incorporat-
ing a co-ordination relation (R) into our supervenience principle. is relation
allows us to connect the domains in a non-holistic manner, by connecting partic-
ular members of the diﬀerent domains. Such a co-ordination relation is not too
restrictive since the mere condition that it connects members of the domains does
not determine whether a one-one, one-many, many-one, many-many or variably
polyadic connection holds.
e role of the co-ordination relation becomes particularly clear when con-
sidering the multiple-domain supervenience version of individual as opposed to
global supervenience:
Phenomenal properties supervene on noumenal properties relative to co-
ordination relation R just in case for any collections of phenomenal objects
mapping of the subvening domain will have a plurality of associated mappings, allowing us to
distinguish between a weak version of multiple-domain supervenience that requires only that one
of these associated mappings be A-preserving and a strong version that requires that all of them
be A-preserving.
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x. . . xn and y. . . yn that have images under R and any worlds w and w*, if
Rjx. . . xn in w is indiscernible with respect to noumenal properties from
Rjy. . . yn in w*, then x. . . xn in w is indiscernible with respect to phenom-
enal properties from y. . . yn in w*.
In the preceding section we gave technical reasons why a co-ordination relation is
required when dealing with multiple-domain supervenience. Now we have seen
that there is independent philosophical motivation for accepting such a relation
insofar as it is required to make sense of non-holistic determination and depen-
dence relations between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. Moreover, there
is a good candidate relation for connecting the domains to which we can appeal,
namely the translation function of the process of intuition.
e forms of intuition thus feature in the supervenience relation insofar as
they are built into the co-ordination relation. Domains are co-ordinated when
there is some relation between the members of the diﬀerent domains that allows
us to identify the objects in the supervening domain that correspond to partic-
ular subvening objects or collection of such objects. is enables us to connect
the mappings of the diﬀerent domains that are used for assessing for property-
preserving isomorphisms. In our case, this relation is the translation function.is
function translates the matter provided by noumena into phenomenal properties,
allowing us to identify the phenomenal ‘images’ of the noumenal entities. e
fact that we do impose certain frameworks into which the information contained
in the manifold of intuition is translated ensures that noumena and phenomena
are co-ordinated and that the supervenience relation is mediated. e particular
translation functions associated with these frameworks then determine the pre-
cise nature of this mediation, the way in which the co-ordination takes place.
Supervenience holds if B-indiscernibility implies A-indiscernibility. In other
words, if the base properties are distributed in the same way, then the supervening
properties must also be distributed in the same way. When trying to apply this to
the grounding relation the problem arises that we need to give an account of how
to individuate distributions of subvening properties. We seem to get into trouble
due to our ignorance of noumena. is lack of knowledge seems to preclude the
possibility of giving an adequate speciﬁcation of the individuation of noumenal
property distributions.
Put diﬀerently, to assess for indiscernibility we appeal to property-preserving
isomorphisms. is, however, requires us to specify noumenal mappings and it
is not clear at all what the members of the domain are that should be mapped.
When there is a one-many co-ordination relation that connects one phenomenal feature to
a plurality of noumenal features, there will not be a unique noumenal feature that is the image
of x and that can be mapped. Instead, the image of x will be a collection of features and one
has to assess the collection for indiscernibility by mapping its members. e same holds, mutatis
mutandis, for many-one and many-many relations.
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ese could be noumenal objects, certain aspects of such noumenal objects, or
some other individuating characteristic such as noumenal analogues of spatio-
temporal positions. ere seems to be no way for us to provide an exhaustive list
of the possible candidates, nor any principled way to decide between them. We
simply do not know how to individuate noumenal grounds.
is problem can be solved by appealing to the co-ordination relation. All
that is required is that there is some co-ordination between phenomenal and
noumenal entities or items. Whether the latter turn out to be objects or as-
pects of objects or something altogether diﬀerent can be completely left open.
Rather than providing a direct characterisation of the way in which noumenal
property distributions are individuated, we should characterise this individuation
indirectly by means of the co-ordination relation. We can do this by providing
an account of the individuation of phenomenal property distributions and then
let the co-ordination relation pick out the noumenal analogues of these individ-
uating features.
In other words, we can give an indirect account that speciﬁes how to individ-
uate phenomenal properties and then appeals to the images of these individuating
features. In this way, we can indirectly identify the relevant unit of analysis which
individuates the distribution of noumenal properties. Hence, all we need to do
is to give an adequate account of the individuation of distributions of phenome-
nal properties. e co-ordination relation will then take care of specifying in an
indirect manner the corresponding noumenal individuating features.
How then are phenomenal property distributions to be individuated, and
what are the members of the distributions which are mapped when assessing for
property-preserving isomorphisms? Two candidates suggest themselves, namely
(i) spatio-temporal points and (ii) phenomenal objects. Given that ontological
structure derives from the noumenal realm, and given that there do not exist any
bounded and uniﬁed individual objects at the phenomenal level when this level
is considered on its own, it follows that we should not use a substantive notion
of objecthood in characterising property distributions. Accordingly, we should
either use a non-substantive notion of objecthood or appeal to spatio-temporal
distributions. It turns out that these two options are equivalent since, according
to the minimal understanding of objects, phenomenal objects can be understood
as ﬁlled spatio-temporal regions. An object in this minimal sense is a collection
of properties local to a spatio-temporal region. Properties are distributed across
regions and objects are then identiﬁed with these ﬁlled regions. We can thus see
ese minimal objects are contrasted with ontologically substantive phenomenal objects,
with phenomenal substances, which require the properties that are bundled into a minimal object
to be bounded and uniﬁed as a result of being adequately grounded.
is minimal understanding of an object has close analogues in ﬁeld theories as well as in
supersubstantivalistic theories. Transcendental idealism allows us to reap the beneﬁts of this min-
imal notion of an object without incurring the costs that this notion brings with it in the context
of these other theories. For example, while ﬁeld theories as well as supersubstantivalistic theories
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that individuating in terms of the minimal notion of objecthood, whereby a phe-
nomenal object is considered as a ﬁlled spatio-temporal region, actually coincides
with individuating in terms of spatio-temporal structures of property instantia-
tions. Hence, we should not use a metaphysically signiﬁcant notion of an object
in characterising property distributions, but should rather claim that superve-
nience holds if we have indiscernible ﬁlled spatio-temporal regions, given that
the images of those regions are indiscernible.
Once we accept that the realms are connected in this way, it may be won-
dered why we cannot gain knowledge of noumena by means of our knowledge
of phenomena. Given that phenomena and noumena correspond to each other
and stand in these co-ordinated supervenience relations, it should be possible to
identify the noumenal counterparts of phenomena. Given that there is this meta-
physical connection between the realms, it would seem that there should also be
an epistemological connection.
is epistemological connection is prominent in Leibniz’s notion of ‘expres-
sion’. “What is common to all these expressions is that we can pass from a con-
sideration of the properties of the expression to a consideration of the properties
expressed” (quoted in Langton: , p. ). As has been mentioned previously,
phenomena express noumena insofar as they are manifestations of noumena.
More precisely, they are temporalised and spatialised manifestations. We have
a co-ordinated supervenience relation which is based on certain translation and
ﬁltering processes. Given these translation processes, it follows that there is no
perfect mirroring relation between the realms. Moreover, since these processes
are intersubjective, if follows that one realm is not merely to be understood as
involving confused perception of the other (cf. ..).
While we do have this manifestation relation, we are unable to pass from
considerations of phenomena to considerations of noumena due to our cogni-
tive limitations. ese limitations are various and impose a strict boundary on
our knowledge. e kind of knowledge that is ruled out by these considerations
is positive knowledge of the determinations of noumena. ere is no problem
in claiming that we have negative knowledge. For instance, we do know that
noumena are not in space and time. ere is also no problem claiming that we
have knowledge of formal properties and higher-order properties. For example,
we do know that noumena are self-identical and that they possess properties. In
short, because of various cognitive limitations, we are ignorant of the positive
have the problematic consequence of making all minimal objects modally rigid, we can account
for the modal ﬂexibility of minimal objects. is can be without undermining the modal rigidity
of spatio-temporal regions since transcendental idealism provides us with two ways of individuat-
ing objects, namely (i) in terms of their phenomenal features, and (ii) in terms of their noumenal
grounds. Only the former way coincides with the rigid way of individuating spatio-temporal re-
gions. e latter version is independent of spatio-temporal characteristics, thereby providing us
with the requisite ﬂexibility.
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determinations of noumena.
To begin with, we are not able to acquire knowledge of the noumenal realm
because we lack intuitions of noumena. Moreover, we lack the conceptual re-
sources to determinately capture the noumenal realm. All we have in order to
think noumena are the unschematised categories. ese categories, however,
are rather abstract. ey only allow us to think certain quite formal features of
noumena. at is, we have no grasp of noumena, except to the extent to which
they fall under the pure and unschematised categories. Since these categories are
quite general and do not fully determine an object, the most we can say is that
noumenal features and objects instantiate some kind of order that possesses cer-
tain formal features. e precise nature of this ordering, however, is unknown to
us and not conceivable by means of our conceptual repertoire.
Additionally, there are worries regarding the multiple realisability of phenom-
enal roles that undermine any attempt to make inferences about noumena. Even
when we do know that there must be a role ﬁller, our knowledge is restricted to
knowing that the role is ﬁlled by something or other, but we never know what
exactly it is that ﬁlls the role. Multiple things could ﬁll this role and there is no
way for us to single out the actual role ﬁller. In a sense, our ignorance is ineﬀable,
to borrow Lewis’s phrase, since we do not even know what the diﬀerent options
are (cf. Lewis: , pp. -). at is, we do not even know what the
diﬀerent possible realisers are.
Even if there were only one possible candidate for ﬁlling the role, we would
not know what would be ﬁlling the role and would not be able to characterise
this unique realiser. is is because we are neither acquainted with the realiser,
nor can we identify it by appealing to the inverse of the translation function since
we lack knowledge of the way the mediation relation works and are not able to
reverse engineer the process whereby phenomena arise. Accordingly, we would
lack the conceptual resources to give a transparent speciﬁcation of the realiser and
could only specify it opaquely as whatever it is that fulﬁls the role in question.
us, even though phenomena are manifestations of noumena and stand in
a co-ordination relation to them, we are not able to make any determinate infer-
ences about the latter from the former. At most, we can treat them as indications
of what noumenal reality might be like.
.. Transcendent and transcendental properties
So far, we have indiscriminately referred to the noumenal sphere as constituting
the supervenience base of the phenomenal sphere. By appealing to the process
of intuition, we can give a more ﬁne-grained account of the base properties as
well as of the subvening domain. is process allows us to distinguish between
e distinction between transparent and opaque speciﬁcations is due to Foster (cf. Foster:
, p. ).
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various kinds of noumenal properties and restrict the set of subvening properties
to a proper sub-set of the noumenal properties. In particular, it is the selection
function of the process of intuition that is responsible for demarcating the tran-
scendental properties and for restricting the supervenience base. Given the way
the selection function works, it follows that the supervenience base is restricted
to transcendental properties. at is, phenomenal properties supervene only on a
sub-set of the properties of the noumenal realm, namely on transcendental rather
than transcendent properties.
More precisely, the selection function determines which properties count as
transcendent properties, namely those that provide a manifold that is incompat-
ible with the forms of intuition. In addition, properties that are inert and do
not give rise to a manifold at all also classify as transcendent properties. ese
transcendent properties do not enter into the process of intuition and are in that
respect irrelevant to the genesis of the phenomenal sphere. ey are consequently
also irrelevant to the supervenience relation that models the grounding relation
between noumena and phenomena. Since they do not aﬀect phenomena insofar
as phenomena do not immediately depend on them and are not determined by
them, they do not belong into the supervenience base.
ere may, of course, be relations amongst objects or properties within the
noumenal realm, that would make some, or maybe even all, transcendental prop-
erties dependent on certain transcendent properties. is would, for instance, be
the case if everything were to be ontologically dependent on God. at is, for all
we know, it might be the case that there are internal or external necessary con-
nections in the noumenal realm. ese connections would make it the case that
any nomologically or logically possible world (depending on what kind of ne-
cessity is involved in the necessary connections) that contains the transcendental
properties would also contain those transcendent properties that are connected
to transcendental properties by means of these connections.
is, however, does not aﬀect the supervenience principle which states that
indiscernibility in terms of transcendental properties implies indiscernibility in
terms of phenomenal properties. It will still be the case that if the same transcen-
dental properties are instantiated, then the same phenomenal properties will also
be instantiated. All it does imply is that it might be nomologically or logically
impossible to have a world that contains an isolated duplicate of the transcen-
dental realm. In other words, it might not be possible to have a duplicate of the
transcendental realm without there being transcendent properties of certain kinds
(if we have generic dependencies) or without there being particular transcendent
properties (if we have rigid dependencies).
In order to get a supervenience principle that takes the restriction of the super-
venience base into account, we have to assess for indiscernibility with respect to
transcendental properties. Rjx. . . xn and Rjy. . . yn have to be indiscernible only
with respect to transcendental properties in order for indiscernible phenomenal
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properties to arise, rather than having to be indiscernible with respect to noume-
nal properties in general. Accordingly, as long as Rjx. . . xn and Rjy. . . yn are
indiscernible in terms of transcendental properties, x and y must be indiscernible
with respect to phenomenal properties, even if Rjx. . . xn and Rjy. . . yn diﬀer in
transcendent properties, since indiscernibility in terms of transcendental proper-
ties suﬃces for making objects B-indiscernible given that transcendent properties
are excluded from the supervenience base.
All the subvening properties are members of the set of transcendental prop-
erties. As a result, the co-ordination relation R connects phenomenal objects
and properties to a sub-set of the noumenal realm, namely the transcendental
realm. is means that any Rjx. . . xn is an object with transcendental properties.
Objects that only have transcendent properties do not feature in the subvening
domain since they do not ground phenomena.
Phenomenal properties supervene on transcendental properties relative to
co-ordination relation R just in case for any collections of phenomenal
objects x. . . xn and y. . . yn that have images under R and any worlds w
and w*, if Rjx. . . xn in w is indiscernible with respect to transcendental
properties from Rjy. . . yn in w*, then x. . . xn in w is indiscernible with
respect to phenomenal properties from y. . . yn in w*.
Alternatively:
Phenomenal properties supervene on transcendental properties relative to
co-ordination relation R just in case for any worlds w and w*, every map-
ping   of transcendental objects from w and w* that preserves transcen-
dental properties is such that all its associated mappings of phenomenal
objects from w and w* preserve phenomenal properties.
ese supervenience claims reﬂect all the features of the grounding relation that
we have discussed, insofar as they are (i) irreﬂexive, (ii) strong cross-world superve-
nience claims, that (iii) hold with logical necessity for all worlds, (vi) connecting
properties across multiple domains, whereby (v) the domains are co-ordinated
and whereby (vi) we assess the indiscernibility of supervenience bases in terms of
transcendental properties.
. e reducibility of phenomena
While reductive accounts of the empirical realm usually involve phenomenalis-
tic reductions whereby sense-data or something of the like constitute the reduc-
tive base, we are able to appeal to a noumenal reductive base. In this way we
can side-step the various problems that befall phenomenalistic reductions. Given
that phenomena are logical constructs that are noumenally grounded, it follows
that we can give a reductive account of phenomena. We can reduce phenomena
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to noumenal features via the forms of intuition. In particular, we can construct
empirical objects out of noumenal information by means of the transformation
functions that derive from the forms of intuition. Phenomena then are nothing
over and above the translated informational manifold and are accordingly com-
pletely reducible.
Accordingly, transcendental idealists are not involved in the project of giv-
ing translations of physical-object statements to statements about experiences or
sense-perceptions or any other such semantic reduction or linguistic project. e
reduction neither tries to reduce objects to actual or available representations,
nor tries to reduce physical-language statements to statements about sensory ex-
periences. Since we do not construct the empirical world out of experienceable
items, such as sense-data, representations or intentionalia, the theory does not
classify as phenomenalistic. Rather than being constructed out of representa-
tions, phenomena are constructed out of that which gives rise to representations,
that which makes representations and experience possible, namely the matter of
intuition and the forms of intuition. We thereby do not end up with phenom-
enalism, but with a logical construction view. Phenomena are logical complexes
and the reduction is ‘noumenalistic’, rather than phenomenalistic. Such an onto-
logical view provides a metaphysical reduction of objects, rather than a linguistic
or analytic reduction of physical-object statements to statements regarding expe-
rience.
Despite not being a phenomenalistic project, it nonetheless classiﬁes as an
idealist account of the empirical realm. is is because of the ideality of the forms
of intuition, which establish the heterogeneity of the noumenal and phenomenal
realms. Transcendental idealism combines a reductive theory of objects with the
view that space and time are mere forms of intuition. It is this combination that
ensures that the theory classiﬁes as a type of idealism, namely a transcendental or
formal idealism.
Since the forms of intuition are our contributions and derive from the struc-
ture of our minds, it follows that everything that is permeated by these forms
of intuition does not belong to reality as it is in itself. Since phenomena are
matter-in-form they inherit the ideality of their forms and thus classify as being
transcendentally ideal. at is, since the form is transcendentally ideal insofar
as it does not apply to things in themselves, it follows that the matter that is in
the form, while it is considered as matter-in-form, is also transcendentally ideal.
Nonetheless, phenomena are empirically real because the matter is absolutely ob-
jective and because the forms are intersubjectively objective.
Put diﬀerently, the untranslated matter of phenomena is transcendentally real
is theory is also combined with an understanding of the categories as pure concepts of the
understanding that structure our thought and experience. However, the categories matter with
regard to idealism only to the extent that the ideality of the forms of intuition is presupposed.
More precisely, we only contribute space and time, while the categories simply allow us to capture
something that is already there (cf. .).
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since it derives from the noumenal realm, while the forms of intuition are tran-
scendentally ideal since they are our contribution to the phenomenal world, yet
are empirically real and objective for us since they are essentially shared by us.
is implies that the translated matter is empirically real and transcendentally
ideal. It is transcendentally ideal because it is something transcendentally real
that is translated into a transcendentally ideal framework. Since the framework is
transcendentally ideal, it follows that that which features therein is also transcen-
dentally ideal, as long as it is considered in its translated form. It is empirically real
because the untranslated matter is transcendentally real and because the forms are
empirically real. us, phenomena are empirically real with regard to form and
matter, but transcendentally ideal with regard to form and translated matter.
In this way we get transcendental idealism without material idealism. e
way that form aﬀects matter does not imply that we get the ideality of matter,
but only the ideality of matter-in-form. Since matter is only given to us in form,
it follows that matter as known to us is ideal. While matter-in-form is ideal, mat-
ter as it is in itself independently of the forms of intuition is mind-independent.
Transcendental idealism “leaves free from ideality everything not speciﬁcally de-
pendent on space and time, such as even the matter of representation as such”
(Ameriks: , p. ).
Given that the subjectivity of the forms of intuition plays such a crucial role,
it is so important to establish that the neglected alternative is properly neglected
and that the forms of intuition really are merely forms of intuition and do not
also apply to things in themselves. In support of this view, it can be argued that
space and time are mental frameworks and that mental frameworks which are
essentially mind-dependent cannot adequately resemble non-mental frameworks
that are mind-independent (cf. Allison: , pp. -). In addition to
considerations stemming from the Antinomies, this appeal to the heterogeneity
of the frameworks strongly supports the claim that space and time are mere forms
of intuition that are restricted to the phenomenal realm.
.. e status of phenomena
Logical constructs are virtual objects that only exist in a manner of speaking. ey
are nominal subjects of predication rather than emergent existents. ey are not
emergent ontological entities, but instead can be fully reduced. While phenom-
ena are logical constructs in Russell’s sense or logical complexes as understood
by Carnap, it is important to note that we have to give a metaphysical reading
of these notions in terms of facts rather than statements. For example, Carnap
distinguishes between a sum and a logical complex, claiming that the former is
e ‘neglected alternative’ is usually associated with Trendelenburg who claimed that showing
that space and time are forms of intuition is compatible with space and time also applying to things
in themselves, which would imply that Kant neglected the view that space and time might both
be forms of intuition and mind-independent features of objective reality.
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composed of its elements, while the latter does not stand in a parthood relation to
its elements but instead is related to its elements in such a way that all statements
about the complex can be transformed into statements about the elements (cf.
Carnap: , x). We can adapt this account by making facts regarding logical
complexes reducible to facts about their elements. e existence of a complex
then consists in nothing over and above the obtaining of its elements.
us, empirical objects are logical constructs that can be reduced to noume-
nal information via the forms of intuition. e phenomenal realm is determined
by the matter of intuition together with the forms of intuition. Matter and form
jointly determine the features of the phenomenal realm. is implies that phe-
nomena are mind-independent to the extent to which they depend on the matter
of intuition andmind-dependent to the extent to which they depend on the forms
of intuition. In particular, phenomena depend for their existence on the matter,
whilst they partly depend for their determinations on the forms.
e existence of noumena implies the existence of noumenal information.
e existence of such information, in turn, implies the existence of phenom-
ena. is is because phenomena are logical constructs that have as their elements
translated noumenal information. In short, the existence of phenomena logically
follows from the existence of the right kind of noumenal information. Since we
are dealing with logical constructs, no actual cognitive processing is required and
there is no need for there to be any cognitive beings with these forms of intuition.
ough phenomena are in a certain sense mind-dependent, given that they de-
pend on the forms of intuition, the sense in which they are mind-dependent is,
however, rather minimal since the existence of phenomena does not even require
the actual existence of cognitive subjects. All we need for there to be phenomena
is for there to be a manifold of intuition and this requires only the existence of
actual noumenal objects. is is because the forms of intuition mediate the su-
pervenience relation, given that they act as co-ordination functions, rather than
being part of the supervenience base.
While the forms of intuition do feature in the supervenience relation that con-
nects noumena and phenomena, they do not feature in the supervenience base but
rather mediate the supervenience relation. We do not reduce phenomena to the
conjunction of noumena and forms of intuition, but rather reduce phenomena to
noumena via the forms of intuition. Conversely, we generate phenomena out of
noumena via forms of intuition, rather than out of the conjunction of noumena
and forms of intuition. e forms mediate the relation between noumena and
phenomena by specifying the selection, ﬁltering and translation processes that are
applied to the manifold of intuition, instead of being ingredients in the reductive
base. is mediation does not require the actual existence of cognitive beings
with these forms of intuition. e translation and transformation functions that
characterise the forms of intuition can mediate the supervenience relation with-
out there existing a subject that has these forms. All that is necessary for the
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existence of phenomena is the supervenience base.
Accordingly, transcendental idealism is committed to the claim that if one
“were to take away the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world would have
to disappear, as this is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of our subject
and one mode of its representations” (A; also cf. A/B). is is true if one
is concerned with the world of appearances. e subjective spatial and temporal
frameworks and all the objects therein are dependent as regards their existence
on the subjects. However, it does not hold for phenomena and the constructed
intersubjective spatio-temporal framework wherein they exist since their existence
is not dependent on representations at all. Tomake phenomena vanish one would
have to remove not the subject but the noumenal object.
.. Reducing phenomenal relations
We have argued that phenomena are grounded in noumena and that the former
are reducible to the latter via the forms of intuition. To this it may be objected that
there are irreducible relations at the phenomenal level, that certain phenomenal
relations are non-supervenient and that this implies that we cannot consider all
aspects of the phenomenal realm to be supervenient.
e irreducibility of phenomenal relations would indeed undermine the claim
that the phenomenal sphere supervenes on the noumenal sphere. Yet, while there
is a sense in which certain phenomenal relations are indeed irreducible, this turns
out to be unproblematic since they are reducible in another sense. More precisely,
there are phenomenal relations, such as spatio-temporal relations, which cannot
be reduced to the intrinsic properties of their relata. ese relations occupy a
fundamental position within the ontological inventory of the phenomenal realm.
is is unproblematic since the fact that something is not reducible to phenom-
enal properties does not imply that it is not reducible tout court. ough they
cannot be reduced to any other phenomenal items, these relations are reducible
to noumenal features. While they do not supervene on phenomenal properties,
they do supervene on noumenal features.
ere is nothing that precludes there being noumenal relations that can fea-
ture in the supervenience base of the phenomenal realm. While it might be the
case that phenomenal relations do not supervene on noumenal non-relational
properties alone, it seems reasonable to claim that they do supervene on a base
that includes noumenal relational properties. us, if the ‘non-supervenient’ phe-
nomenal relations are to be grounded, it is not suﬃcient to ground the intrinsic
properties of their relata. Instead, we need to provide a direct ground of these rela-
tions. Accordingly, we should claim that phenomenal relations that do not super-
How we ought to understand the reducibility of chiral relations and what impact this will
have on the argument from incongruent counterparts will not be discussed here. An investigation
of this intriguing topic will have to wait for another occasion.
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vene on the intrinsic properties of their relata supervene on noumenal relations,
which means that our supervenience claim must include relations or relational
properties in the supervenience base. Unless we want to be extreme Leibnizians
and argue that all relational properties are reducible to noumenal non-relational
properties, we will have to make room for noumenal relations upon which these
‘non-supervenient’ relations can supervene.
us, we can claim that relational and non-relational phenomenal properties
supervene on relational and non-relational noumenal properties. We must take
the relational properties of the noumenal grounds into consideration if we are to
have a supervenience principle that covers all phenomenal features. Accordingly,
we can claim that the phenomenal sphere is wholly sustained by noumena, that it
is a logical complex and that every aspect of it, including every relational aspect,
is reducible to that out of which it is constructed.
Transcendental idealism commits us to the reducibility of phenomenal rela-
tions, including the reducibility of spatio-temporal relations. To this it can be
objected that such a reduction of phenomenal relations amounts to ontologising
space and time in the way done by Leibnizians and that Kantians should be suspi-
cious of such a commitment. To ontologise space and time amounts to treating
them as transcendentally real, making them properties of things in themselves.
Understood in this way, we can see why Leibnizians ontologise space and time
insofar as they accept the reducibility of spatio-temporal relations, even though
they argue that monads are atemporal and aspatial. If spatio-temporal relations
are reducible to monads, then they are features of monads, even if monads them-
selves are neither in space nor in time. ey are not fundamental features of
monads but are rather derivative features. is means that the reducibility of
spatio-temporal relations implies that space and time turn out to be features of
monads, that is, of things in themselves.
e Kantian can avoid treating space and time as transcendentally real, while
accepting the reducibility of relational properties. is combination of views is
possible because of the imposition and translation functions involved in the pro-
cess of intuition. ese functions mediate the supervenience relation and con-
sequently also mediate the reducibility relation. In both the Leibnizian and the
Kantian system there is supervenience and reducibility. What diﬀerentiates them
is that the supervenience relation in the latter system is a co-ordinated multiple
domain supervenience relation, whereby the co-ordination relation is provided
by the process of intuition. Rather than understanding phenomena as just being
confused perceptions of noumena, they are logical complexes that result from a
transformation process that translates the information contained in the manifold
of intuition into imposed frameworks, namely the forms of intuition. Conse-
quently, the relation between monads and phenomena in the Leibnizian system is
characterised by a non-mediated reducibility relation. Spatio-temporal relations
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are therefore immediately reducible to determinations of monads. e Kantian
system also includes a commitment to a supervenience relation. Yet, the superve-
nience relation in this system is mediated by the translation process. Accordingly,
we need both (i) the supervenience base and (ii) the transformation functions in
order to reduce spatio-temporal relations. is means that we are dealing with a
mediated reducibility relation.
e diﬀerence between the two systems derives from the forms of intuition.
e forms of intuition ensure that we have real heterogeneity, rather than merely
confused perceptions. ese forms genuinely add something and thereby en-
sure that we do not have a direct reducibility to the properties of noumena. We
need something in addition to the non-relational properties of noumena to get
phenomena. We even need something in addition to the non-relational and re-
lational properties of noumena to get phenomena. What we need is the transla-
tion scheme. It is the translation scheme that provides the connection between
noumena and phenomena, thereby mediating the supervenience and reducibility
relations. In this way the forms of intuition ensure that the mediated reducibil-
ity of spatio-temporal relations does not involve the ontologisation of space and
time.
From a Kantian point of view, the kind of reducibility of relational prop-
erties to which Leibnizians are committed is particularly problematic given that
Leibnizians hold a relationalist view of space and time. In the context of such a
relationalist view, the reduction of spatio-temporal relations amounts to a reduc-
tion of space and time themselves. is is something the Kantian cannot accept.
Space and time would thereby become relational properties of things in them-
selves. For the Kantian, however, space and time are forms of intuition. ey
are not reducible to noumenal relations, but are our contributions to the phe-
nomenal realm. While the Kantian needs to reject the reducibility of space and
time, there is no need to reject the reducibility of spatio-temporal relations. We
can reduce spatial relations without reducing space itself. All that needs to be re-
jected is the relationalist view of space and time. Instead, the Kantian can claim
that space and time are mental frameworks. As such, they are independent of any
spatio-temporal relations. ings are related within space and time, rather than
space and time merely being the systems of spatio-temporal relations.
According to transcendental idealism, spatio-temporal relations are grounded
in and supervene on noumenal relations. As a result, we can reduce spatio-
temporal relations to noumenal relations. is reduction, however, has to go
via the forms of intuition, thereby avoiding worries of ontologising space and
time. To understand how this works, we need to appeal to the co-ordinated su-
pervenience relation and to the role of the translation function. is allows us to
retain our commitment to the view that space and time are nothing but forms of
intuition, while accepting the reducibility of all phenomenal relations.
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.. Antinomial worries
enoumenal grounding theory of transcendental idealism is committed to there
being noumenal grounds for phenomenal facts. is may seem to be problematic
in that it makes the connection between noumena and phenomena too tight. In
particular, two problems arise from this tight connection.
On the one hand, there is a worry that phenomena are not independent
enough from noumena and that this leads to phenomena being merely epiphe-
nomenal. In other words, the noumenal grounds are seen to deprive phenomena
of signiﬁcance. Since the empirical realm is intuitively taken to possess some
form of independence, it may seem worrisome that noumena that are doing all
the work and that phenomena are just manifestations or reﬂections of an under-
lying noumenal reality. (is worry will be discussed in the next section.)
On the other hand, a diﬃculty arises insofar as this theory allows noumena to
do toomuch work, thereby inviting the problems that transcendental realists face.
If the connection between phenomena and noumena is too close, then one may
worry that the former inherit the realism attaching to the latter. In particular, it
may be objected that this version of transcendental idealism does not enable us to
deal with the antinomies anymore and that it does not allow us to give regulative
principles their due regard. Accepting noumenal grounds does not suﬃciently
recognise the object-constituting role that supposedly is an essential aspect of
transcendental idealism. e objection states that if this object-constituting role
were denied, and if phenomena were to inherit their reality from noumena, then
this would have the eﬀect of hypostatising phenomena, which would undercut
the transcendental idealist’s response to the antinomies. e phenomenal realm
would then end up being subject to antinomial paradoxes after all. In particular,
even though noumena would not be subject to antinomies, given that they are
outside of space and time, noumenally-grounded phenomena would be spatio-
temporal entities that would derive their reality from noumena and would thus
be subject to antinomies.
While considerations of space preclude us from giving a comprehensive treat-
ment of the antinomial conﬂicts, we will give some indication as to how the anti-
nomies can be resolved when accepting the grounding theory. In particular, we
will focus on the second antinomy, which is concerned with the inﬁnite divisibil-
ity of matter. e thesis of the antinomy states that everything must be inﬁnitely
divisible, given that objects occupy inﬁnitely divisible space. e antithesis, on
the contrary, states that we have to accept indivisible simples because we would
otherwise end up with an inﬁnite regress, given that the existence of wholes is
grounded in the existence of their parts. Reason is here in conﬂict with itself
since it can neither accept that matter is inﬁnitely divisible, nor that there are
indivisible simples.
A standard Kantian response to this antinomy consists in treating phenomena
as entities that are constructed or constituted by us, such that they only possess
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parts to the extent to which they are divided. As a result, phenomena turn out to
be indeﬁnitely divisible, without being inﬁnitely divided. Rather than following
this constructivist route, we can accept a realist stance. We can do this by arguing
that spatio-temporal divisibility need not correspond to ontological divisibility.
is means that we will not have a correspondence between spatio-temporal parts
of phenomena and mereological parts of noumena. is then shows that the
antinomy is due to a transcendentally realist construal of space and time, in that
spatio-temporal parts are considered to be the actual parts that make up an object.
A transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can treat spatio-temporal regions and
their parts as merely manifesting features of their grounds.
us, we might have a simple and indivisible noumenon that grounds the
facts holding in an extended region R as well as all the facts in all the sub-regions
of R. Now, this does not mean that the object identiﬁed with region R has
inﬁnitely many parts corresponding to the inﬁnitely many sub-regions of R and
that there are inﬁnitely many distinct grounds for these diﬀerent parts. Instead,
we have a grounding relation connecting one noumenon to an inﬁnite number of
regions contained in R.at is, if we individuate phenomena by means of spatio-
temporal criteria, then we have a one-many grounding relation holding between
noumena and phenomena. One noumenon directly grounds an inﬁnite number
of phenomena (which form a hierarchy connected by an inclusion relation and
harmonise due to the identity of grounds). is means that we do not have the
inﬁnitely many phenomena occupying the sub-regions somehow composing or
making up the phenomenon that occupies region R. e phenomena in these
sub-regions are not mereological parts but only spatio-temporal parts.
While it is true that parts are prior to wholes, as the antithesis states, this does
not apply to spatio-temporal parts but only to mereological parts. Accordingly,
we can restrict this priority claim to the noumenal realm, while allowing inﬁnite
spatio-temporal divisibility at the phenomenal realm. In this way, we end up with
the inﬁnite divisibility of space as well as the inﬁnite divisibility of ﬁlled regions,
without a commitment to there being inﬁnitely divisible mereological parts.
e grounding theory implies that, in some sense, there are no parthood rela-
tions at all in the phenomenal realm since this realm is not intrinsically structured
but derives its structure from its grounds. Phenomena considered on their own
are ontologically amorphous and the phenomenal realm can be characterised by
an adverbial understanding. Now, it is clear that an adverbial account does not
give rise to mereological antinomies since it does not involve quantiﬁcation over
In this way we avoid a clash of what is made true of the region and its sub-regions, as well as
of the sub-regions and their sub-regions and so on.
It might be objected that we end up with inﬁnitely divisible parts of space. Yet, since the
priority of parts applies only to objects and since space is not an object and does not have parts of
which it is composed, it follows that space falls outside the scope of the antithesis. Accordingly, it is
possible to reconcile an acceptance of the antithesis with a commitment to the inﬁnite divisibility
of space.
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any objects that could stand in parthood relations. All that the phenomenal level
contains by itself is inclusion relations holding between ﬁlled regions. However,
it does not contain uniﬁed objects made up of parts. Given that all mereological
structure derives from the noumenal realm, it follows that mereological structure
is not due to spatial structure. In particular, parthood relations and constraints
do not derive from geometrical relations and constraints. e geometrical divis-
ibility of ﬁlled spatial regions thus has to be distinguished from the mereological
divisibility of ontological entities.
Considerations concerning space do not on their own give rise to an anti-
nomy. ere is nothing about the inﬁnite divisibility of space and time that
engenders an antinomy. We only end up with an antinomy if we combine the
view that objects inherit their mereological structure from the structure of space
with the view that parts have ontological priority over wholes. To give rise to
an antinomy, considerations about space must be combined with metaphysical
considerations. In particular, we need objects and substances in order to have
mereological relations. If there were no substances, then there would not be any
mereological relations and hence no antinomies.
Since it is noumena that provide ontological structure, it is they that deter-
mine mereological divisibility. Space and time, on the contrary, are not con-
cerned with mereological relations and do not determine parthood structure. In-
stead, they are individuative frameworks that determine the structure of individ-
uation of spatio-temporal regions and their contents. In particular, the inﬁnite
divisibility of space and time allows for more and more ﬁne-grained adverbial as-
criptions. Regions can be treated as units of individuation and given that regions
are inﬁnitely divisible, it follows that the individuation of the phenomenal realm
can be inﬁnitely ﬁne-grained. Yet, this does not mean that there is a correspon-
dence between mereological units and spatio-temporal individuative units. e
structure of individuation of space and time does not constrain or determine the
mereological structure but only determines how we can individuate phenomenal
features.
In other words, what does derive from geometrical considerations is the indi-
viduation of features of the phenomenal realm. Due to the inﬁnite divisibility of
space and time we can give inﬁnitely ﬁne-grained individuations of phenomenal
features. is, however, does not imply that there correspond bounded mereo-
logical unities to these individuated features. e inﬁnitely ﬁne-grained individ-
uation does not track or highlight objective boundaries. is is because we can
individuate and distinguish beyond the metaphysical structure. In other words,
we can draw arbitrary boundaries and identify ever smaller ﬁlled regions, even
Since all mereological relations derive from noumena, it follows that if we were to have an
antinomy obtaining at the phenomenal level, then this would also aﬀect the noumenal level since
the structure of the former derives from that of the latter (the only exception would be if the
mediation by the forms of intuition would have an impact on the antinomy, which does not
seem to be the case in the scenario at issue).
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though no uniﬁed objects correspond to these regions.
us, the resolution of the second antinomy that a grounding theorist can give
involves a scope-restriction that involves disconnecting the geometrical structure
of phenomena and the mereological structure of noumena. We restrict the meta-
physical principle about the priority of parts to the metaphysical realm, that is,
to the noumenal realm. At the same time, we restrict the geometrical principle
about the inﬁnite divisibility of space to the spatial realm, that is, to the phenom-
enal realm. is resolution cannot be accepted by transcendental realists since,
by giving reality to space, they make it the case that the mereological structure
of objects is inherited from the inﬁnitely divisible geometrical structure of space
and time.
By utilising this scope-restriction we can avoid the antinomial conﬂict. is
means that we can use the same strategy for dealing with the mathematical anti-
nomies that we use for the dynamical antinomies, namely restricting the scopes
of the thesis and antithesis to diﬀerent realms. is is appropriate in that an
antinomy about mereological divisibility arises only in a context in which dy-
namical categories are applied, in particular the category of substance. It would
only be a purely mathematical antinomy if solely considerations regarding space
were at issue. Such geometrical considerations, however, are insuﬃcient to gen-
erate an antinomy since they must be combined with metaphysical principles for
the conﬂict to arise. ese metaphysical principles require the involvement of
the dynamical categories since only then do we get ontological structure to begin
with.
.. Epiphenomenal phenomena
“. . . that all life is really only intelligible, not subject to temporal al-
terations at all, and has neither begun at birth nor will be ended
through death, that this life is nothing but mere appearance, i.e.
a sensible representation of the purely spiritual life, and the entire
world of the senses is a mere image, which hovers before our present
cognition and, like a dream, has no objective reality in itself ” (A/B).
We have argued that the phenomenal realm is a non-autonomous realm that can
be reduced noumenalistically. Every phenomenal fact has a noumenal ground
and there is a complete determination of the phenomenal realm by the noume-
nal realm. e phenomenal realm is the way it is because the noumenal realm,
or more precisely the part of this world consisting of its transcendental features,
is the way it is. Given that the phenomenal realm lacks autonomy, it may well
be wondered whether the ‘dream analogy’ that Kant gives as a transcendental hy-
pothesis in his discussion of the possibility of immortality is an adequate descrip-
We saw previously that spatio-temporal structure is ﬁxed by ontological structure. is im-
plies that a similar scope-restriction strategy can be employed for dealing with the ﬁrst antinomy.
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tion of what the grounding theory implies. Put diﬀerently, once the phenomenal
realm is deprived of any independence, it may seem that phenomenal life really
is nothing but an image or a dream.
It is indeed true that the phenomenal realm is non-autonomous and that it
is fully determined by and dependent upon the noumenal realm. Yet, it does
not thereby follow that it is a mere illusion or that it lacks any signiﬁcance. Phe-
nomenal life is not like a dream since it is not the arbitrary product of the imag-
ination. Even though phenomena can be considered to be epiphenomenal, and
even though they are not absolutely real, this does not change the fact that the
phenomenal realm does have objective reality, that it is real for us. Indeed, it is
precisely because it is determined in this way by the noumenal realm, in conjunc-
tion with the forms of intuition, because it derives from this realm in an orderly
fashion, that it is objective for us. In other words, phenomena derive their ob-
jectivity from the absolutely real and objective noumena. is means that even
though phenomenal life is an appearance or a manifestation, it is one that pos-
sesses objectivity and is empirically real.
In Kit Fine’s terminology, the phenomenal realm has factuality but not reality (cf. Fine:
).
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Chapter 
Transcendental structure
. Grounding ontological structure
ephenomenal realm is ontologically amorphous. When the phenomenal world
is considered in isolation from its noumenal grounds, it is completely devoid of
ontological structure. Like the realm of appearances, it only has empirical struc-
ture and nometaphysical structure. An adverbial account that speciﬁes the spatio-
temporal distribution of physical intensive magnitudes exhausts all features of the
phenomenal realm. e phenomenal world can be fully described adverbially and
everything is reducible to the matter of the manifold of intuition as well as the
forms of intuition. is implies that phenomena can be fully characterised with-
out bringing in metaphysical concepts. In particular, no appeal to the notion
of an individual object or substance needs to be made. Similarly, causation and
modality are equally left out of the picture and can be set aside in describing the
phenomenal world. ere is no commitment to substances, causality or modal-
ity. Instead, everything can be characterised adverbially in terms of intensive and
extensive magnitudes. All we have are facts about intensive and extensive magni-
tudes. ere are only magnitudes and space-time regions across which they are
distributed.
Given that no unity, causation and modality are to be found, it follows that
we need not appeal to these metaphysical notions when giving a scientiﬁc descrip-
tion of the world. Instead of making metaphysical claims based on the dynamical
categories, science onlymakes use of themathematical categories in describing the
world. ese categories permit us to cognise empirical structure, make scientiﬁc
claims and describe the empirical features of the phenomenal world. e math-
ematical categories concern the spatio-temporal features as well as the degree of
reality of various properties, allowing us to specify extensive and intensive magni-
tudes. More precisely, they underwrite adverbial judgements that describe what
the world is like. Spatio-temporal regions function as the individuative backdrop,
while the intensive magnitudes that are ascribed to these regions give the adver-
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bial modiﬁcation. While the categories of quantity are required for specifying
the spatio-temporal regions (the extensive magnitudes), the categories of quality
allow us to specify the adverbial ﬁlling (the intensive magnitudes).
Accordingly, the intensive magnitudes are not attributed to objects, but to
spatio-temporal regions. at is, instead of making claims about objects, science
describes the spatio-temporal patterns amongst property instances. We simply
describe how things are at the region, what properties are instantiated thereat.
ere is no subject of instantiation. ere are no objects, no unities, no bearers
of magnitudes. Not even the region counts as the subject of instantiation, given
that we accept the ideality of the forms of intuition and thereby reject the hypo-
statisation of spatio-temporal points. e spatio-temporal regions only play an
individuative function. us, properties are instantiated at regions rather than
being instantiated by regions – they merely occur there.
is lack of ontological structure is problematic since the world must be
structured if there is to be a uniﬁed intersubjective spatio-temporal framework, if
metaphysics is to be possible and if morality is to be grounded. e problem we
face is thus that metaphysics, morality and science require ontological structure,
yet the phenomenal realm is ontologically amorphous. If the phenomenal realm
were to exhaust reality, then we would only have perspective-dependent spatio-
temporal frameworks across which intensive magnitudes would be distributed.
Science, metaphysics and morality would accordingly be impossible. As tran-
scendental idealists, however, we deny that the phenomenal realm exhausts reality
and instead accept that there is also a noumenal realm. is allows us to invoke
noumena to ground ontological structure and attribute non-empirical features to
phenomena that can be cognised by means of the dynamical categories.
Whilst the phenomenal realm is ontologically amorphous when it is consid-
ered on its own, ontological structure can be brought in when phenomena are
considered in relation to their noumenal grounds. Once the noumenal grounds
are included into the picture, we are able to provide ontological structure to the
phenomenal realm. Metaphysical features can be introduced into the phenome-
nal realm in virtue of properties of the noumenal grounds that underlie the facts
that make up the empirical world. Since noumena are ontologically structured,
this structure can be transferred to the phenomenal realm. e grounding rela-
tion allows us to import metaphysical structure from the noumenal world. We
can structure the content of the phenomenal world in accordance with the struc-
ture of the grounds which determine this content. In other words, since phenom-
ena are manifestations of ontologically structured noumena, ontological structure
can be attributed to them in virtue of the structure possessed by the grounds of
which they are manifestations. In this way we can get substantial individual en-
tities that are both synchronically and diachronically uniﬁed. Similarly, we can
make room for causation and modality. If we were, per impossibile, to take away
As a result, we only give an adverbial account of properties and not of regions.
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the noumena without thereby eliminating the phenomena, we would only be left
with empirical structure. But given that there are noumena and given the way in
which they ground phenomena, we can make room for non-empirical features in
the empirical world and provide phenomena with ontological structure.
Even though phenomena do not literally possess or instantiate non-empirical
properties, they can nonetheless be said to have non-empirical features in virtue
of having certain grounds. ese features are not elements of the constructs and
do not directly belong to them. Nonetheless, we can characterise the constructs
in terms of these features. To borrow van Cleve’s phrase, we can say that they
possess these features ‘by courtesy’ (cf. van Cleve: , p. ). ey are not
features that are directly possessed by phenomena, but rather are attributable to
them in virtue of being grounded in a certain way. Phenomena do not possess
these features by themselves but only in virtue of standing in a grounding relation
to noumena that do possess such features. It is not the case that the thing to which
we attribute these features directly possesses these properties but rather that there
is an objective distinction corresponding to this attribution. For instance, it is not
the case that there is a bounded and uniﬁed phenomenal entity, but rather that
there is a privileged place where to draw a boundary in the phenomenal realm.
Drawing a boundary at this place captures an important fact about the world. To
this place there does correspond a real boundary. Obviously this is not a spatial
boundary, given that noumena do not exist in space. Instead, it is an ontological
boundary that concerns the unity of an object and its distinctness from other
objects. is boundary thus captures a fact about the distinctness of objects and
about the respective unities of diﬀerent collections of aspects or features.
In this way we can include non-empirical ontological features that are not
empirically accessible. Such features are not amenable to being represented by in-
tuition, but require the understanding and in particular the dynamical categories
in order for them to be thought. ey are features that we do not experience and
that are not open to scientiﬁc investigation. Instead, they exclusively belong to
the domain of metaphysics. Despite the fact that these features are not empiri-
cally accessible, the phenomenal world can contain such non-empirical features
in virtue of the features possessed by the grounds of this world. Since these non-
empirical features do not play any role in experience, they cannot be covered by
an empirical reduction, which implies that ontologically structured phenomena
cannot be fully reduced to facts about the manifold of intuition and the forms of
intuition. To achieve a full reduction of both empirical and non-empirical fea-
tures, the reductive base needs to be expanded to include noumenal properties.
What is given in experience is only a spatio-temporal distribution of qualita-
tive features and hence lacks ontological structure. Any demarcation of objects,
both in space and through time, any bundling of properties into uniﬁed col-
lections, any attribution of causal dependencies and interactions, as well as any
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assignments of modal statuses are due to our thought, due to our conceptual
structuring that is guided by the categories. While the mathematical categories
capture empirical structure, the dynamical categories capture ontological struc-
ture. ese pure concepts are required to cognise ontological structure since they
embody the fundamental unifying functions that bundle representations and pro-
vide them with unity. ey allow us to synthesise and unify our representations,
thereby allowing us to make metaphysical claims and describe the non-empirical
features of the phenomenal world.
e category of substance, for instance, allows us to carve out and demarcate
objects out of the undiﬀerentiated and amorphous qualitative manifold that is
provided by intuition and thereby allows us to represent real objects that possess
unity. Carving up the manifold of appearances into objects involves drawing
boundaries and bundling together properties. Filled spatio-temporal regions, i.e.
regions across which qualitative properties are distributed, are treated as contain-
ing uniﬁed and bounded entities. ese boundaries are taken to reﬂect the unities
of diﬀerent objects insofar as properties located on the diﬀerent sides of a bound-
ary are taken to belong to diﬀerent uniﬁed wholes.
Our ability to cognise uniﬁed objects rests on the fact that the pure concept
of substance fulﬁls the same function as objects do insofar as they both synthesise
and provide unity. is category, on the one hand, uniﬁes representations. It
synthesises and combines a plurality of representations. Objects, on the other,
unify properties. ey combine properties and provide unity to them. Accord-
ingly, the concept of substance can be considered as the conceptual correlate of
an object. It allows us to bring unity to our representations that corresponds to
the unity in the object.
us, the uniﬁcation resulting from conceptualisation is supposed to mirror
the unity to be found in the object. is implies that objects determine the cri-
teria of correctness. ey determine which representations go together, namely
those representations that have corresponding properties that are uniﬁed in the
object. While we never know which properties really do go together, since we
have no access to the objects in themselves, this is not problematic. ough we
lack knowledge, we can nonetheless have warranted belief. ere are various in-
dicators that we can identify and there are theoretical and practical principles to
which we can appeal in our search for unity. e key thing to note is that this
search for unity is underwritten by our explanatory story. is story explains how
objective unities are intelligible and how the category of substance allows us to
represent uniﬁed objects.
It is important to note that it is not the case that we construct phenomena,
that we provide unity and confer properties upon them. We do not create unity
ere are interesting parallels to Quine’s claim that “the very notion of an object at all, con-
crete or abstract, is a human contribution, a feature of our inherited apparatus for organizing the
amorphous welter of neural input” (Quine: , p. ).
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and do not construct the world by means of the forms of thought. We do not
impose laws or categories on the world. Instead, we accept a modest position that
classiﬁes, broadly speaking, as a realist approach, according to which the world
must co-operate to make uniﬁed experience possible. e metaphysical features
that structure the world are not given in intuition and if there are phenomena
that do possess these non-empirical features, then they do so independently of
any activity of the human mind. e structural features possessed by phenomena
are grounded in noumena and do not derive from us. It is simply the case that we
utilise the categories to conceptualise that which is given in experience in such a
way that it matches up to the structure that objects possess independently of any
conceptualising. We only provide ontological structure to our thoughts and our
representations, not to the objects themselves, which means that the categories
only allow us to capture what is already there.
.. Unity
ephenomenal level considered on its own contains only intensive and extensive
magnitudes. ere are no ontological boundaries, no uniﬁed bundles of qualities
or magnitudes. ere are no uniﬁed wholes. Without appealing to noumena,
any construction of individuals would be relatively arbitrary and convention-
dependent. Structural nexuses that are invariant under various transformations
can only be considered as ‘objects’ in an ontologically insigniﬁcant sense. Such
objects are merely heuristic devices.
It is not just the case that for there to be an object is for there to be a spatio-
temporal region ﬁlled with physical intensive magnitudes. Rather, for there to
be an object is for there to be a spatio-temporal region that is ﬁlled in such a
way that these physical properties possess a certain unity. ese properties are
not arbitrarily assembled but constitute a unity. Whilst objects have the particu-
lar feature of being bounded entities, there is nothing in the phenomenal realm
to unify properties and to hold them together. Nothing is available to provide
boundaries and to determine which properties belong to which object and where
one object begins and another ends.
If we want to identify certain bundles as objects, then we need to give an
account of how boundaries are to be drawn and of what is responsible for the
demarcation and individuation of objects. We need to explain how there can be
boundaries. Within the phenomenal realm, there are no resources for explaining
the existence of boundaries. All we have is the distribution of intensive magni-
tudes. ere simply is not anything available that could function as a boundary
or give rise to boundaries. ere is nothing that could produce unities. Any phe-
What appearances are given to us is entirely unrelated to the dynamical categories since these
categories do not enter at the stage of perception, but only afterward when it comes to carving
up the manifold of appearances and representing metaphysical structure.
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nomenal bundle considered on its own is simply an arbitrary bundle and is not
in any way distinguished from other arbitrary bundles as regards its ontological
status.
Real objects can only be gained by invoking the noumenal grounds since it
is the underlying noumenal level that provides principles of unity and to which
we must appeal to make sense of individual entities. Accordingly, if we are to
account for the unity of objects, we need to appeal to noumenal grounds. us,
in addition to grounding the intensive and extensive magnitudes of the phenom-
enal world, noumena also permit us to make room for substantive individuals in
the phenomenal realm. We can introduce individuals at the phenomenal level
since phenomena are grounded in noumena that do possess individuality. is
individuality can be conferred upon the phenomena. We thereby get transcen-
dental individuality, which means that the individuality of an object is explained
in terms of the individuality of its transcendental ground.
Bundles of qualitative features constitute a uniﬁed object insofar as they are
grounded in the same noumenal object. Boundaries in the phenomenal sphere
thereby reﬂect facts about the distinctness and identity of noumenal grounds.
e spatial boundaries between phenomenal objects supervene on distinctness-
facts amongst noumenal grounds. In this way we can make room for unity and
individuality. e grounds provide unity and identity-criteria. e unity of the
collection derives from the unity of the ground of the collection. e unity of the
noumenal ground allows us to account for the way in which diﬀerent properties
belong together and form unities. Diﬀerent properties are connected and belong
to the same phenomenal object in virtue of the identity of the ground of these
diﬀerent properties.
is account of unity applies both to synchronic and to diachronic cases.
Noumenal grounds provide both synchronic and diachronic unity, connecting
phenomenal features existing at the same time, as well as at diﬀerent times. Ac-
cordingly, transcendental idealism provides us with an account of persistence that
allows us to explain how there can be genuine diachronic unities. Transcendental
idealism allows us to make room for persisting objects and allows us to explain
genuine identity through time. It allows us to identify persisting objects as uni-
ﬁed temporally extended ﬁlled spatio-temporal regions andmake sense of the idea
that the very same object can be present at diﬀerent times. is is achieved by
appealing to the identity of the noumenal ground of a plurality of phenomenal
features existing at diﬀerent times. In other words, persistence can be explained
by means of reference to the atemporal noumenal ground. ings existing at dif-
ferent times can be uniﬁed if they have the same noumenal ground. e ground
provides unity to them and ensures that we do not just have a random collec-
tion of phenomenal features, but have diachronic unities that are uniﬁed by their
grounds.
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us, if we consider the phenomenal realm on its own, then all we have is dif-
ferent properties at diﬀerent times. ere is nothing that connects or binds them
together, nothing that tells us which go together and form a diachronic unity.
Yet, by bringing noumena into the picture we can make room for diachronic
unity. Properties at diﬀerent times belong together if they have the same noume-
nal ground. A noumenal ground can manifest itself at diﬀerent times by giving
rise to properties at diﬀerent times. We thus have genuine identity through time
since it is numerically the same thing that is present at these diﬀerent times, the
very same object that is manifested at diﬀerent times. It is not a temporal entity
that is thus located at multiple times, but rather an atemporal entity that mani-
fests itself at multiple times, an entity the manifestations of which are located at
multiple times. Unity at the phenomenal level is accordingly again grounded in
unity at the noumenal level.
e synchronic as well as diachronic unity and boundedness provided by the
noumenal grounds does not imply that we cannot view phenomena as logical
constructs. Rather, it means that phenomena are logical constructs that possess
unity and stand in certain relations and that these non-empirical features have to
be reduced to noumenal features. Fully ﬂedged phenomena are privileged logical
constructs, namely constructs that have uniﬁed grounds. is means that while
every ﬁlled region can be treated as a logically constructed object, only some of
these constructs classify as real objects whilst the others are only arbitrary col-
lections of properties. In order for there to be more than a mere collection, for
there to be a substantive object, we need unity and this unity can be provided by
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a noumenal ground. What makes it the case that a logical construct corresponds
to or can be identiﬁed with a substantive object is that certain non-empirical
features can be attributed to it. A substantive object is a collection of such prop-
erties that is uniﬁed in virtue of being grounded in a noumenon that possesses
unity. Real phenomena are only those constructs that possess unity in virtue of
an adequate ground. at is, there is a set of privileged complexes which can be
considered to possess unity in virtue of being made of elements that have a uni-
ﬁed ground. All other constructs are just arbitrary collections of properties that
are of no ontological signiﬁcance.
It is not the case that we then no longer have a logical construct or complex
and instead have amereological sum that has the elements as its parts. Real objects
simply are privileged collections or bundles of facts. ey are bundles that reﬂect
an underlying unity. at is, it is not the case that the facts compose an emergent
existent if they possess unity or that a uniﬁed individual somehow arises. Instead,
we still only have logical constructs whereby adequately grounded constructs are
collections that possess the non-empirical feature of being uniﬁed collections.
ey are privileged collections or constructs.
e grounding relation thus allows us to make the existence of persisting
individuals at the phenomenal level intelligible. Since these individuals are em-
pirically inaccessible, we still need to appeal to invariances to identify individuals
in practice. Yet, while we appeal to invariances to identify individuals in practice,
when it comes to making the possibility of individuals intelligible, we have to ap-
peal to the noumenal grounds. Given that the phenomenal world has ontological
structure and is carved up in certain ways in virtue of the way it is grounded, we
can take these invariances as indications of there being substantial metaphysical
individuals. We can then carve up the representational manifold by making use
of the categories in such a way that it hopefully coincides with the objective carv-
ing. us, though we cannot empirically discover the way the world is carved up,
we can identify invariances and treat them as indications of underlying unities.
is can be compared to the contemporary debate regarding the ‘naturalness’ or ‘ontological
privilege’ that certain mereological fusions supposedly possess. In the same way that naturalness
is supposed to privilege certain fusions, noumenal grounding provides unity to logical constructs
and identiﬁes the boundaries of objects. However, rather than positing unexplained ‘joints in
nature’ we can give a principled account of the possibility of genuinely uniﬁed objects in terms of
the underlying noumenal grounds. Moreover, by appealing to noumenal grounds we can ensure
that unity and boundedness are binary rather than being a matter of degree.
Since extensive and intensive magnitudes allow for continuous variation, the drawing of sharp
boundaries at the phenomenal level would seem arbitrary. e underlying noumenal features,
however, need not be susceptible to these kinds of continuous variations, thereby making room
for non-arbitrary sharp cut-oﬀs. Accordingly, a sharp cut-oﬀ on the phenomenal continuum, that
would be arbitrary if it were chosen on the basis of it occupying that position on the continuum,
can still turn out to be non-arbitrary in virtue of reﬂecting a principled cut-oﬀ along a (possibly
non-continuous) noumenal dimension.
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.. Causation
At the phenomenal level we have a distribution of intensive magnitudes that ex-
hibits certain regularities and patterns. ere are, however, no necessary connec-
tions and hence no causal relations at this level. Yet, once we bring in noumena,
we can make room for genuine causation. We do not have to appeal to some
inadequate Humean substitute, but can allow for necessary connections whereby
a cause brings about its eﬀect in such a way that the eﬀect follows from the cause
with necessity. In particular, the phenomenal eﬀect necessarily follows the phe-
nomenal cause since their grounds stand in a necessary connection. Noumenal
grounds stand in necessary connections and thereby give rise to causal relations
amongst the phenomena that they ground.
Supervenient causation in transcendental idealism allows us to explain how
we can have necessary connections at the phenomenal level. It allows us to explain
how phenomenal objects can be connected by the schema of causality. We can ex-
plain necessary connections holding between phenomenal objects insofar as they
result from causal eﬃcacy that belongs to the noumenal realm. We can say that
causes and eﬀects are joined with necessity because we have causal eﬃcacy at the
level of the noumenal grounds. Causal eﬃcacy at the noumenal level ensures that
we do not have mere regularity but necessity amongst phenomena. is necessity
is not brute, but grounded in noumena. is enables us to explain why it is the
case that x necessarily follows y, why they stand in this necessary relation. Accord-
ingly, causality at the phenomenal level can be seen as nomologically governed
regularity that reﬂects underlying noumenal causation. Noumenal causation un-
derlies and gives rise to the necessary connection at the phenomenal level, which
means that phenomenal causation supervenes on noumenal causation.
e relation between phenomenal objects x and y falls under the
schematised category of causality iﬀ the relation between the noume-
nal grounds of x and y falls under the unschematised category of
causality.
at is, y follows on x with necessity iﬀ the noumenal grounds of x and y stand
in the asymmetrical ground-consequent relation, whereby the eﬀect obtains in
virtue of the cause. In other words, we have nomologically-governed regularity
between x and y iﬀ we have causal eﬃcacy between the noumenal grounds of x
and y.
e necessity at the phenomenal level is sustained by necessary connections
that obtain at the noumenal level. Such an indirect explanation of causation ac-
counts for nomological regularity in terms of underlying causal eﬃcacy. Accord-
ingly, we can explain necessary connections at the phenomenal level and thereby
underwrite causal explanations. While supervenient causation in contemporary
philosophy is concerned with explaining causal processes at one level in the mere-
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ological hierarchy in terms of the causal connections that hold at more fundamen-
tal levels, transcendental idealism appeals to the grounding relation to connect
two heterogeneous levels in order to combine causal eﬃcacy at the noumenal
level with nomologically-governed regularity at the phenomenal level. Diﬀerent
kinds of causation are involved at the diﬀerent levels and the grounding relation
enables us to explain one kind of causal relation obtaining at the supervening
level, namely nomological regularity, in terms of another kind obtaining at the
subvening level, namely causal eﬃcacy.
While phenomena do not strictly speaking possess any non-empirical prop-
erties, they can be said to be causally eﬃcacious in virtue of the eﬃcacy of their
noumenal grounds, they can be said to manifest the eﬃcacy of their grounds.
is implies that the causation attributed to phenomena is not threatened by the
causal eﬃcacy to be found in the noumenal realm. We have two diﬀerent levels
at which two diﬀerent kinds of causation are to be found and that do not com-
pete with each other, thereby undermining worries regarding overdetermination.
Rather than giving rise to doubts about overdetermination, the causal relations
at the noumenal level ground the phenomenal relations. ose who accept only
one kind of causal relation will not be able to avoid this problem. For them, su-
pervenient and subvenient causation seem to be in competition, which implies
that, unless we are dealing with a case of overdetermination, only one of them
can have a claim to being an instance of genuine causation.
.. Mind-body interaction
“[I]f one considers that the two kinds of objects are diﬀerent not
inwardly but only insofar as one of them appears outwardly to the
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other, hence that what grounds the appearance of matter as thing in
itself might perhaps not be so diﬀerent in kind, then this diﬃculty
vanishes, and the only diﬃculty remaining is that concerning how a
community of substances is possible at all” (B-).
Mind and body seem to be radically heterogeneous, thereby making it diﬃcult
to comprehend how they could interact. is problem can be overcome by pro-
viding a dual-level explanation of mind-body interaction. ough the phenom-
ena are heterogeneous and diﬀer signiﬁcantly, it may be that their grounds are
homogenous. e phenomenal heterogeneity would then not be due to an un-
derlying noumenal heterogeneity but would rather result from the diﬀerences in
the ways in which we are related to the noumenal grounds. While the grounds
of the mind are inwardly intuited, those of the body are outwardly intuited. is
diﬀerence in access relations can explain the radical diﬀerences between mind
and body at the phenomenal level, without requiring us to posit an underlying
heterogeneity at the noumenal level thus allowing us to preserve the homogeneity
that is required to account for interaction. Interaction between a heterogeneous
mind and body can then be made intelligible by appealing to interaction between
homogeneous grounds.
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is allows us to say that mental state m causes physical state p iﬀ the noume-
nal grounds of m and p stand in a causal relation. Since mental states have physi-
cal correlates, it follows that mental state m causes physical state p iﬀ the physical
correlate of m causes p, which in turn, happens iﬀ the noumenal grounds of the
physical correlate of m and of p stand in a causal relation.
Since the noumenal ground of m is identical to the noumenal ground of
the physical correlate of m, it follows that the mental state and its correlate are
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manifestations of the same thing but diﬀer insofar as they manifest the same thing
in diﬀerent ways. ere is one thing, namely a noumenal mental state, that is
manifested in two diﬀerent ways. e former constitutes a manifestation as it
appears to inner sense, while the latter is a manifestation as it appears to outer
sense. is means that the former is a subjective manifestation, while the latter
is an intersubjective manifestation. In this way we can explain the heterogeneity
that is to be found at the phenomenal level in terms of the diﬀerent ways in which
the noumenal entity is manifested. Mental states and their physical correlates are
thus both manifestations of the same underlying noumenal thing.
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Accordingly, we can see that the mental and the physical are on a par. It is not
the case that the physical correlates are fundamental and that the mental states are
supervenient and derivative. Rather both of them are derivative. We do not have
real physical causation and then supervenient mental causation. Instead, we have
real noumenal causation and supervenient physical as well as mental causation.
Since these diﬀerent kinds of supervenient causation are perfectly compatible and
do not exclude each other, it follows that we can confer eﬃcacy on the mental
(even if this is only eﬃcacy by courtesy) whilst avoiding exclusion arguments. In
particular, since the mental state and its correlate are manifestations of the same
thing, it follows that there is no overdetermination. Both the mental state and
In this way we can understand how it is possible for mental states to have physical correlates,
how we can identify mental states with physical states given that they seem to be radically diﬀerent
in kind.
Inner sense is here to be understood as reﬂexive awareness, rather than as reappropriation of
mental content.
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its correlate are related to the physical state p by means of the schema of causality
since both of them are grounded in a noumenal object that is connected to the
ground of p by the unschematised relation of causation.
. Dual-level explanations
Transcendental idealism is a dual-level ontology consisting of noumena and phe-
nomena, whereby the levels are connected by a grounding relation. Since the
phenomenal sphere is grounded in the noumenal sphere, we can appeal to the
latter to explain the former. We can explain that which is derivative in terms of
that which is more fundamental and from which it derives. Such dual-level ex-
planations explain features at one level in terms of features at another level. e
limiting case arises when we explain the whole level in terms of the level that
grounds it. Explanations of this kind track ontological dependence, whereby the
direction of explanation is the inverse of the direction of grounding. If y grounds
x, then x can be explained in terms of y.
ese explanations can be combined in an eﬀectivemanner with transcenden-
tal arguments. We identify necessary preconditions by means of transcendental
arguments and appeal to dual-level explanations to make these preconditions in-
telligible. In particular, transcendental idealism allows us to identify the necessary
presuppositions for experience as well as for moral agency. In both cases, we can
then provide grounding for these presuppositions by appealing to the noumenal
level. In this way problematic metaphysical features that are presupposed by expe-
rience and morality can be relegated to the noumenal sphere. We thereby explain
their relative unintelligibility, while at the same time allowing them to be con-
nected to the phenomenal level by means of the grounding relation, given that the
phenomenal realm arises out of the noumenal realm via the process of intuition.
is is important since dual-level explanations require that there is some corre-
spondence relation between the realms. e phenomenal features must have their
noumenal counterparts and the diﬀerent realms must somehow be connected and
co-ordinated if the phenomenal realm is to be explained in terms of the noumenal
realm.
As we have seen, dual-level explanations can be used to provide a vindication
of metaphysical features, such as causation and substance. ey provide answers
to questions as to how certain things are possible, by making these features intel-
ligible to us. ey show us how it could be the case that there is causation and
that there are substances. ese are metaphysical explanations that are concerned
with how certain metaphysical features are possible. ey do not tell us what is
actually the case but only tell us how something that is inexplicable and unintel-
ligible in its own terms can be made intelligible by explaining it in terms of some
other set of facts to which it is related.
e reason why we need to appeal to dual-level explanations is that, prima
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facie, it looks as if these metaphysical features cannot be accounted for. e phe-
nomenal realm does not give us adequate explanatory resources to account for
their possibility. Accordingly, we have to appeal to another level, namely the
noumenal level. In this way we can give an indirect explanation, whereby fea-
tures at the phenomenal level are explained in terms of features at the noumenal
level. By invoking the noumenal realm, we can bring in additional explanatory
resources. As a result, we can explain things that would otherwise seem inexpli-
cable.
For instance, we are not able to explain how something can persist through
time if we only appeal to resources to be found at the phenomenal level. Numer-
ical identity through time is unintelligible if the phenomenal realm is considered
on its own. Nonetheless, we know that objects must persist through time if there
is to be experience. We have to posit persisting objects, but are unable to explain
their possibility. In order to overcome this conﬂict we have to bring in additional
explanatory resources. In particular, we have to invoke two diﬀerent levels and
explain persistence at the phenomenal level by reference to the noumenal world.
is allows us to accept the need for persistence, while accepting that it is inco-
herent to claim that phenomena persist if these are understood independently of
their grounds.
It should be noted that these dual-level accounts are highly signiﬁcant for
Kantian ethics. is is because it might well be possible to appeal to dual-level
explanations to establish correspondences and connections between intelligible
and empirical characters, between intelligible and empirical laws and between
noumenal and phenomenal choices. For example, we might be able to take the
empirical character to be an expression of an agent’s intelligible character, thereby
providing us with an indication of an agent’s fundamental disposition (Gesin-
nung). is would allow us to partly countenance our ignorance of our maxims
and thereby our ignorance of our moral worth.
Moreover, these connections are crucial if we are to attempt an integration of
the empirical and the intelligible causal orders. Such an integration must enable
us to overcome the modal conﬂict resulting from reconciling the necessity of
determinism with the contingency of spontaneity. is integration should also
make room for our ordinary understanding of moral agency and responsibility, as
well as the possibility of moral progress. Both of these aspects of the integration
require that the diﬀerent realms and the diﬀerent causal orders be connected and
co-ordinated in a systematic way. It is the task of dual-level explanations to show
how such connections are possible.
.. Fundamental explanations
We have seen that noumena are ontologically prior to phenomena. is ontolog-
ical priority implies an explanatory priority. We can explain phenomena in terms
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of noumena, but not vice versa. Indeed, in order to give a complete account of
phenomena we must appeal to noumena. Only in that way will we be able to
give more than just a description of phenomenal features, but explain how they
come about and what their grounds are. As Fine notes, an explanation in terms
of grounds “is the ultimate form of explanation” (Fine: , p. ). To achieve
this kind of explanation we need to appeal to noumena. We need to explain the
phenomenal realm in terms of the noumenal realm. An explanation whereby one
realm is explained in terms of another realm is called a ‘fundamental explanation’
by Nozick (cf. Nozick: , p. ). Dual-level explanations are such fundamen-
tal explanations. We can then say that noumena have explanatory priority since
theymust be appealed to if a complete or fundamental explanation of phenomena
is to be given.
Fundamental explanations are particularly informative since they explain one
realm in terms of another realm and thereby enable us to bring in explanatory
resources that are not available for intra-realm explanations. If the realms are
heterogeneous, then the explanantia and the explananda share very few variables
in common. is heterogeneitymakes the explanation informative, non-question
begging and non-circular. If we need to explain x, then we need to appeal to
something other than x to do the explaining. We need a qualitative diﬀerence
or a diﬀerence in kind between the explanantia and the explanandum for the
explanation to be informative.
e need for heterogeneity is particularly relevant when it comes to answer-
ing how-possible questions since the question how x is possible arises when the
intelligibility and coherence of x is put into doubt. In order to explain the intelli-
gibility of x, we need to appeal to something that is not doubtful, something that
is suﬃciently dissimilar from x. Otherwise, if the explanantia should be too simi-
lar to x, then those things that put the coherence of x into doubt would also raise
questions about the intelligibility of the explanantia. Unless we have suﬃcient
heterogeneity, the doubts about explananda will transfer to the explanantia. At
the same time, the explanantia must still be connected to x in a substantial way,
such that x can be explained in terms of them. Without an adequate ontological
connection, there will not be an adequate explanatory connection. Explaining
phenomena in terms of their noumenal grounds satisﬁes both conditions since
phenomena and noumena are heterogeneous, but are nevertheless connected by
a grounding relation, thereby allowing for informative explanatory connections.
.. Fact-defective potential explanations
e suggestion that we can provide dual-level explanations of the phenomenal
realm in terms of the noumenal realm, naturally gives rise to the objection that
this endeavour is futile since we lack knowledge of noumena. How can we appeal
to noumena to explain something, if we do not have knowledge of any of their
positive determinations? e point of a supervenience explanation is to explain
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something that is not very well understood, by showing that it supervenes on
something of which we do have a more sophisticated understanding. is means
that in order for such explanations to be explanatory, the explanantia to which
they appealmust have a better epistemic standing than the explananda. Yet, prima
facie, this condition does not seem to be met by our noumenal explanations.
Despite our ignorance of noumena, we can explain problematic features, in
this case the problematic metaphysical features of phenomena, in terms of some-
thing that is taken to be less problematic, namely noumenal features. Metaphys-
ical features at the phenomenal level are problematic because they appear to be
incoherent and unintelligible if we consider the phenomenal realm on its own.
Noumenal features, on the contrary, are simply unknown rather than incoherent
and unintelligible. ere is at least room for their possibility since nothing counts
against them. Accordingly, even though we lack knowledge of the antecedent of
the explanation, we still have a scenario in which something that is problematic
is explained in terms of something that is less problematic. e explanantia are
more intelligible, or rather less unintelligible, than the explananda. is implies
that explaining phenomena in terms of noumena does satisfy the condition for
being explanatory.
Nonetheless, it may still be objected that an explanation of x in terms of y is
only of signiﬁcance if y is really the case. Telling some hypothetical story is not of
interest to us, the objection goes, since we want to know what is actually the case.
If appealing to y constitutes only one of a large number of possible explanations of
x, then our ignorance of y will undermine any claim to having given an adequate
explanation of x. In order to explain why we have x, we need to identify the way
in which x actually arises and not a way in which it could possibly have arisen.
In short, the objection states that to be a genuine explanation that is informative
the explanantia that are given must actually be the case. e facts to which one
appeals must really obtain and this we cannot know when appealing to noumenal
facts, thereby undermining the utility of dual-level explanations.
e objection correctly depicts the relation between the explanantia and the
explananda. Moreover, it gives a correct account of our epistemic status with
respect to the former. However, it misses the point of dual-level explanations.
When giving such explanations, we are involved in a diﬀerent kind of explanatory
project. We do not want to provide a description of the way reality actually is.
Instead, we want to show how certain things are intelligible. We want to answer
certain ‘how-possible questions’. It is because we have this diﬀerent aim that
even potential explanations, i.e. explanations that are valid but have some false
premises, can be useful.
Potential explanations come in diﬀerent kinds, depending on what kind of
premises are false. In particular, we can distinguish fact-defective, law-defective,
and process-defective potential explanation (cf. Hempel:  & Nozick: ,
pp. -). Our dual-level explanations would be problematic if they were law-
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defective or process-defective. Fact-deﬁciency, however, does not cause any com-
plications.
e process to which dual-level explanations appeal is the process of intu-
ition that gives rise to phenomena, as well as the supervenience relations follow-
ing therefrom. Accordingly, we can see that process-deﬁciency would be a serious
problem. If the process were deﬁcient, we would be unable to given an account
of the relation between noumena and phenomena. Phenomena are those things
that arise as a result of the process of intuition. If we should be appealing to a
diﬀerent process, then we would no longer be speaking about phenomena. We
do not, however, have to worry about process-deﬁciency. is possibility is not
connected to our ignorance of noumena. We are ignorant of the positive deter-
minations of the noumenal realm, but this does not undermine our knowledge
of the way in which phenomena arise. at is, ignorance of noumena is com-
patible with knowing the process of intuition, thereby warding oﬀ the danger of
process-deﬁciency.
A law-defective explanation would be at least equally worrisome. e laws
governing the genesis of phenomena are the laws of logic. is can be seen
from the fact that the multiple-domain supervenience principles hold with log-
ical rather than nomological necessity. e existence of transcendental objects
and transcendental properties logically implies the existence of phenomena. Phe-
nomena are logical constructs, rather than being emergent entities that arise by
means of certain bridge laws. is means that our dual-level explanations do
not appeal to any bridge laws, but only to the laws of logic. Accordingly, law-
deﬁciency would amount to an explanation making use of the wrong logical laws.
e possibility that we are mistaken about the laws of logic is suﬃciently remote
to be safely set aside.
It is only fact-deﬁciency that is relevant to our case. In giving dual-level ex-
planations we appeal to certain noumenal facts, even though we do not know
whether they actually obtain. is, however, is unproblematic since we do not
attempt to explain why things are the way they are. Our aim is rather to make
things intelligible. We try to show how they are possible. We attempt to establish
their coherence relative to certain background assumptions. Even if the explana-
tion is not true, insofar as some of the explanantia do not obtain, it can still be a
useful explanation. Our dual-level explanations can be insightful, even if we do
not know whether the antecedent of the explanation is met and even if it should
turn out to be false. A potential explanation can be useful and informative, even
if it is fact-deﬁcient. It can explain how something could be the case by pro-
viding a mechanism or a scenario that depicts how the explananda could occur,
how they could be instantiated. It thereby gives us an understanding of what the
possibilities are and helps us to get a better grasp of what kind of things phenom-
ena are. Most importantly, it shows that the explananda are not incoherent and
unintelligible.
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When we are concerned with ‘how-possible’ questions, we do not want a
description of what is the case. We do not want to know whether we have x.
Rather, we want to know whether x is possible and under what conditions it
could be actual. We want to understand and make sense of x. We want to grasp
and comprehend its nature. If these are our goals, then fact-deﬁciency is not
a real issue. Accordingly, if we are explaining x in terms of y by means of an
explanation that allows us to gain some understanding of what kind of thing x is,
then it does not matter whether y is actual. A fact-deﬁcient explanation allows us
to learn about the status of x. We learn that x is the kind of thing the actuality
of which could be explained by y. e explanation shows that x is possible, that
it could arise in a certain way, that it is compatible with certain things. ese are
all important things to know and none of them is dependent on the actuality of
the explanantia. All that we require is that the explanantia be possible, not that
they be actual.
.. Answering ‘how-possible questions’
Dual-level explanations aimed at answering how-possible questions are not sup-
posed to describe how things are or explain why things are the way they are.
Instead, they are supposed to make things intelligible and explain how certain
things are possible. It is for this reason that fact-defective potential explanations
are still useful since factual accuracy is not our concern. We need to provide a
description of a possible way in which something could be the case, rather than
providing an account of what is actually the case. Such a description of a possible
scenario involving the thing in question establishes that that thing is possible and
shows us how it could be actual. It tells us what kind of scenario would make it
actual. e depicted scenario may be one of many scenarios in which that thing
would be actual or it may be the only one. We do not need to provide an ex-
haustive list of such scenarios but only show that there is at least one. Providing a
single scenario is suﬃcient to establish the coherence and possibility of the thing
in question. It is suﬃcient for making that thing intelligible.
How-possible question are naturally followed by ‘whether-actual question’.
Once the possibility of x has been established the question then becomes salient
whether x is actual. Transcendental idealism allows us to deal with the ﬁrst kind
of question by providing us with dual-level explanations. Answering the latter
question requires us to appeal to transcendental arguments. e role and nature
of transcendental arguments will be considered later on in this chapter. For now,
however, we will be concerned with the general nature of how-possible questions,
the conditions under which they arise and the ways in which we can deal with
them.
How-possible questions are concerned with the coherence, intelligibility and
possibility of certain things. ey ask for an explanation of how something could
be the case. As such, they require us to provide a coherent scenario in which
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that thing is the case, thereby showing that its obtaining is possible. ese kinds
of questions arise if there are apparent obstacles to the possibility of the thing in
question. As Cassam notes, how-possible questions are obstacle-dependent. If we
want to assert that x is possible and there are arguments to the contrary, then the
question concerning how x is possible gains salience. ere must be arguments
that put the coherence and intelligibility of x in doubt for this question to become
relevant.
e question how x is possible arises if we want to assert x, but realise that x
is incompatible with y. In this case, y casts doubts on the possibility of x. If y is
contingent, the question is how x can be possible given the actuality of y, i.e. how
we can have y-worlds that are also x-worlds, whilst if y is necessary, the question is
how x is possible at all. To answer such questions, we need to provide an account
that explains how x and y can be rendered compatible. Wemust depict the way in
which we can have the thing in question despite the fact that its coherence is put
in doubt and despite the fact that it appears to be incompatible with something
to which we are committed.
ere are diﬀerent ways of dealing with how-possible questions (cf. Cassam:
 & Nozick: ). In particular, we can identify two main strategies. e
problem is that we want to assert x, but then realise that x and y are incompatible,
whereby y seems prima facie to be plausible. is casts doubt on x and raises the
question how x could be possible. e ﬁrst strategy involves the denial that the
obstacle does exist. at is, we reject y, showing that even though y is prima facie
plausible it should upon analysis be denied, thereby removing the obstacle to the
coherence of x.
Alternatively, we can make use of the second strategy and show that what was
considered to be an obstacle is actually compatible with what we want to assert.
In other words, we do not deny y but show that there is only a prima facie incom-
patibility. We show that x and y turn out on analysis to be compatible after all
or that there are certain background assumptions we can make that render x and
y compatible. We provide some story or mechanism of how x and y could both
be true, thereby showing that y is not necessarily an obstacle to x and that the
acceptance of y accordingly does not cast doubt on the coherence of x. Cassam
calls these strategies ‘obstacle-dissipating’ and ‘obstacle-overcoming’, respectively.
us, a how-possible question arises if we want to assert x, but are unable
to do so because there is an obstacle to x, namely y. We have a situation where
we want to accept x and y, but are not able to assert both of them since they
are incompatible. In such a situation, we need to ﬁnd a way to deal with the
incompatibility. If we cannot use an obstacle-dissipating strategy, that is, if we
cannot reject y, then we have to ﬁnd some way to overcome the incompatibility.
Fundamental explanations that invoke transcendental idealism allow us to
provide answers to particularly diﬃcult how-possible questions. ese questions
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involve an obstacle that can neither be overcome nor dissipated, as long as one
appeals only to explanatory resources internal to the phenomenal realm. Tran-
scendental idealism provides us with further explanatory resources, allowing us
to provide obstacle-overcoming dual-level explanations. By appealing to another
realm we can show that there is inter-realm compatibility, even though there is
an intra-realm incompatibility, and thus explain how we can accept both x and
y, thereby overcoming the incompatibility.
Transcendental realists are not able to provide such obstacle-overcoming dual-
level explanations. e reason for this is that in order to be able to give such
an explanation, the level which is to be explained must diﬀer suﬃciently from
the level which features in the antecedent of the explanation. Unless we have
suﬃcient heterogeneity, we will not be able to get adequate explanatory resources
to overcome the incompatibility. ough it is possible for transcendental realists
to use multi-level explanations that explain what happens at one level in terms
of what happens at another level, their levels lack the requisite heterogeneity.
is is because these levels are understood as layers in a mereological hierarchy,
which means that they all belong to the same realm, have the same nature and
are levels of the same kind. Given this similarity amongst the levels, it will not be
possible to overcome the incompatibilities. Explaining one level in a mereological
hierarchy in terms of another level in that very same hierarchy does not suﬃce
for dissipating incompatibilities.
Transcendental idealists, on the contrary, have at their disposal two radically
heterogeneous levels, namely the noumenal and phenomenal realms, that are con-
nected by a grounding relation. ese levels are heterogeneous in important re-
spects. We have realms of diﬀerent kinds that diﬀer quite radically, rather than
merely having diﬀerent levels in a mereological hierarchy. is enables us to give a
fundamental explanation of a whole realm in terms of a diﬀerent realm and allows
us to restrict the scope of certain constraints in such a way that they only apply to
the phenomenal realm, while leaving open the possibility that these constraints
do not apply to the noumenal realm. In that way we can appeal to explanatory
resources that are to be found in the noumenal realm and give fundamental ex-
planations that allow us to overcome incompatibilities.
e requirement of having heterogeneous realms applies, for instance, if we
want to explain the possibility of causal eﬃcacy. We can accept that causal ef-
ﬁcacy is unintelligible at the phenomenal level. At the same time, we can argue
that we can make sense of noumenal casual eﬃcacy. ese views are compatible
since the obstacle which prevents us from ascribing causal eﬃcacy to phenom-
ena does not apply to noumena. e obstacle has restricted applicability and
can hence be overcome by appealing to noumena. We can then claim that phe-
nomenal causation diﬀers fundamentally from noumenal causation. e former
is nomologically-governed regularity, while the latter consists in causal eﬃcacy.
Similarly, by accepting the atemporality of the noumenal realm, we can explain
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identity through time by means of the identity of an atemporal ground. In this
way we can show how an object can be present at diﬀerent times. We can give
this explanation, whilst allowing that it is unintelligible how phenomena could
persist through time by being wholly present at diﬀerent times.
We need to appeal to the noumenal level because all these metaphysical fea-
tures that we want to account for, such as unity and causal eﬃcacy, cannot be
found at the phenomenal level. e level of phenomena is a logical construct and
logical complexes lack causal eﬃcacy and unity. To show the possibility of these
features, we need to appeal to the grounds of these logical complexes. is means
that even though we do not need transcendental idealism for dual-level expla-
nations in general, we do require it for vindicating metaphysics and for making
sense of unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction. ese dual-
level explanations cannot be provided by simply appealing to diﬀerent layers in
a mereological hierarchy, but require us to appeal to diﬀerent levels that are het-
erogeneous in important respects.
. Transcendental arguments
We have seen so far that the ontological framework of transcendental idealism
gives rise to the possibility of dual-level or transcendental explanations. By means
of these explanations we canmake various metaphysical features intelligible. ey
do not tell us what is the case, but show us how something could be the case, how
it is intelligible and coherent despite serious arguments to the contrary.
Such dual-level explanations can be combined with theoretical and practical
transcendental arguments that show that these metaphysical features are neces-
sary presuppositions for the possibility of experience and morality. Transcen-
dental arguments are concerned with identifying the necessary conditions that
must be satisﬁed for experience and morality to be possible. ey establish that
if experience and morality are to be possible, then these presuppositions must be
met. us, having established the intelligibility and coherence of various prob-
lematic metaphysical features by means of dual-level explanations, we can appeal
to transcendental arguments to connect these metaphysical features to morality
and experience.
e transcendental arguments only show that x is a necessary presupposition
for the possibility of y. ey only establish a hypothetical statement of the form:
‘if we do have experience, then the world is . . . ’. However, they do not establish
the actuality of y and therefore do not show us that x obtains. In order to establish
the actuality of the antecedents of the transcendental arguments, we can appeal
to considerations stemming from practical and theoretical reason. In this way we
can arrive at a warranted belief in the actuality of these metaphysical features.
us, our strategy consists of three steps, namely (i) make x intelligible by
means of a dual-level explanation, (ii) show that x is a necessary presupposition
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of y by means of a transcendental argument, and (iii) provide some warrant for
believing in the actuality of y and thereby its necessary presupposition x.
Transcendental idealism makes room for things that are connected to expe-
rience, and can thus constitute necessary presuppositions for the possibility of
experience, without it being possible to experience those things themselves. Tran-
scendental arguments thus allow us to make claims that go beyond that which is
experienced, by allowing us to make claims about that which is required if expe-
rience is to be possible. Such preconditions of experience cannot be experienced
but are presupposed by the possibility of experience. By means of such arguments
we can identify the transcendental grounds of experience and show what must be
the case for experience to be possible. is implies that we can make claims about
what the noumenal realm must be like if experience is to be possible. In particu-
lar, we can identify a role that the noumenal realm must ﬁll, namely the role of
grounding the metaphysical structure that is required for experience and morality
to be possible. While we do not know what ﬁlls this role, what exactly it is that
grounds this metaphysical structure, we do know that this role must be ﬁlled.
Transcendental arguments are not particularly eﬀective against sceptics and
nihilists since it is always possible for them to deny the antecedent. Transcenden-
tal realists who accept the antecedent, however, will have diﬃculty in reconciling
the consequent with their transcendental realism. If the antecedent is accepted,
then the consequent should also be accepted. Yet, accepting the consequent is
problematic for transcendental realists since they do not have the explanatory re-
sources of transcendental idealism to explain how the consequent is even possible.
us, any transcendental realist who wants to accept that we have objective
experience or who wants to accept that we are bound by morality faces the dif-
ﬁcult task of establishing the coherence of the presuppositions of morality and
experience. is task does not seem possible given the limited explanatory re-
sources available to the transcendental realist. Accordingly, we can argue that
morality and experience have various presuppositions that can only be explained
by transcendental idealism. Nihilism about experience and morality, on the one
hand, and transcendental idealism, on the other, seem to be the only two coher-
ent options. is means that to be a realist one has to be a transcendental idealist.
is argumentative strategy ﬁts into a larger dialectic that leads from a com-
mon sense metaphysics via a Humean reductionist metaphysics to transcendental
idealism. e debate begins with a criticism of single-level theories of unity, sub-
stance, persistence, causation and reciprocity. is is done by appealing to the
Humean critiques of real connections. We then argue against the adequacy of
Humean substitutes. To do this we make use of transcendental arguments that
establish the need for ontological structure, thereby showing the inadequacy of
reductionist metaphysical theories. After rejecting reductionist theories, we es-
tablish the intelligibility of dual-level theories of unity, substance, persistence,
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causation and reciprocity by means of dual-level explanations. e upshot of
this discussion then is that nihilism and transcendental idealism are the only two
tenable positions.
More precisely, the dialectic unfolds as follows:
(i) We begin with the common sense starting-point of transcendental realism.
In particular, we believe that there are substances that persist through time
and stand in causal relations to each other. Substance, persistence and cau-
sation are all understood in a metaphysically weighty sense. at is, we
appeal to a broadly Aristotelian notion of substance as an underlying sub-
stratum in which properties inhere, the endurantist’s account of persistence
as being wholly present at diﬀerent times, as well as an understanding of
causality whereby the cause produces the eﬀect, making it the case that the
latter follows with necessity from the former.
(ii) As a result of various Humean critiques we realise that the common sense
picture has to be abandoned. Aristotelian substances, enduring objects and
causal eﬃcacy are all ruled out given the Humean denial of real connec-
tions. ese weighty metaphysical notions are shown to be incoherent and
accordingly have to be rejected.
(iii) Even though these metaphysical notions fall prey to the Humean criti-
cisms, we are not left with nihilism since the Humean provides various
reductionist substitutes that supposedly permit us to claim that there are
persisting objects that stand in causal relations. To do this, we simply have
to construe the metaphysical notions in a way that is signiﬁcantly less on-
tologically loaded. For example, persistence becomes perdurance instead
of endurance and causation is identiﬁed with counterfactual dependence
rather than with causal eﬃcacy.
(iv) eHumean substitutes are shown to be insuﬃcient by means of transcen-
dental arguments. In particular, it is shown that objective uniﬁed experi-
ence and unconditioned morality require substantial ontological structure
which the Humean cannot provide. Real unity, real persistence and real
causation are required, which implies that theHumean account is deﬁcient.
(v) e threat of nihilism then re-emerges. We want to be realists and accept
that there is objective uniﬁed experience and that we are unconditionally
bound by morality but do not seem to be able to do so since such a com-
mitment presupposes the metaphysical notions that have been ruled out
by the Humean critiques.
(vi) Transcendental idealism allows us to ward oﬀ nihilism by making it in-
telligible how there can be ontological structure. Its dual-level ontology
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permits us to accept that there are no real connections at the phenome-
nal level, while still making room for real unity, real persistence and real
causation. By means of scope-restrictions it enables us to reconcile what is
irreconcilable within the framework of the single-level ontologies of tran-
scendental realists. In this way we can be realists who can make room for
ontological structure and thus for experience and morality, without being
shown to be inconsistent by the denial of real connections in the way that
this happened to the common sense picture with which we began.
(vii) Hence, we can see that the only way to be a realist is to be a transcendental
idealist. We need to accept a dual-level ontology to acquire the relevant
explanatory resources to make intelligible the necessary presuppositions of
experience and morality.
(viii) Transcendental idealism is thereby shown to be the only viable alternative
to nihilism. Moreover, we can argue against nihilism by appealing to the
fact of experience and the fact of reason, which support the reality of expe-
rience and morality, respectively, and thereby support transcendental ide-
alism. As a result, we conclude that we should reject nihilism and instead
accept realism and consequently transcendental idealism.
.. e possibility of experience and morality
Experience is objective cognition of a uniﬁed world. is means that the world
must be uniﬁed and possess structure for experience to be possible. Phenomena
must stand in metaphysical relations that provide unity to the phenomenal realm.
e elements must be arranged so as to form a uniﬁed whole (nature). e non-
empirical properties corresponding to the dynamical categories, in particular the
categories of relation, must connect, order and unify the phenomenal elements
in order for experience to be possible.
While the world must be uniﬁed in this way, the elements of our experience,
that is, our representations, must be combined and synthesised in a way that
reﬂects the structure of the world. Our representations must be connected and
ordered to amount to a uniﬁed whole. is connectedness results from synthesis
that is guided by the categories since it is the categories that allow us to order our
representations and provide structure and form to them. e categories provide
unity to our representations and thereby allow us capture the ontological structure
of the phenomenal realm.
e phenomenal world consists of a spatio-temporal distribution of intensive
magnitudes. ese magnitudes must be uniﬁed and structured if experience is to
be possible. Ontological structuring consists in connecting, ordering and unify-
ing the real in space. Unity is provided by metaphysical relations that connect,
combine and order diﬀerent elements both synchronically and diachronically. In
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particular, the unity of experience requires there to be spatially and temporally
bounded entities that combine properties into objects, as well as necessary con-
nections that relate diﬀerent things existing at the same time as well as at diﬀer-
ent times. e elements of the phenomenal world must be uniﬁed by inherence,
causal and reciprocal relations. ese metaphysical relations at the phenomenal
level must, in turn, be grounded in the ontological structure of the noumenal
realm.
e inherence relation allows us to treat a plurality of features as a unity and
is thus a synchronic as well as diachronic uniﬁcation function. In this way we
can identify a (temporally as well as spatially) extended ﬁlled spatio-temporal
region as an object. Substances are thus responsible for synchronically and di-
achronically unifying features into objects. Causal and reciprocal relations, on
the contrary, allow us to treat diﬀerent features as connected by dependency re-
lations or as being mutually interdependent. ey are diachronic sub-ordination
and synchronic co-ordination functions that are responsible for the asymmetrical
and symmetrical ontological dependencies amongst property instances, ensuring
that they are combined into a uniﬁed whole.
More precisely, causation connects properties diachronically, by providing a
dependency-ordering. It provides unity to the property distributions at diﬀer-
ent times, connecting the qualitative distribution of properties at one time with
the distributions at other times. One property distribution becomes the cause
or ground of the subsequent distribution. In this way the diﬀerent property dis-
tributions are connected, which means that causation provides diachronic unity.
Reciprocity connects properties of diﬀerent objects synchronically, thereby pro-
viding synchronic unity. e diﬀerent aspects of a synchronic property distribu-
tion are interconnected and explicable in terms of each other. is ensure that
the distribution at any time constitutes a uniﬁed whole that does not possess dis-
connected and separate elements.
Hence, experience is only possible if the world is a uniﬁed whole. e world
must possess ontological structure that provides unity. is ontological structure
results from synchronic as well as diachronic uniﬁcation, dependency and inter-
dependency relations. ese metaphysical features are responsible for bundling
properties into objects, thereby providing synchronic and diachronic unity to the
bundles, as well as for connecting these uniﬁed bundles to each other synchroni-
cally by reciprocity and diachronically by causation, thereby ensuring that they all
belong to the same uniﬁed whole. Accordingly, we can see that substance, causa-
tion and reciprocity are necessary presuppositions of the possibility of experience
since they are responsible for structuring the world and providing unity to it.
We have seen that we require ontological structure if experience is to be pos-
sible. e ontological structure is needed for connecting the diﬀerent things that
happen at a time as well as at diﬀerent times, thereby providing synchronic and
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diachronic unity. We can strengthen this argument by showing that without on-
tological structure we would not have an objective spatio-temporal order at all.
ere would not be a uniﬁed spatio-temporal framework within which diﬀerent
events would be ordered. ere would thus not be any matters of fact about the
spatio-temporal relations amongst diﬀerent events. is means that for there to
be an objective temporal ordering, there must be ontological structure. is is
not just an epistemological claim about what the conditions that must be satisﬁed
for us to be able to identify or represent such an ordering, but is rather a claim
about the conditions of the very existence of such an ordering.
It was argued earlier that diﬀerent perspective-dependent spatio-temporal
frameworks are fragmented and do not stand in spatio-temporal relations to each
other. To get a uniﬁed perspective-independent spatio-temporal ordering there
must be ontological structure that connects the diﬀerent perspectives and imposes
an ordering on them. We need objective ontological structure to get objective
spatio-temporal structure. e ontological structure is ﬁxed by gen-identity rela-
tions as well as by synchronic and diachronic causal relations, and is accordingly
captured by the categories of substance, causality and reciprocity. ese ontolog-
ical relations are thus required for unifying diﬀerent spatio-temporal frameworks
into a single, uniﬁed, objective perspective-independent space-time. Without
them, we would have diﬀerent spatio-temporal frameworks that would not be
part of the same order and that could not be integrated into a uniﬁed and objec-
tive ordering.
is transcendental argument shows not only that we need substantive on-
tological structure. It also gives us details about what this structure must be like
if experience is to be possible. For instance, there must be universal causal de-
pendencies, such that any two events are connected by a chain of causal depen-
dencies. Otherwise, we end up with isolated systems that cannot be integrated
into a uniﬁed framework. More precisely, in order to have a uniﬁed ordering
that makes possible the unity of experience, it must be the case that every pair of
events <x,y> is such that either (i) x and y are reciprocally causally dependent,
or (ii) x and y are identical to or contemporaneous with events that stand in an
asymmetrical causal dependency relation.
e ontological structure required for grounding an objective spatio-temporal
order cannot be provided by Humeans since the Humean substitutes for sub-
stance, causation and reciprocity presuppose the very spatio-temporal ordering
that these metaphysical features have to ground. For example, causal relations
and laws of nature cannot simply be reduced to local matters of fact since the
supervenience base would have to include a spatio-temporal ordering and this
presupposes that we have independently given spatio-temporally ordered matters
of fact. However, no such independently ordered facts are given, which implies
that we have to be non-reductionists about laws and causation. Instead, what
is given are independently ontologically structured facts that ground the objec-
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tive spatio-temporal ordering. e ontological structure is prior to the spatio-
temporal structure, which means that we need independently causally ordered
facts.
us, we can see that the Humean project cannot even get oﬀ the ground
and that the Humean substitutes are insuﬃcient for making experience possible.
ese substitutes are not able to provide the requisite ontological structure and
presuppose precisely that which they are meant to ground. Ontological structure
cannot be reduced to local categorical matters of fact since such matters of fact
do not give rise to a uniﬁed and objective spatio-temporal ordering, leaving the
world fragmented and ontologically amorphous. is fragmentation and amor-
phousness, however, cannot be accepted, which implies that there is a need for
ontological structure. What is required to make experience possible is something
that provides structure to the matters of fact, something that uniﬁes and con-
nects them. Since the categorical matters of fact must be uniﬁed and structured,
it follows that ontological structure cannot be reduced to these matters of fact.
Humeanism thus does not suﬃce for objectivity and unity. For that ontological
structure is required, which can only be provided by the structure of the noume-
nal world.
Morality, understood along Kantian lines, amounts to a system of moral laws
that are derived from the categorical imperative and that are objectively binding.
Practical transcendental arguments are based on the fact that morality imposes re-
quirements upon us. e applicability of moral requirements has transcendental
conditions since such requirements only apply to an agent if that agent satisﬁes
certain conditions that can only be grounded in noumena. Practical transcenden-
tal arguments try to identify these necessary preconditions of the applicability of
moral requirements.
In particular, bindingness requires the possibility of compliance since ‘ought
implies can’. For it to be possible for an agent to comply with a moral require-
ment that agent must be able to act out of duty. is, in turn, requires that the
agent is transcendentally free and able to act on maxims. e agent must be an
uncaused cause, freely bringing about eﬀects in the world. Accordingly, we need
to make room for transcendental freedom and need to explain how an agent can
be eﬃcacious by acting on maxims. Moreover, it can be argued that the imposi-
tion of requirements brings with it the possibility of attributing responsibility to
agents. For this to be possible, the agent must be a uniﬁed subject who persists
through time. Only in this way can a subject be a locus of responsibility.
.. Supporting the antecedent
A transcendental argument only establishes that x is a necessary presupposition for
the possibility of y. It does not, however, show us that y is actual and consequently
does not show us that x obtains. In order to go from the conditional statement
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that is established by the transcendental arguments to an aﬃrmative claim about
the actual world, we need to close this gap and provide warrant for believing in
the actuality of the antecedent. In this way we can be warranted in inferring the
actually of the consequent.
Transcendental arguments cause problems for transcendental realists since
they are willing to accept the antecedent but are unable to explain the conse-
quent. ese arguments identify necessary connections between experience and
morality, on the one hand, and certain metaphysical features that are only intelli-
gible on the assumption of transcendental idealism, on the other hand. is then
establishes that one has to be a transcendental idealist, if one wants to accept the
actuality of experience and morality.
Nihilists and sceptics are not aﬀected by such arguments since they are willing
to reject the antecedent. In response to this manoeuvre, we have to provide some
support for accepting that experience and morality are actual. No proof can be
given that establishes the truth of the antecedent and no refutation of scepticism
or nihilism seems possible. Nonetheless, there are various supporting considera-
tions to which we can appeal. ese considerations allow us to ward oﬀ nihilism
as well as scepticism and thereby render the acceptance of experience andmorality
and hence a commitment to transcendental idealism more plausible.
To support the belief that we do have experience and not mere imagination
we can appeal to a broadly realist starting-point and simply treat experience as a
fact. We start with the fact of experience and explain its possibility, rather than
attempt to establish its actuality (cf. Ameriks: , Introduction). We appeal
to common sense and take it for granted that there is a reality independent of us
and that this reality is not an amorphous, inchoate, disconnected assemblage of
stuﬀ that lacks unity but is rather ontologically structured. We show how this
common sense realism is intelligible on the assumption of transcendental ideal-
ism, thereby countering any doubts about its coherence. While transcendental
realism is open to various criticisms, transcendental idealism allows us to capture
this common sense view and provide a broadly realist position the intelligibility
of which can be defended. In particular, we can make intelligible how experience
is possible by providing dual-level explanations of the presuppositions of experi-
ence. at is, we do not provide a refutation of the sceptical position. Instead,
we make the realist assumption that our sensory input is somehow determined by
objects that are independent of us and that sensation is not merely an arbitrary
play of the imagination.
Similarly, we cannot provide a refutation of the moral sceptic but can only
provide supporting considerations for believing that morality is objectively valid
I am not going to give any detailed account of how these considerations work and what their
precise epistemic status is. Rather, I will provide some indications of what kind of considerations
could support our belief in the actuality of morality and experience.
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and not a mere ﬁgment of the imagination. In particular, we can appeal to the
fact of reason, to our consciousness of the bindingness of moral requirements.
Moreover, we can show that we have to make certain presuppositions if action is
to be possible at all, that certain presuppositions are inescapable from a practical
standpoint.
More precisely, there are two facts of reason or two aspects of the fact of reason.
e ﬁrst aspect consists in our consciousness of the bindingness of the moral law.
is is a fact given to reason insofar as the commands of the moral law confront
us. From this bindingness we can infer our freedom. Given that we ought to act
in certain ways and given that it is only possible for us to act in these ways if we
are free, it follows that we are free. e second aspect concerns our consciousness
of the moral motive. is is a fact that is produced by reason. We are aware of a
feeling of respect and this is a feeling that could only come from reason. It is an
a priori feeling resulting from the activity of a free rational will.
Additionally, practical reason can only act under the assumption of freedom.
Freedom must be presupposed for deliberation and agency to be possible. is
obviously does not establish that we are free but only that we have to regard
ourselves as being free. Accordingly, we have to reject nihilism and scepticism
from a practical point of view and instead accept transcendental idealism, which
allows us to consider ourselves as free agents who are bound by the moral law.
.. Refuting idealism and scepticism
In addition to appealing to the ‘fact of experience’ and the ‘fact of reason’, we can
also show that the most attractive forms of idealism and scepticism are untenable,
thereby making the acceptance of anti-realist positions more burdensome and
shifting the dialectical situation in favour of realism and hence transcendental
idealism.
e perspectival and fragmentary nature of appearances implies that the ap-
pearances of which a particular subject is aware fail to be temporally ordered and
do not stand in temporal relations to each other. Not only is it the case that they
are not temporally ordered, it is also the case that we lack the requisite transcen-
dental structure to impose an ordering on them if we conﬁne ourselves solely to
these appearances and their grounds. To connect them and impose an ordering
on them, we need to integrate them into a larger nexus and look not only at their
grounds but also at the relations that connect these grounds to other things.
We can do this by considering the noumenal representations that ground a
subject’s appearances not as they appear to inner sense, but as they appear to outer
sense, namely as brain states. Once we focus on the physical correlates, we can
arrive at a temporal ordering of appearances since these correlates are integrated
into the law-governed external world. ey are embedded in a larger system that
It should be noted that we are concerned with the correlates of the mental states, not with the
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possesses the right kind of structure since the elements of this system stand in the
relevant ontological relations that give rise to a spatio-temporal ordering. Since
the physical correlates of appearances are embedded in physical space-time, we
can use the temporal order of the physical counterparts of these appearances to
impose an ordering on the appearances of a subject. is means that an inner
event x can only be said to be earlier than an inner event y if the intersubjective
correlates of x and y can be said to stand in this temporal relation, which in
turn is the case only if the correlates of x and y stand in a chain of asymmetrical
causal dependency relations or are contemporaneous with events that stand in
such relations.
us, the requisite dependency ordering obtains amongst the intersubjective
phenomena and not amongst the merely subjective appearances. is means that
the ordering of appearances is parasitical on the ordering of phenomena and that
appearances can only be ordered indirectly by ordering their phenomenal corre-
lates. Accordingly, in order for appearances to be temporally ordered, they must
be integrated into a larger nexus of events that stand in the right kinds of on-
tological relations. In particular, they must be integrated into the law-governed
physical world. is can be done by focusing on the physical correlates of the
appearances, namely the brain states that result when the noumenal mental states
are not inwardly intuited by means of rexﬂexive awareness, but are outwardly in-
tuited. Hence, for my mental states to be temporally ordered, there must exist
an external world that has the right kind of ontological structure and into which
the physical correlates of my mental states are integrated. Otherwise, they will be
fragmented and will not stand in any temporal relations to each other.
A corollary of this argument is that any objective time-determination that
tracks the relations giving rise to the temporal order has to proceed via identify-
ing the physical counterparts of the mental states as well as identifying the causal
laws that govern the physical world. Once the laws have been speciﬁed, they
can be used to identify the objective ordering amongst the brain states, which
then allows us to order the mental states accordingly. Hence, it is the functional
relationships established by science, as well as the causal laws that these relation-
ships track, that are to be appealed to in objectively determining any temporal
ordering. us, whilst subjective time-determination proceeds via the contents
of representations, objective time-determination has to proceed via laws. It is
the physical laws that provide criteria of objectivity, that ground temporal rela-
tions and determine which ordering is correct. is means that any objective
time-determination has to go via the law-governed external world.
ose who deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world will
correlates of the contents of these states. e physical correlates are thus determined by sameness
of ground, rather than by sameness of source of manifold of intuition.
‘Inner’ is here taken in the transcendental rather than the empirical sense and accordingly
includes all subjective events, i.e. all appearances rather than only all inner appearances.
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have to deny or doubt that the diﬀerent episodes of a subject’s mental life are tem-
porally ordered. Since the claim that the diﬀerent episodes of a subject’s mental
life do stand in temporal relations is not indubitable, it follows that this argument
does not constitute a refutation of all forms of scepticism and idealism, but only
a refutation of those sceptics and idealists who, whilst doubting or denying the
existence of a law-governed external world, nonetheless believe that their repre-
sentations are temporally ordered. is implies that, even though this argument
does not establish the truth of realism beyond doubt, it nevertheless signiﬁcantly
increases the costs of accepting scepticism and idealism and thereby strengthens
the dialectical position of realism.
It should be noted that we might be able to get some temporal relations by restricting our
attention to inner states since their grounds may well stand in dependency relations to each other.
Yet, since brain states do not form a closed causal system, it follows that there are not enough
dependency relations amongst inner states for there to be a complete ordering and that we must
consequently embed them into a larger set of law-governed events. Moreover, to the extent to
which we are concerned not only with the existence of temporal relations but also with objective
time-determination, we need to appeal to laws. Since laws are holistic and can only be identiﬁed
or rather approximated by considering the physical system as a whole, the objective determination
of temporal relations requires us to extend our attention to the whole physical system.
Additionally, idealists who do not want to be solipsists, but want to accept that there are
several subjects that stand in temporal relations to each other, will be refuted since temporal
relations amongst diﬀerent subjects can only be established via the shared intersubjective physical
realm.

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Conclusion
According to the theory developed in this dissertation, there exist aspatial and
atemporal noumena. ese noumena give rise to appearances insofar as noume-
nal selves are aﬀected and thereby receive a manifold of intuition that is then pro-
cessed in accordance with the forms of intuition to yield noumenal mental states
with translated content. By means of apperception the subject can become re-
ﬂexively aware of the contents of its own representations whereby these contents
are subjected to the form of inner sense, namely time. As a result, the subject
is immediately aware in a temporalised manner of the intentional objects of its
noumenal representations, whereby these intentional objects can be both inner
and outer appearances depending on whether the original manifold was provided
by inner intuition or outer intuition.
e intentionalia of which we are aware are subjective emergent inexistents
that are immanent to the act of awareness. ey are subjective objects that only
exist for the subject that is aware of them and that are dependent for their existence
on the act of awareness that gives rise to them. ese intentional objects do not
possess any ontological structure, which means that the world of appearances is
ontologically amorphous and consists only of a spatio-temporal distribution of
qualitative features, namely of phenomenological intensive magnitudes. We can
carve up this manifold of appearances in thought by drawing boundaries and
treating bundles of properties as possessing unity. To do this we have to appeal
to the dynamical categories since these a priori concepts allow us to represent
non-empirical properties and cognise ontological structure.
While appearances are subjective objects, phenomena are intersubjective ob-
jects. ey are logical complexes that have as their elements translated noumenal
information. is noumenal information encapsulates noumenal properties and
constitutes the matter of the manifold of intuition. is matter is translated into
the frameworks provided by the forms of intuition to yield phenomena since these
are nothing other than matter-in-form. Phenomena thus arise through a con-
structive process whereby the information provided by noumena is transformed
to yield logical constructs. at is, we have a noumenal informational manifold
that is processed in accordance with the forms of intuition, whereby the process-
ing consists of imposition, selection and translation functions. e manifold is
ﬁltered insofar as only that information which is amenable to translation into the
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imposed frameworks is selected. is selected manifold is then translated into
spatio-temporal frameworks provided by the forms of intuition.
is constructive process yields a spatio-temporal distribution of qualitative
features, which means that the phenomenal world consists of a distribution of
physical intensive magnitudes, whereby these physical magnitudes are the inter-
subjective correlates of the phenomenological magnitudes of appearances. While
we can gain knowledge of the structure of the phenomenal world, since the
spatio-temporal structure of perspective-dependent phenomena corresponds to
that of appearances thereby allowing for non-trivial knowledge of concrete physi-
cal structure, we cannot know the intrinsic natures of these intensive magnitudes.
ough this way of constructing phenomena initially only provides perspective-
dependent spatio-temporal structures, these fragmented perspectives can be con-
nected and uniﬁed to form a perspective-independent manifold since the tran-
scendental structure of the world imposes an ordering on the perspectives.
e phenomenal and noumenal realms are thus connected insofar as they en-
capsulate the same information, though they diﬀer with respect to the form in
which this information is to be found. While noumena embody the matter in
its pure form, phenomena are made of translated matter since they are matter-
in-form. Given that phenomena have translated noumenal information as their
matter it follows that they are grounded in noumena, that they depend on and are
determined by noumena. is grounding relation can be captured by a superve-
nience relation. In particular, we can appeal to a co-ordinated multiple-domain
supervenience relation to model the relation between noumena and phenomena,
whereby the process of intuition provides the co-ordination relation.
Phenomenal properties supervene on transcendental properties relative to
co-ordination relation R just in case for any collections of phenomenal
objects x. . . xn and y. . . yn that have images under R and any worlds w
and w*, if Rjx. . . xn in w is indiscernible with respect to transcendental
properties from Rjy. . . yn in w*, then x. . . xn in w is indiscernible with
respect to phenomenal properties from y. . . yn in w*.
Even though the phenomenal world is ontologically amorphous when it is
considered on its own, we can attribute non-empirical features to phenomena
when these are considered in relation to their noumenal grounds. Certain logi-
cal complexes are privileged in virtue of being made up of elements that have a
uniﬁed noumenal ground. In this way we can get uniﬁed and bounded phenom-
enal objects and can identify boundaries in the phenomenal world to which our
carvings of the manifold of appearances should correspond.
Such attributions of non-empirical features are cases of dual-level explana-
tions. is kind of explanation is possible since the grounding relation connects
the two levels in such a way that we can explain features at the phenomenal level in
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terms of features at the noumenal level that ground them. ese explanations al-
low us to make certain metaphysical features, such as unity, persistence, causation
and mind-body interaction, intelligible. ough we are not able to identify how
the world is actually structured since we are ignorant of the noumenal grounds,
we can give accounts of how certain features at the phenomenal level could result
from certain noumenal features. e dual-level explanations therefore provide a
vindication of metaphysics insofar as they show how it is possible for the world
to be ontologically structured.
Once the intelligibility of these metaphysical features has been established, it
is possible to appeal to theoretical and practical transcendental arguments in order
to connect them to morality and experience. is is done by showing that meta-
physical structure, provided by substance, causation and reciprocity, is necessary
for the possibility of experience since this structure makes possible the unity of
experience, and that these metaphysical features are required for the possibility of
morality since there must be uniﬁed agents that can persist through time and be
causally eﬃcacious by acting on their maxims.
More generally, we have seen that transcendental idealism is indispensable
for science and metaphysics. On the one hand, it provides the subject matters of
science and metaphysics since the forms of intuition provide empirical structure,
while the noumenal grounds provide ontological structure. Empirical structure
is the spatio-temporal structure with which science is concerned, while ontologi-
cal structure is the non-empirical structure with which metaphysics is concerned.
On the other hand, it allows us to cognise empirical and ontological structure
by giving us the fundamental mathematical and dynamical pure concepts enu-
merated in the table of categories, making scientiﬁc and metaphysical cognition
possible. Without the mathematical categories, science would not be possible
since the categories of quantity and quality are required for cognising extensive
and intensive magnitudes and for mathematising nature. Without the dynamical
categories, metaphysics would not be possible since the categories of relation and
modality are required for cognising non-empirical features and for ontologically
structuring nature.
is situation then implies that we have two options since we can either
be transcendental idealists who can accept the actuality of experience as well as
morality and can be realists about science, metaphysics and ethics, or we can be
nihilists or sceptics. Transcendental realism is ruled out as an option since it at-
tempts to accept experience and morality but is unable to make the necessary
presuppositions thereof intelligible since it lacks the explanatory resources to give
dual-level explanations of these presuppositions. As a result, we can see that if
one wants to be a realist one has to be a transcendental idealist.
To ward oﬀ nihilism and scepticism, we have to provide considerations in
favour of the actuality of experience and morality. By appealing to a broadly re-
alist starting-point as well as to considerations stemming from practical reason,
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we can provide support for believing that the antecedents of our transcenden-
tal arguments are met. is then provides warrant for believing in transcendental
idealism and in the actuality of experience andmorality, as well as for understand-
ing ourselves as causally eﬃcacious agents who persist through time. Moreover,
by appealing to considerations regarding the conditions that must be satisﬁed for
there to be a temporal ordering of mental states as well as the conditions required
for objective time-determination, we can refute the more attractive versions of
scepticism and idealism, thereby making the acceptance of anti-realist positions
more burdensome, shifting the dialectical position in favour of transcendental
idealism.
If the view that space and time are forms of intuition is ﬂatly rejected, then the
proposed theory should also be dismissed. ose willing to repudiate this system
should, however, be aware of the implications that follow from this rejection. In
particular, they will not be able to account for ontological structure and will not
be able to defend realism about science, metaphysics and ethics. Realism is only
possible on the assumption of transcendental idealism, which implies that the de-
nial of transcendental idealism leaves us only with scepticism and nihilism. e
world will be desolate, dismal and bleak and there will be no hope for morality.
However, once this system is accepted we are able to make room for ontological
structure, explain the possibility of non-trivial scientiﬁc knowledge, provide a vin-
dication of metaphysics and secure the presuppositions of ethics. Transcendental
idealism allows us to consider ourselves as uniﬁed subjects, as agents that persist
through time, are causally eﬃcacious and can freely act on maxims. It is for this
reason that transcendental idealism should be accepted and that we should hold
that the world has a transcendental structure.

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